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I. INTRODUCTION
The threat of terrorist attacks by al Qaeda and other transnational terrorist
organizations is a constant topic of public discourse in the United States. Despite
its prominence, the nature of that threat is notoriously difficult to define. On the
one hand, terrorists might be compared to other kinds of organized, dangerous
criminals who should be prosecuted and punished using the federal criminal law.
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On the other hand, terrorists might be compared to enemy soldiers engaged in
warfare against the United States. There are problems with either approach,
however, because the threat posed by al Qaeda and other transnational terrorist
organizations is substantially different from both paradigmatic criminal activity
and paradigmatic military conflict. Accordingly, it is far from clear whether
alleged terrorists should be treated as criminal defendants or military enemies.
The definitional problem is made even more complicated by the reality that
the terrorist threat has many components. The organization itself, such as al Qaeda,
is a danger. So too are the leaders, commanders, and strategists who plan and
manage plots to carry out terrorist attacks, and the operatives and agents who
commit or try to commit them.
Many other individuals play roles in terrorist activity, as well. Some
individuals may assist in the preparations for an attack by providing weapons,
bombs, information, or surveillance. Other individuals might provide safe houses,
transportation, or financing to those involved in a planned attack, but have no
direct role in the actual anticipated violence. Finally, some individuals may support
the overall objectives of the terrorist group with money or other general resources,
yet have no personal involvement in, or even knowledge of, any particular plan to
carry out specific terrorist acts.
Are all of these individuals "terrorists" because of their involvement, at some
level, in the activities of al Qaeda or another transnational terrorist organization?
Are only some of them "terrorists" and others not, and potentially subject to
differential treatment based on their level of participation? Most importantly,
which of these individuals are properly deemed military enemies subject to
military authority, including identification as targets of military force, detention as
military prisoners, and prosecution in military proceedings? Likewise, which of
these individuals must be deemed criminal defendants subject to prosecution and
punishment under criminal law in civilian courts?
The U.S. federal criminal law and the international laws of war provide
alternative models for answering these difficult questions. The criminal model
presents one framework for defining the threat of terrorism, primarily focused on
the prosecution and punishment of individuals for their alleged terrorist activities.
The military model offers another framework, emphasizing the dangers posed by
an organized armed force engaged in planning and carrying out acts of war. Each
model provides options for pursuing the dual objectives of preventing terrorist
attacks from occurring and punishing individuals involved terrorism, whether one
plans or commits acts of terrorism or supports the operations of terrorist
organizations. Yet in their currently existing forms, neither model is adequate to
fully address the nature of the threat posed by al Qaeda and other transnational
terrorist organizations.
The criminal and military models each provide insights into the nature of the
terrorist threat, identifying particular aspects of the problem that most closely
resemble their respective paradigms. Each model also has shortcomings in defining
the threat. Both models struggle to balance the relative importance of personal
conduct and group affiliation, assessing the dangerousness and culpability of
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individual terrorists and the broader organizations of which they are a part. Thus,
neither model, standing alone, adequately addresses all aspects of the problem.
The solution is to combine the criminal and military models into an integrated
model for defining the threat of al Qaeda and other transnational terrorist
organizations. This new model identifies which individuals with involvement in or
connections to terrorists should be treated as criminal defendants and which
individuals should be deemed military enemies subject to military authority. In
doing so, this integrated model pursues the dual objectives of prevention and
punishment by using the insights of the criminal and military models to
compensate for their respective shortcomings. It balances the importance of
personal conduct and group affiliation by reserving the most substantial
consequences for activities dependent on direct, personal involvement. An
integrated model also can fully account for the particular dangers that exist because
al Qaeda is a form of organized armed force, and the substantial implications that
fact holds for the nature of the terrorist threat. This integrated model concludes that
most individuals involved in terrorism should be treated as criminal defendants,
and that only the most dangerous direct participants should be deemed military
enemies. Through this analysis, the integrated model resolves the problems with
the existing criminal and military models and fully addresses the threat posed by al
Qaeda and other transnational terrorist organizations.
II. LIABILITY UNDER U.S. FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW
One model for addressing the terrorist threat is prosecution under U.S. federal
criminal law. The applicable offenses and forms of liability create an extensive
array of available charges against individuals involved to widely varying extents in
terrorist activities. Federal criminal law punishes persons who directly participate
in carrying out acts of terrorist violence, of course, but it reaches far deeper into
terrorist networks than that. It also punishes those who plan, organize, or direct
specific terrorist operations and those who provide assistance and resources for
particular terrorist plots. In addition, some individuals have involvement with or
connections to al Qaeda or another transnational terrorist organization without
participating in, or even being aware of, any specific scheme to carry out a
particular act of terrorism. In many circumstances, federal criminal law punishes
those forms of assistance and support as well. Thus, even those who render
relatively minor assistance to terrorists and terrorist organizations face substantial
penalties.1
1 In certain situations, the application of U.S. federal criminal authority to accused
terrorists would raise controversial questions of extraterritoriality. In most cases, however,
jurisdiction is available. See generally United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 85-111 (2d
Cir. 2003) (discussing various forms of extraterritorial jurisdiction and rejecting
defendant's jurisdictional challenge). For example, no extraterritorial jurisdiction is needed




Federal criminal law provides four forms of liability for participation in
terrorism, encompassing varying degrees of involvement in terrorist plots and
organizations. Most obviously, charges may be filed against individuals who
personally took part in a completed act of terrorism. Those charges, however, may
not consist entirely, or even partly, of crimes specifically designed for punishing
terrorism. Instead, generally applicable offenses, which happen to fit the facts,
often are charged in terrorism cases. Additionally, inchoate offenses may be filed
in connection with personal involvement in a foiled, unsuccessful, or planned, but
not yet implemented, terrorist plot.
Even more broadly, liability extends far beyond direct personal participation
in terrorist violence. Under federal conspiracy law, a member of a conspiratorial
agreement will be convicted of the crimes committed by other conspirators. This
liability extends to crimes in which he had no personal involvement, and even
offenses he did not specifically conspire to commit.
Finally, individuals who do not participate in violent crimes or conspiracies
may be charged with crimes of facilitating terrorism if they render support to the
general objectives of terrorist organizations. Unlike the other forms of liability,
however, such charges do not impose liability for the crimes directly related to the
actual or contemplated terrorist acts. Rather, under the "material support" offenses,
persons who knowingly render aid toward terrorist objectives are guilty of a
separate, but still serious, felony.
1. Direct Liability (Personal Participation)
The first form of liability under U.S. federal criminal law includes charges
arising from direct personal participation in completed crimes of terrorist activity.
For example, the men who carried out the first World Trade Center attack in 1993
contemplated terrorist attack was to (or actually did) take place in the United States or in a
foreign country is irrelevant. See, e.g., United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 107-08 (2d
Cir. 1998) (involving a conspiracy abroad to commit the 1993 World Trade Center
bombing in the U.S.); United States v. Sattar, 314 F. Supp. 2d 279, 285-93 (S.D.N.Y.
2004) (involving a conspiracy in the U.S. to commit terrorist attacks abroad, including an
attack in Luxor, Egypt). Extraterritorial jurisdiction also is readily available for crimes
committed abroad when the target (or victim) of the attack is the United States or its
government. See, e.g., Yousef 327 F.3d at 80-85 (involving a foiled 1995 al Qaeda plot to
bomb U.S. airliners while in flight over the Pacific Ocean); United States v. Bin Laden, 92
F. Supp. 2d 225, 227-31 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (involving 1998 al Qaeda bombings of two U.S.
embassies in Africa). And it is available for crimes committed abroad when the defendant
is a U.S. citizen. See, e.g., First Superseding Indictment, United States v. Gadahn, Criminal
No. 05-254(A) (C.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov
/opa/documents/adam indictment.pdf [hereinafter Gadahn Indictment] (indicting fugitive
U.S. citizen for treason and material support for terrorism based on conduct abroad).
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were convicted of the bombing.2 Individuals involved in the bombings of two U.S.
embassies in Africa in 1998 also were charged criminally and convicted.3 And a
U.S. citizen is currently under indictment for treason for his actions in inciting
terrorist violence against the United States.
4
Some charges of this type are specifically designed for prosecuting terrorists.
One offense applies to the killing of a U.S. national when it "was intended to
coerce, intimidate, or retaliate against a government or a civilian population.
5
Another offense punishes the use of weapons of mass destruction.6 A third offense
in the same chapter is entitled "acts of terrorism transcending national
boundaries."7 Aircraft piracy is another offense often viewed as a terrorism crime.8
Interestingly, many charges filed against accused terrorists involve the
application of "ordinary" crimes to terrorist conduct, rather than terrorism-specific
offenses. Terrorist bombings, for example, have been prosecuted under an offense
proscribing destruction, by fire or explosive, of property of the United States
Government and property used in interstate commerce. 9 On its face that crime is
unrelated to terrorism, and in fact often is prosecuted in contexts that have nothing
to do with terrorism, such as ordinary arson.10 Similarly, a criminal statute
sometimes used to prosecute plots to carry out terrorist attacks overseas initially
was enacted to deal with a different foreign-relations problem entirely: mercenaries
and soldiers of fortune.11 And perhaps most simply of all, killings committed by
2 See Yousef 327 F.3d at 135-37; Salameh, 152 F.3d at 107-08.
3 See Bin Laden, 92 F. Supp. 2d at 227-31.
4 See Gadahn Indictment, supra note 1, at 2-4.
5 18 U.S.C. § 2332 (2006); see Yousef 327 F.3d at 135-37 (1993 World Trade Center
bombing).
6 See 18 U.S.C. § 2332a; see Bin Laden, 92 F. Supp. 2d at 228 n.2 (truck bombs).
7 18 U.S.C. § 2332b; see Superseding Indictment at 6-7, United States v. Moussaoui,
Criminal No. 01-455-A (E.D. Va. July 16, 2002), available at http://capitaldefenseweekly.
com/library/moussaoui/l_01-cr -00455/ docs/ 66826/0.pdf [hereinafter Moussaoui
Indictment].
8 See 49 U.S.C. § 46502; Moussaoui Indictment, supra note 7, at 25.
9 See 18 U.S.C. § 844(f), (i); see, e.g., United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 152-53
(2d Cir. 1998) (involving the 1993 World Trade Center bombing); United States v. Bin
Laden, 92 F. Supp. 2d 225, 228 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (involving the 1998 U.S. embassy
bombings); see also United States v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166, 1176 (10th Cir. 1998)
(affirming the defendant's conviction for blowing up a federal building); United States v.
Nettles, 400 F. Supp. 2d 1084, 1086 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (affirming the defendant's conviction
for "attempting to damage and destroy" a federal building).
10 See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 850-51 (2000) (holding "that an
owner-occupied residence not used for any commercial purpose does not qualify as
property 'used in' commerce or commerce-affecting activity" for purposes of the statute).
1 See 18 U.S.C. § 956 (conspiracy to kill, kidnap, maim, or injure persons or damage
property in a foreign country); Robert M. Chesney, Beyond Conspiracy? Anticipatory
Prosecution and the Challenge of Unaffiliated Terrorism, 80 S. CAL. L. REv. 425, 459
(2007) (explaining that § 956 "originally was intended to protect the federal government's
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terrorists may be prosecuted under the generally applicable federal murder
statutes. 
12
Regardless of the exact offenses charged in any given case, however, the fact
remains that federal criminal law provides a wide variety of crimes that can be
used to prosecute and convict individuals who directly participate in the execution
of a terrorist attack.
2. Inchoate Offense Liability (Conspiracy & Attempt)
Ideally, of course, terrorists will be apprehended before their plots can be
carried out so that charges for a completed act of terrorism are not possible. In
these circumstances, inchoate offense theories must be used to bring charges. In
some situations, the defendant can be charged with attempting the relevant crimes.
In other situations, conspiracy law will be used.
Oddly, the Federal Criminal Code lacks a generally applicable provision that
would make the attempt to commit a federal offense itself a federal offense.
13
Nevertheless, the text of some federal crimes includes attempted violations within
the definition of the offense. 14 Many of the offenses described above contain such
language.
15
Even when attempt liability is provided for in the definition of an offense, its
usefulness in prosecuting alleged terrorists is constrained by the narrowness of
attempt doctrine in the federal courts. Because the Federal Criminal Code does not
provide a definition of attempt liability, the lower federal courts have adopted one
as a matter of federal common law. Although the precise formulation varies across
opinions and the circuits, the courts require that the defendant have made such
substantial progress toward the completion of the offense that, absent frustration of
the defendant's objective, the offense would have been committed. 16 Under this
control over foreign affairs by regulating the private projection of force outside the United
States").
12 See 18 U.S.C. § 1111 (murder within maritime or territorial jurisdiction of the
United States); id. § 1114 (murder of federal officer or employee in performance of official
duties); see, e.g., Bin Laden, 92 F. Supp. 2d at 228 n.2 (1998 U.S. embassy bombings).
13 Cf MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(1)-(2) (1985) (proscribing attempted commission
of Code offenses).
14 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1951 ("Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or
affects commerce.., by robbery or extortion or attempts or conspires so to do .... "). As a
consequence of such language, a conviction for attempting the crime has the same
applicable punishment range as a conviction for the completed offense.
15 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 844(f), (i) (punishing attempted damage of personal or real
property); id § 2332(b) (punishing attempted homicide); id. § 2332a (punishing attempted
use of weapons of mass destruction).
16 See, e.g., United States v. Nelson, 66 F.3d 1036, 1044 (9th Cir. 1995) ("Nor were
[defendant's actions] a step toward the commission of the crime so substantial that without
an intervening act the crime would have occurred."); United States v. Buffmgton, 815 F.2d
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stringent standard, situations that colloquially would be described as being "caught
red-handed" may be inadequate to obtain a conviction for attempting the
applicable crime. 17 For this reason, attempt liability for inchoate offenses has
limited effectiveness in prosecuting and punishing incipient acts of terrorism.
Unlike attempt, the Federal Criminal Code does contain a generally applicable
conspiracy provision, which proscribes conspiracy to commit a federal offense.
18
That section, however, carries a maximum penalty of only five years'
imprisonment. 19 Consequently, some federal offenses include conspiring to
commit the crime as an independent means of violating the same statutory
offense.20 Such a provision ensures that a person convicted of conspiring to
commit the offense faces the same punishment range as a person who actually
commits it, rather than the truncated punishment otherwise available under the
default conspiracy provision.
21
In addition, conspiracy law allows for conviction for an inchoate offense far
earlier in the course of conduct than attempt liability. Technically speaking, the
inchoate offense of conspiracy is completed once the members have concluded the
agreement to commit the applicable underlying crime and one member of the
conspiracy has engaged in some overt act pursuant to that agreement.22 Some
terrorism cases involve prosecutions brought when the conspiracy is still in its very
preliminary stages, such as when the plotters have reached agreement on a basic
terrorist objective but have done little actual planning or preparation toward its
1292, 1303 (9th Cir. 1987) ("Standing alone, their conduct did not constitute that requisite
'appreciable fragment' of a bank robbery, nor a step toward commission of the crime of
such substantiality that, unless frustrated, the crime would have occurred."). These
formulations are based on the language of Model Penal Code. See MODEL PENAL CODE §
5.01(1)-(2); see also United States v. Rahman, 189 F.3d 88, 128-29 (2d Cir. 1999)
(quoting and applying the Model Penal Code's attempt standard).
17 See, e.g., Nelson, 66 F.3d at 1042-44; United States v. Harper, 33 F.3d 1143 (9th
Cir. 1994); United States v. Still, 850 F.2d 607, 610 (9th Cir. 1988); Buffington, 815 F.2d
at 1303. In Harper, for example, the court held that the defendants' actions in creating a
"bill trap" at an ATM machine to lure a repair technician to the site, which would enable
them to steal the cash inside when the technician opened the ATM for servicing, was not a
step substantial enough to constitute an attempt; accordingly, the court reversed the
convictions for attempted bank robbery. See 33 F.3d at 1145, 1147-48.
18 See 18 U.S.C. § 371.
19 See id.
20 See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
21 Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (twenty years), with id. § 371 (five years); see also id. §
1117 (providing that conspiracy to commit murder is punishable by any term of years, or
life).
22 See, e.g., JOSEPH F. MCSORLEY, A PORTABLE GUIDE TO FEDERAL CONSPIRACY
LAW 6-28 (1996) (discussing elements of conspiracy formation). Some federal conspiracy
statutes do not require an overt act, but most do. See id. at 24-28. The overt act need not
itself be criminal; it can be a tangential or even trivial act, so long as it relates to the
objectives of the agreement. See id. (citing cases).
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commission. The recent "Fort Dix" plot in New Jersey appears to be such a case.23
Other cases are brought when significantly more progress toward fulfillment of the
conspiracy has been made and more corroborating evidence has been obtained.24
Inchoate offense liability, under conspiracy law in particular, provides a
powerful tool for prosecuting, convicting, and punishing individuals whose
objective is the commission of terrorist acts but whose plans are foiled before they
can succeed.
3. Vicarious Liability (Conspiracy & Complicity)
The liability doctrines of federal criminal law reach much further than
personal participation in conduct directly related to carrying out a completed or
planned act of terrorism, or even personal participation in an early-stage
conspiracy intended to culminate in the commission of an offense. Instead,
doctrines of vicarious liability make the defendant responsible for the conduct of
other individuals, including instances when the defendant played a small, minimal,
or even no role at all in that conduct. This liability can extend, in its greatest scope,
to crimes the defendant did not know would be committed or to acts carried out by
persons she has never met. Yet the defendant is equally guilty for those crimes as
though she had committed them herself.
Federal conspiracy law provides the usual basis for imposing vicarious
liability. The existence of a conspiratorial agreement requires specific intent on the
part of its members to cooperate in a course of conduct that constitutes the
planning and commission of federal offenses.25 Each member of the conspiracy
then becomes guilty not only of the charge of conspiracy itself, but also of those
substantive "object"26 offenses committed by any member of the group pursuant to
the agreement. 27 Thus, even if a particular member of the conspiracy has only a
23 See Complaint at 4-7, United States v. Eljvir Duka, Magistrate No. 07-M-2047
(D.N.J. May 7, 2007), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/nj/press/files /pdffiles/
ELJVIRDUKAcmplt.pdf (charging defendants with conspiracy to commit murder of
federal officers and employees in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1117, as well as with a
generic count of unlawful firearm possession by an illegal alien under 18 U.S.C. §
922(g)(5)); see also Chesney, supra note 11, at 487-92 (describing the prosecution of
Hamid Hayat). Ultimately, the defendants were convicted of conspiracy. See Paul von
Zeilbauer, 5 Men Are Convicted in Plot on Fort Dix, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 22, 2008, at A3.
24 See, e.g., United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d at 80-85 (2d Cir. 2003) (involving a
foiled 1995 airliner bombing plot); Moussaoui Indictment, supra note 7, at 1-24
(describing extensive preparations to carry out airline hijacking attack similar to 9/11).
25 See MCSORLEY, supra note 22, at 6-24. The conspirators need only conspire to
engage in the factual conduct (and corresponding mens rea) constituting the offenses; their
knowledge or beliefs about the legal definitions of those offenses is irrelevant. See id. at
184-85.
26 See id at 7 (defining "object" of conspiracy).
27 See id at 109-10.
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tangential role in the commission of one of the object offenses, he is convicted of
that offense no differently than the conspirators who personally carried it out.
28
Moreover, under the Pinkerton doctrine, additional vicarious liability may
apply to offenses that the defendant never actually conspired to commit. Under
Pinkerton, members of the conspiracy are liable not only for the object offenses
specifically intended by the agreement, but also for any reasonably foreseeable
additional substantive crimes committed in furtherance of the conspiracy. 29 The
Pinkerton doctrine is an especially powerful tool against violent crime conspiracies
because additional violence by conspirators, above and beyond the specific acts of
violence contemplated in the agreement, often will be deemed reasonably
foreseeable.3 °
The prosecution of Zacarias Moussaoui demonstrates the breadth of federal
conspiracy law. All six counts filed against Moussaoui were conspiracy charges,
including terrorism transcending national boundaries, aircraft piracy, murder of
federal officers and employees, and destruction of property.31 Much of the
indictment recites a pattern of behavior by Moussaoui parallel to that of the
September 11 th hijackers, including undertaking flight training and
communicating with the same al Qaeda leaders abroad.32 Accordingly, the
Government argued that Moussaoui was a member of a terrorist conspiracy that
included the September l1th hijackers and al Qaeda leaders.33 Although early
media accounts of his case often referred to him as the so-called "twentieth
hijacker,, 34 Moussaoui repeatedly denied he was directly involved in the
September 11 th plot. He ultimately pled guilty to the charges, 35 however, and the
28 See id. at 112-14.
29 See id at 109-15. The doctrine's name comes from Pinkerton v. United States, 328
U.S. 640, 647 (1946).
30 See, e.g., MCSORLEY, supra note 22, at 114 (citing cases in which Pinkerton was
applied to extend liability for violent crimes). The additional violence must also be in
furtherance of the objectives of the conspiracy, but this, likewise, usually is not difficult to
prove. See id
31 See Moussaoui Indictment, supra note 7, at 2-31 (charging, inter alia, violations of
18 U.S.C. §§ 2332b, 46502, 1114, 1117, and 844(f), (i)). The remaining two counts were
conspiracy to destroy aircraft, 18 U.S.C. §§ 32, 34, and conspiracy to use a weapon of mass
destruction, § 2332a. See Moussaoui Indictment, supra note 7, at 2-31.
32 See Moussaoui Indictment, supra note 7, at 5-7, 10-24.
33 See id. at 6-7, 25-29.
34 See, e.g., Frank Dunham, Constitutionalism and the War on Terror: Hamdi Meets
Moussaoui in the War on Terror, 53 DRAKE L. REV. 839, 847 (2005) (referring to
Moussaoui's alleged status as "the twentieth hijacker"); Tung Yin, Procedural Due
Process to Determine "Enemy Combatant" Status in the War on Terrorism, 73 TENN. L.
REV. 351, 412-13 (2006).
" See Criminal Docket, United States v. Moussaoui, No. 1:01-cr-00455 (E.D. Va.
Apr. 22, 2005) ("PLEA entered by Zacarias Moussaoui. Court accepts plea by Zacarias





Government sought the death penalty. At sentencing, the Government did not
prove that Moussaoui had personally participated in the planning or commission of
the September 11 th attacks or even that he had knowledge of the specific attacks
being planned by others.37 Nonetheless, the Government maintained that he was
vicariously liable for them under Pinkerton because the September 11 th attacks
were reasonably foreseeable crimes committed in furtherance of the same terrorist
conspiracy of which Moussaoui was a member. 38 Although the jury agreed with
many of the Government's assertions, they ultimately recommended a sentence of
life imprisonment without the possibility of release,39 which the judge imposed.4 °
Although conspiracy law frequently is used to attach vicarious liability, the
Federal Criminal Code also provides for vicarious liability for complicity-that is,
"aiding and abetting" the commission of an offense. 41 Like a conspirator, an
accomplice who aids and abets a crime is equally guilty of that offense, even
though she did not personally participate in its actual commission.42 Unlike
Pinkerton liability, however, which attaches solely due to the defendant's
membership in a conspiracy, complicity liability requires that the defendant have
assisted the commission of the crime in some personal, direct way.43 Accordingly,
36 See Special Verdict Form for Phase II at 2, United States v. Moussaoui, Criminal
No. 01-455-A (E.D. Va. April 24, 2006) [hereinafter Moussaoui Special Verdict Form].
37 This problem arose in part because the Government refused to allow Moussaoui
access to three captured al Qaeda leaders who could have provided exculpatory testimony
on exactly that issue. See United States v. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453, 463-64 (4th Cir.
2004) (addressing the Government's violation of, and the appropriate remedy under, the
Compulsory Process Clause), aff'g United States v. Moussaoui, 365 F.3d 292 (4th Cir.
2004) (same).
38 See Moussaoui Special Verdict Form, supra note 36, at 1, 15, 29. The Government
sought the death penalty on counts one, three, and four, charging conspiracy to commit acts
of terrorism transcending national boundaries, to destroy aircraft, and to use a weapon of
mass destruction, respectively. See id. at 2, 15, 29.
'9 See Jury Verdict Form for Phase II at 13, 27, 41, United States v. Moussaoui,
Criminal No. 01-455-A (E.D. Va. May 3, 2006). Notably, three jurors specifically made a
finding "[t]hat Zacarias Moussaoui had limited knowledge of the 9/11 attack plans" and
believed it was a mitigating factor in favor of a life sentence. See id. at 9, 23, 37.
40 See Judgment in a Criminal Case at 2, United States v. Moussaoui, No.
1:01CR00455-001 (E.D. Va. May 4,2006).
41 See 18 U.S.C. § 2 (2006); see also MCSORLEY, supra note 22, at 56-62 (discussing
§ 2).
42 Under complicity liability, a person who aids and abets the commission of an
offense "is punishable as a principal." 18 U.S.C. § 2(a); see also MCSORLEY, supra note
22, at 56-57 ("Aiding and abetting... is a vehicle for secondary liability that renders an
aider and abettor culpable as a principal.").
43 See MCSORLEY, supra note 22, at 112 (noting that, when both theories are argued
by the prosecution, the jury must be unanimous regarding whether defendant is guilty
because of Pinkerton liability or complicity liability); see also id at 57-58 (describing
complicity liability).
1264 [No. 4
CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS AND MILITARY ENEMIES
the primary benefit of the aiding and abetting theory is to prosecute those who
assist the commission of crimes without ever joining the conspiratorial
agreement.44
4. Facilitation Liability (Material Support)
In contrast to the first three forms of liability, the fourth form of liability relies
on a different type of conduct by the defendant. Instead of proving the defendant's
personal participation or vicarious involvement in activities leading to specific
completed or inchoate incidents of terrorism, under the "material support"
offenses, the Government can obtain a conviction based on facilitation liability;
45
that is, a defendant is guilty of facilitating terrorism when he knowingly rendered
aid to terrorists without knowing the manner in which the aid would be used.46 The
conviction entered is not for terrorist activities directly, but rather for the distinct,
independent facilitation offense.47
44 See id. at 59.
45 See generally 1 PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES §§ 81-85 (1984 &
Supp. 2008) (describing and analyzing facilitation liability); 2 WAYNE LAFAVE,
SUBSTANTIVE CRIM[NAL LAW § 13.2n.111 (2d ed. 2003 & Supp. 2007) (describing the
mens rea for facilitation liability as based on knowledge, rather than purpose).
46 If the defendant did know the manner in which his aid would be used, then the
defendant would be part of a conspiracy to commit the relevant crimes. Accordingly, the
material support offenses expand liability to cover situations in which the defendant lacks
the necessary mens rea for conspiracy to commit any particular crimes but is nevertheless
knowingly aiding terrorists in doing something.
47 The concept of "material support" for terrorism originated in 18 U.S.C. § 2339A,
enacted in 1994. See Robert M. Chesney, The Sleeper Scenario: Terrorism-Support Laws
and the Demands of Prevention, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 12-13 (2005). That offense
punishes a person who "provides material support or resources... knowing or intending
that they are to be used in preparation for, or in carrying out, a violation of' listed federal
offenses relating (directly or implicitly) to terrorism prosecutions. 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(a).
On the one hand, like a facilitation offense (including § 2339B, which was enacted in
1996), the defendant is not made vicariously liable for the actual offenses for which he
provided material support; instead, the defendant is convicted and punished (by up to
fifteen years' imprisonment) under § 2339A. See Chesney, supra, at 13-18. On the other
hand, like conspiracy or complicity, the Government must prove that the defendant had
mens rea with respect to particular terrorist objectives. See id. at 13 ("It is, in short, a type
of aiding-and-abetting statute."). Thus, although § 2339A is not a basis for imposing
vicarious liability, it does not serve the function of a facilitation offense, either. Cf
Chesney, supra note 11, at 479-80 (noting that, although § 2339A requires knowledge or
intent to support predicate offenses, it more broadly proscribes supporting preparations for,
or supporting conspiracies to engage in, predicate offenses as well as the narrower
proscription on supporting commissions of predicate offenses). Likewise, the necessary
mens rea often makes § 2339A superfluous, because the same mens rea also would support




The most frequently charged material support offense is § 2339B, which
makes knowingly providing "material support or resources" to a designated
"foreign terrorist organization" (FTO) a felony punishable by up to fifteen years'
imprisonment.48 The definition of material support is expansive, including
providing money or financial services, training or personnel, transportation or
lodging, or weapons or explosives. 49 The list of designated FTOs is maintained by
the U.S. Department of State, and that list is incorporated by reference in
§ 2339B. 50 To be convicted under § 2339B, the defendant either must know that
the group to which she is rendering support is actually on this list, or more broadly
must know that the organization engages in terrorism. 51 Thus, the recipient of the
defendant's material support need not be specific individual terrorists preparing a
particular attack, but rather can be simply the FTO in general.
Many of the prominent terrorism cases since 2001 have involved charges
under § 2339B. For example, the "Lackawanna Six" defendants in upstate New
York, an alleged al Qaeda "sleeper cell," pleaded guilty to § 2339B charges,52 as
did the "American Taliban," John Walker Lindh. Accused terrorist fundraiser
Sami Al-Arian was acquitted on material support charges, although he ultimately
pleaded guilty to conspiracy to raise funds for an FTO.54 Another American, Adam
48 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2006).
49 See id. §§ 2339(g)(4), 2339A(b).
50 See 8 U.S.C. § 1189 (2006); 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(g)(6) (2006).
51 See 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1). The requisite knowledge was clarified by the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Protection Act of 2004 to resolve statutory
interpretation issues raised by the lower courts under the prior version of the statute. See
Pub. L. No. 108-458, § 6603(c), 118 Stat. 3638, 3762-63; see, e.g., Humanitarian Law
Project v. Gonzales, 380 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1147-48 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (discussing
Humanitarian Law Project v. United States Dep't of Justice, 352 F.3d 382 (9th Cir. 2003),
vacated, 393 F.3d 902 (9th Cir. 2004) and United States v. Al-Arian, 308 F. Supp. 2d 1322
(M.D. Fla. 2004), reh 'g denied, 329 F. Supp. 2d 1294 (M.D. Fla. 2004)).
52 See United States v. Goba, 240 F. Supp. 2d 242, 258 n.20 (W.D.N.Y. 2003)
(discussing the "Lackawanna Six" guilty plea under § 2339B); Chesney, supra note 47, at
39-44; see also United States v. Goba, 220 F. Supp. 2d 182 (W.D.N.Y. 2002) (discussing
the allegations against the "Lackawanna Six" and ordering pretrial detention without bail).
53 See Neil A. Lewis, Admitting He Fought in Taliban, American Agrees to 20-Year
Term, N.Y. TIMEs, July 16, 2002, at Al; see also United States v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d
541 (E.D. Va. 2002) (discussing charges against defendant and denying defendant's motion
to dismiss).
54 See Plea Agreement at 1, 3, United States v. Al-Arian, No. 8:03-CR-77-T-30TBM
(M.D. Fla. Apr. 14, 2006); Verdict at 7, United States v. Al-Arian, No. 8:03-CR-77-T-
30TBM (M.D. Fla. Dec. 6, 2005) [hereinafter Al-Arian Verdict]; Chesney, supra note 11,
at 465 (noting acquittal on § 956 charge); see also United States v. Al-Arian, 329 F. Supp.
2d 1294, 1295 (M.D. Fla. 2004) (describing defendant's conviction for conspiracy to raise
funds for an FTO); United States v. Al-Arian, 308 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1329, 1350-51 (M.D.
Fla. 2004) (describing charges against defendant under § 2339B).
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Gadahn, is currently under indictment on § 2339B charges for providing personnel
and services to al Qaeda.5 5
Although § 2339B is the most prominent example, several other facilitation
offenses also can be charged in terrorism cases. These offenses include the crimes
of harboring terrorists and financing terrorism, which carry penalties of up to ten
and twenty years' imprisonment, respectively. 56 Like § 2339B, these offenses do
not make the defendant liable for the terrorist activities as such, but rather for a
separate crime imposing liability on a facilitation theory. Similarly, another statute
makes it a felony, punishable by up to ten years' imprisonment, to "knowingly
receive military-type training from or on behalf of' an FTO.57 This statute, rather
than § 2339B, likely would be used to charge defendants in future cases similar to
Lindh or Gadahn.58
Thus, the facilitation offenses, and the § 2339B material support crime in
particular, expand criminal liability even further than conspiracy law's vicarious
liability. Under the facilitation offenses, a defendant can be convicted for
knowingly supporting terrorists, even if the defendant had no idea of the terrorists'
future plans for using that support. This offense marks a stark departure from
personal or vicarious liability, which require proof of the defendant's involvement
in specified crimes. Even generalized support for unspecified terrorist goals creates
significant felony liability.
B. The Complexities
Given the preceding discussion, it might appear that prosecuting terrorists
under the U.S. federal criminal laws is relatively straightforward, and that the
difficulties would arise in proving of the requisite facts beyond a reasonable
51 See Gadahn Indictment, supra note 1, at 9.
56 See 18 U.S.C. § 2339 (harboring); id. § 2339C (financing).
57 See 18 U.S.C. § 2339D. This offense was enacted in the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Protection Act of 2004. See Pub. L. No. 108-458, § 6602, 118 Stat. 3638, 3761
(2004).
58 The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Protection Act of 2004 also amended the
definition of material support in 2339A(b) to clarify that "personnel" is defined as "(1 or
more individuals who may be or include oneself)." See Pub. L. No. 108-458, § 6603(b),
118 Stat. 3638, 3762. Prior to the 2004 amendments, the lower courts had raised significant
statutory interpretation questions regarding the application of § 2339B to individuals whose
only alleged provision of material support was "personnel" in the form of their own
personal participation in Taliban or al Qaeda training camps. See, e.g., Humanitarian Law
Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130, 1137 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp.
2d 541, 574 (E.D. Va. 2002). After the Act, such individuals can be prosecuted under
§ 2339D, as well as the amended § 2339B. Due to the Ex Post Facto Clause, the prior
version of § 2339B continues to be charged for such conduct prior to the 2004 Act. See,
e.g., Gadahn Indictment, supra note 1, at 9 (charging § 2339B, not § 2339D, based on
conduct occurring prior to Act).
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doubt5 9 rather than in resolving questions of the application or interpretation of the
law. In fact, there are several significant aspects of existing criminal law doctrine
which are complex and controversial under any circumstance. The context of
terrorism prosecutions tests these complexities to their outer limits.
The most prominent and important-and most problematic-issue is
determining the scope of a conspiratorial agreement. Both the nature of the object
offenses of the conspiracy and the extent of vicarious liability for the crimes
committed by the members of the conspiratorial group depend on the scope of the
agreement. The conspiracy's scope, therefore, is crucial for deciding a given
defendant's fate. Yet the law of conspiracy provides very little guidance for
defining the scope of any given conspiratorial agreement. Instead, the question of a
conspiracy's scope is almost entirely one of fact. Consequently, the Government
has every incentive to try to describe the conspiracy as extensively as possible,
while the defendant's interests are served by describing it as narrowly as
possible.60
The scope of a conspiratorial agreement varies on two axes: the identity of the
agreement's membership (who) and the criminal content of the agreement (what).
When the stakes are as high as they are in crimes of terrorism, each axis can prove
critical in shaping the indictment, trial, and punishment of the accused terrorists.
The first question is who is involved in the conspiracy: which individuals are
part of the conspiratorial group and its criminal agreement? The answer determines
the extent of the vicarious liability faced by all of the conspirators. 61 Every single
one of the conspirators is liable for crimes committed by other conspirators
pursuant to the conspiracy-that is, the agreement's object offenses. 62 They also
are liable for crimes committed by other conspirators in furtherance of the
conspiracy's objectives, although not specifically agreed to-that is, reasonably
'9 See Chesney, supra note 11, at 464-86 (describing dispositions of § 956 and §
2339A cases, including acquittals); see also Al-Arian Verdict, supra note 54, at 7
(acquitting defendant of three material support counts under 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) and
18 U.S.C. § 2).
60 The opposite incentives exist when the inchoate aspect of conspiracy is implicated,
but there is no vicarious liability for completed (or attempted) object or Pinkerton offenses
to impute. In that situation the Government's incentive is to describe multiple, narrow
agreements to sustain multiple counts of conspiracy (and consequently more total
punishment), while the defendant's interest is served by having fewer, broader conspiracies
(and consequently less total punishment). See, e.g., Braverman v. United States, 317 U.S.
49, 53 (1942) (holding that where defendants' agreed course of conduct constituted
violations of seven different tax offenses and the Government charged seven counts of
conspiracy, the defendants had entered one agreement creating a single conspiracy relating
to a course of conduct and not seven agreements creating seven conspiracies).
61 See supra notes 25-30 and accompanying text; see also Chesney, supra note 11, at
466-73 (discussing conspiratorial vicarious liability).62 See MCSORLEY, supra note 22, at 109-10.
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63foreseeable Pinkerton offenses. But to impose liability, of course, either object
offenses or Pinkerton offenses must have been committed by a member of the
same conspiracy to which the defendant belongs.64 For example, if supplier A
conspires with dealers B, C, and D to sell cocaine, none of them is liable for
cocaine sales by dealer E if E is not a member of their conspiracy.
Certainly defendants are members of the same conspiracy if they personally,
directly agreed with each other. Two individuals also may be found to be part of
the same conspiracy even if they do not directly interact, so long as they are aware
of the existence of other participants in the same agreement.65 Such conspiracies
might take the form of a "chain" with a series of links, or a "wheel" with a central
66figure coordinating the efforts of others-or both. For example, even if B and D
never meet, or do not even know each other's names, D is nonetheless part of the
same conspiracy as B if D conspires with supplier A knowing that A is conspiring
with other dealers, as well (one of whom happens to be B).67
The criminal law has no bright-line principle for determining which
individuals are members of a given conspiracy; rather that determination is made
through a finding of fact. It begins when the Government makes factual allegations
about the scope of the conspiracy's membership in the indictment. If the defendant
does not plead guilty to some or all of the relevant conspiracy-related counts, then
the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury that its assessment
of the factual situation is correct.68 The decisions made on the questions of fact
about the scope of the conspiracy's membership determine the extent of the
defendant's liability.
Terrorism prosecutions can press this fact-based standard to its limits. A
simple, uncontroversial charge would assert that the individuals personally
involved in a particular terrorist plot are members in the same conspiracy. At the
other, controversial extreme the Government might claim that all members of al
Qaeda are part of the same overarching conspiracy to commit terrorist acts. The
prosecution in Moussaoui was somewhere in the middle. Although the
Government could not prove that Moussaoui was a direct participant in the group
of individuals who prepared for and carried out the September 11 th attacks, it did
maintain that he conspired with the same al Qaeda handlers and leaders to commit
63 id.
64 See id. at 114-15; Chesney, supra note 11, at 450-51.
65 See MCSORLEY, supra note 22, at 143-46.
66 "A typical chain conspiracy involves relationships between wholesalers, retailers,
sellers, brokers, and purchasers." Id. at 144. "When different persons (spokes) are involved
with a common individual or group (the hub), a successful conspiracy prosecution may
depend on whether the spokes can be drawn together (connected by a rim) into a single
agreement." Id. at 145.
67 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03(2) (1985); see also MCSORLEY, supra note 22, at
146 (discussing marijuana importation "wheel" conspiracy in United States v. Champion,
813 F.2d 1154, 1165-67 (11th Cir. 1987)).
68 See MCSORLEY, supra note 22, at 146-52; Chesney, supra note 11, at 473-74.
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highly similar attacks-and therefore was a member of the same conspiracy as the
September 11 th hijackers, as another "spoke" in the wheel conspiracy formed by
the leaders at its "hub., 69 But there is no doctrinal reason why, on the question of
the conspiracy's membership, the Government was obligated to stop there. If it
were possible to prove, factually, that a defendant conspired with high-level al
Qaeda leaders, then in theory it would be possible to claim, as a factual matter, that
he was a member of the same conspiratorial group as all other members of al
Qaeda who also gave their allegiance to the same leaders. If such a claim were
accepted, then the defendant would be responsible for all object and Pinkerton
offenses committed by any member of al Qaeda. 70 The Government rarely pursues
such an expansive conspiracy charge, but it is not for lack of legal authority.7 1
After all, the potential to charge an extensive conspiracy with a large membership
exists in other kinds of large network criminality cases as well, such as narcotics
69 Specifically, Ramzi Bin al-Shibh was portrayed as the mastermind behind both
Moussaoui's activities and those of Mohammed Atta, whose highly similar plot culminated
in the 9/11 attacks; thus, because both Moussaoui and Atta conspired with the same person
to carry out airliner attacks, the Government maintained that there were not two separate
airliner conspiracies, but rather a single larger one (led by Bin al-Shibh), of which both
Moussaoui and Atta were a part. See Moussaoui Indictment, supra note 7, at 6-7, 10-24.
70 Subject, of course, to the crime occurring either in the United States or in a place or
manner over which the U.S. has extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction. See supra note 1.
71 See Chesney, supra note 11, at 466-74 (describing § 956 conspiracy charges
predicated on connections to FTOs or the global jihad movement). Alternatively, if the
Government wishes to pursue an expansive theory of liability based on the activities of al
Qaeda as a whole, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) may be
a better theory, rather than a charge under a traditional conspiracy theory. Under RICO, a
defendant may be convicted for operating or managing the "affairs" of a criminal
"enterprise" affecting interstate commerce "through a pattern of racketeering activity." 18
U.S.C. § 1962(c) (2006) (offense); see also id. § 1961 (defmitional provisions); Reves v.
Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 182-83 (1993) (discussing what qualifies a defendant as an
operator or manager in the affairs of the enterprise); United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S.
576, 590 (1981) (discussing the application of RICO to an enterprise consisting of an
association-in-fact with illegal objectives). In addition to the leaders of a criminal
enterprise, RICO also reaches those subordinates who are not themselves eligible RICO
defendants but who conspire with the enterprise's leaders (who are personally violating
RICO). See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d); Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 66 (1997)
(upholding the conviction of an individual, who did not qualify as an operator or manager
under § 1962(c), on a charge of RICO conspiracy under § 1962(d)). Thus, RICO
potentially could be charged not only against high-level al Qaeda leaders who personally
direct or supervise the organization's terrorist activities, but also against the operatives who
conspire with them to carry out the pattern of criminal activity in violation of RICO. To
date, however, RICO charges have been rare in terrorism cases. See Chesney, supra note
11, at 467 n.205.
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trafficking or organized crime families.72 Yet the Government rarely indicts a
street-level distributor in the same conspiracy as the importer who acquires
massive quantities of cocaine from Colombia, even though an "ordinary" dealer
presumably is aware that importation is a necessary link between production and
retail in the overall cocaine distribution chain.73 Thus, it is only the Government's
exercise of prosecutorial discretion in the interests of fairness and justice, or
perhaps issues of factual proof beyond a reasonable doubt, which restrain the
breadth of membership alleged in conspiracy indictments.
The second question is what constitutes the conspiratorial agreement: which
crimes are the objectives of the group's criminal agreement? As with membership,
the answer determines the extent of the conspirators' vicarious liability. All
members of the conspiracy are liable for its object offenses when they are
committed, regardless of their level of personal involvement, if any, in the carrying
out of any given crime.74 Similarly, the nature of the object offenses of the
conspiracy will delimit which additional crimes, committed by conspirators in
furtherance of the agreement's objectives, are-or are not-reasonably foreseeable
Pinkerton offenses for which the other conspirators are equally liable.
75
Just like the scope of membership, the scope of the agreement's content also
is a question of fact. For example, A, B, and C might conspire to sell cocaine, and
A and D might conspire to engage in money laundering to conceal the proceeds,
creating two separate conspiratorial agreements. Alternatively, A, B, C, and D
might form a single agreement to sell cocaine and launder money. Which
characterization is the "correct" one is a factual conclusion about how many
separate agreements there are, and the content of each.76 Importantly, the decisive
determination is the number of agreements, not the number of object offenses,
because a single agreement can comprise many object offenses. 77 Just as broader
membership expands the potential vicarious liability for the actions of more
individuals, so too a broader scope of the criminal agreement creates the possibility
of more vicarious liability for more object offenses and more corresponding
72 See, e.g., United States v. Gotti, 451 F.3d 133, 134-35 (2d Cir. 2006) (charging
conspiracy in a case involving an organized crime family); United States v. Sessa, 125 F.3d
68, 70 (2d Cir. 1997) (charging conspiracy in a case involving narcotics trafficking).
73 Cf Stephen J. Schulhofer, Assessing the Federal Sentencing Process: The Problem
is Uniformity, Not Disparity, 29 AM. CRiM. L. REV. 833, 855-56 (1992) (noting that the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines base a defendant's punishment in narcotics cases on
personal conduct, not the entire distribution chain).
74 See MCSORLEY, supra note 22, at 109-11.
71 See id. at 114-15.
76 See id. at 45-49, 131-43; Chesney, supra note 11, at 473-74.
77 See Braverman v. United States, 317 U.S. 49, 53 (1942) (holding that a single
agreement to engage in a course of conduct, which constituted seven different tax offenses,
created a single conspiracy and not seven conspiracies).
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Pinkerton offenses in the course of the conspiracy.7 8 Regardless of the breadth or
narrowness of its content, a conspiracy charge necessarily requires an agreement to
engage in activity that would constitute the violation of the relevant criminal
statutes.79 That is, the Government must charge a conspiracy to commit specified
offenses, not simply a generalized agreement to do yet-to-be-determined bad
things. °
The prosecution of alleged terrorists creates the potential for testing the limits
of this fact-based standard, as well. If the Government relies on a facilitation
offense, of course, then the issue does not come into play; generalized support to
an FTO for unspecified purposes, for example, violates § 2239B. When the charge
is conspiracy, however, and the Government seeks to impose vicarious liability for
crimes committed by others, then the scope of the conspiratorial agreement's
content is crucial. On one hand, an agreement "to attack X target by Y means on Z
date" clearly is precise enough to constitute a conspiracy to commit the delineated
actus reus elements of the statutory offenses relevant to the X and Y factors-for
example, causing the deaths of other human beings for murder, or destroying a
federal building by explosives under § 844.81 On the other hand, an agreement "to
carry out some kind of terrorist attack eventually" is almost certainly too
ambiguous and undefined to permit the conviction, beyond a reasonable doubt, of
its participants for a conspiracy to commit any specific offenses-the Government
would be unable to allege which particular actus reus elements of which particular
crimes the defendants were actually conspiring to commit.
In between are agreements with varying degrees of specificity that might or
might not sustain a valid, or at least an uncontroversial, conspiracy charge. For
example, an agreement "to start figuring out how to go about building a dirty bomb
to detonate in a major American city" could be charged as a conspiracy to commit
a weapon of mass destruction offense, even if the implementation of the agreement
78 See Mark Noferi, Towards Attenuation: A "New" Due Process Limit on Pinkerton
Conspiracy Liability, 33 AM. J. CRiM. L. 91, 113 (2006) (describing the vast potential
breadth of liability under Pinkerton).
79 See MCSORLEY, supra note 22, at 7-9; Chesney, supra note 11, at 451-58.
80 See Chesney, supra note 11, at 452-53 (citing United States v. Gallishaw, 428 F.2d
760, 763-64 & n.1 (2d Cir. 1970); United States v. Rosenblatt, 554 F.2d 36, 38-39 (2d Cir.
1977)); see also id. at 465-69 & n.211, 474 (discussing required specificity for § 956
conspiracy charges as an agreement to commit violence against persons abroad, but not the
identification of particular victims or the manner of violence).
81 See supra note 9 and accompanying text for a discussion regarding Section 844.
82 In the hypothetical conspiracy, the agreement is so ambiguous and undefined
("some kind of terrorist attack") that the Government might be unable to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt even a conspiracy to commit the actus reus of murder. That is, because
some forms of terrorism involve property damage but no loss of life, the defendants might
be able successfully to raise doubt about whether their agreement necessarily contemplated
causing deaths.
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is only in its preliminary stages,83 because the specific intent to carry out the
delineated actus reus elements of that object offense is present. But an agreement
"to kill some Americans somewhere at some point in time by some means to be
determined later" is arguably too indistinct even to constitute a conspiracy to
commit murder. 84 Of course, in cases where proof of a conspiracy to commit
particular offenses will be difficult to obtain, the Government can exercise its
prosecutorial discretion to pursue facilitation charges rather than conspiracy and
thereby avoid the need to specify any agreement-at the cost of abandoning
vicarious liability. Thus, when vicarious liability is in play, it is the Government's
ability to prove the scope of the agreement's content beyond a reasonable doubt
that limits the breadth of the conspiracy. 5
Taken together, these two axes of a conspiratorial agreement give the
Government considerable authority to aggressively charge and prosecute terrorism
cases. The Government can seek to define the membership of the agreement with
great horizontal and vertical breadth, casting the net of liability for others' crimes
as wide as possible. Likewise, the Government can frame the objectives of the
conspiracy in equally broad terms, including as many object offenses as possible
within its scope. To the extent that there are constraints on such charging practices,
they are not doctrinal, but factual. A jury, for example, might not be persuaded
beyond a reasonable doubt that one group of terrorists plotting an airliner attack
really is part of the same conspiratorial agreement as others planning to bomb a
U.S. embassy, even though both groups report to the same "supervisor" in al
Qaeda. Or a defendant might refuse to plead guilty to an expansively drawn
conspiracy charge, but be willing to plead to a narrower one.
Moreover, the earlier in the terrorist endeavor the criminal charges are filed,
the more difficult it may be to obtain definitive evidence about the agreement's
membership and objectives. 86 That is, the more inchoate the nature of the
conspiracy, the more difficult it may be to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
exactly who and what the conspiracy is. Sometimes direct evidence may exist,
such as when a participant in the conspiracy testifies for the Government. Even
then, however, a conspiracy in the preliminary stages of agreement and planning
must be proven more by inference and intent than one further along, which may
83 See id. at 457-58 (concluding that conspiracy to bomb yet-to-be-determined
buildings is sufficient to sustain conspiracy charge (citing United States v. Salameh, 152
F.3d 88, 145-48 (2d Cir. 1998))).
84 Consider, for example, an agreement between A and B to kill C, while leaving the
time, place, or manner of the killing to be figured out later. In that situation, the selection of
a particular victim makes possible the identification of a specific object offense-the
murder of C. A conspiracy "to commit the murder of somebody" fails to provide even that
level of specificity.
85 "The more remote the defendant is from the group's violent activities, the more
difficult it becomes to prove that the defendant specifically intended those activities to
occur." Id. at 469 n.211.
86 See id. at 434.
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have substantial evidence of actions in preparation and other corroborative
activities.87 In the end, therefore, it is ultimately proof and persuasion, not law,
which determine how extensive the scope of conspiracy charges and convictions
will become in terrorism prosecutions.
Two other situations presented by the threat of terrorism illustrate
complexities in the existing criminal law doctrines. These situations do not fit
neatly within the current doctrinal frameworks, highlighting the need to think
creatively and flexibly to ensure that terrorist activity worthy of criminal sanction
falls within the reach of the law.
One situation is the problem of "sleeper cells," small groups of terrorists who
infiltrate civilian society and undertake ordinary daily lives-until the point in time
arrives when they are "awakened" to engage in terrorist activity. 88 Sleeper cells
may be put into place without specific, predetermined plans for what kind of
activity they ultimately will be asked to carry out; instead, they may be awaiting
instructions about what to do, and only begin preparing to commit terrorist acts
once operational orders arrive.8 9 Surveillance, confidential informants, or fruits of
other antiterrorism investigations, for example, may be able to identify sleeper
cells prior to activation. But in such circumstances, it is likely that conspiracy
charges may not be viable because the Government will be unable to prove beyond
a reasonable doubt an agreement to engage in specified, particular object offenses.
Accordingly, facilitation offenses may be the only charges available against such
individuals. But the § 2339B offense applies to all forms of providing material
support, without differential penalties for conduct that is more or less directly or
indirectly connected to ultimate terrorist attacks. Thus, § 2339B fails to distinguish
between an al Qaeda fundraiser, who supports the organization financially, and a
sleeper cell operative, who intends to one day personally carry out a terrorist
attack.90
87 The terrorist plot to blow up United States-bound airliners foiled by British
authorities in August 2006 illustrates this dilemma. "British law enforcement officials, for
instance, typically wait longer to arrest terrorism suspects than do American authorities,
[Martin R. Pollner, senior partner at the law firm Loeb & Loeb in New York and a former
United States representative to Interpol, the international police network] said, because the
British want to let a plot develop further so they have stronger evidence when it comes to
prosecuting a case." Heather Timmons & Eric Pfanner, Europe Says It Will Unify Effort in
Fight on Terrorism, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 2006, at A15. Rather than making arrests soon
after the plot was uncovered, British authorities engaged in "months of surveillance of the
suspects" before arresting them and acquired significant amounts of corroborating evidence
by doing so. Alan Cowell, Britain Charges 11 in Plane Case, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 2006,
at Al.
" See Chesney, supra note 47, at 1-2 & n.2, 71.
89 Cf Chesney, supra note 11, at 488-92 (describing the prosecution, and quoting the
interrogation, of Hamid Hayat).
90 In some circumstances, the § 2339D offense is a step toward addressing this
disparity. Terrorists concealed in sleeper cells may have engaged in the requisite military-
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Similarly, the § 2339B offense makes no distinction between a person who
provides a safe house or forged identity papers to terrorists, and a sleeper cell
operative who procures weapons or bomb-making materials in anticipation of
possible (but not certain) future use by himself or fellow terrorists. Perhaps the
existing terms of § 2339B strike an appropriate balance between those who
knowingly advance terrorist objectives through indirect, generalized assistance and
those who provide direct, tailored support but are not quite inculpated enough to
prove involvement in a specific conspiratorial agreement. On the other hand, it is
not obvious that a "fellow traveler" who donates money to al Qaeda, but would
never commit an act of terrorist violence personally, should have equal culpability
with a "terrorist in waiting" who waits only for detailed instructions before
becoming a deadly, active terrorist himself. The sleeper cell situation exemplifies
the constant need to adapt criminal law offenses and punishments to the terrorist
threat.
The other problematic situation is that of "unaffiliated" terrorism.91 Also
called "wannabe" or "homegrown" terrorists, these individuals aspire to take part
in the destructive agenda of al Qaeda but are not connected to it and do not
cooperate with it. For example, the men charged with plotting to attack Fort Dix in
New Jersey appear to have no connection to al Qaeda. 92 Likewise, the Miami men
indicted for planning to bomb the Sears Tower in Chicago do not seem to have any
affiliation with foreign terrorists.93 Of course, affiliation with al Qaeda or any other
terrorist organization is not a necessary element of committing, attempting, or
conspiring to commit acts of terrorism in the first place, so such individuals will be
convicted for the relevant crimes irrespective of their "lone wolf' nature. On the
other hand, existing federal criminal law does not impose facilitation liability in
relation to unaffiliated terrorists. In particular, § 2339B only proscribes providing
material support to foreign terrorist organizations designated by the State
94Department. Rendering material support to domestic terrorists who have no
type training in al Qaeda camps prior to being deployed as sleeper cell operatives and
accordingly could be convicted under § 2339D. A fundraiser who has never undertaken
such training, by contrast, could be reached only under § 2339B, or possibly the § 2339C
financing offense. Ironically, § 2339D carries a maximum sentence of ten years, while §
2339B and § 2339C carry maximum sentences of fifteen and twenty years, respectively.
Thus, under existing law, the fundraiser actually faces worse potential penalties than the
trained, violent operative awaiting instructions on when to strike.
91 See Chesney, supra note 11, at 427-29, 437-46, 471-73; see also Chesney, supra
note 47, at 72-74 (describing problems in prosecuting terrorists unaffiliated with any
specific group using statutes drafted with international terrorist organizations in mind).92 See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
93 See Chesney, supra note 11, at 426 n.4, 435 & n.34, 458.
94 See supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text. The military-type training offense
also requires an affiliation with an FTO. See 18 U.S.C. § 2339D (2006). The financing
offense does not rely on the FTO designations, but its coverage is acts of international, not
domestic, terrorism. See id. § 2339C(a)-(b).
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affiliation with an FTO, therefore, is not covered by the offense; accordingly, only
persons who affirmatively conspire with them can be convicted of a crime. This
differential between FTOs and unaffiliated, homegrown terrorist groups may well
be justified,95 but it illustrates the complexities in addressing the full nature of the
terrorist threat.
Thus, existing U.S. federal criminal law provides extensive liability for those
involved in terrorist attacks and the activities of terrorist organizations. In many
cases, imposing liability will be easy and uncontroversial, as matters of both legal
interpretation and factual proof. In other situations, however, the application of the
offenses and theories of liability is more complicated. Particularly in cases
involving charges of conspiracy, the inchoate aspect of the offense combined with
the expansive reach of vicarious liability creates the potential for a terrorism
indictment with an extensive scope.
Yet there are few legal principles to constrain the Government's charging
decisions. Sometimes those outer limits can be avoided by charging a facilitation
offense rather than conspiracy, but the most significant penalties will depend on
vicarious liability. Thus, confronting the complexities in the criminal law of
antiterrorism is unavoidable.
III. APPLICABILITY OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAWS OF WAR
In contrast to U.S. federal criminal law, the applicability of the international
laws of war to transnational terrorist organizations and individual (alleged)
terrorists is substantially less well defined. 96 There is considerable disagreement
among scholars, judges, lawyers, and government officials about when, how, or
even ifthe laws of war apply to antiterrorism efforts.
This is unsurprising, however, because all sides in those disagreements can
find common ground on a simple premise: the current treaties embodying the
international laws of war were devised with many problems and issues in mind,
but the threat of transnational terrorist organizations, as such, was not one of them.
Therefore, everyone agrees that the application of the existing international laws of
war to terrorism will involve interpretive difficulties. The principal disputed
questions concern how much of the international laws of war should be deemed to
apply to terrorism, and how much remains outside their scope. The answers are
contested and unclear, and some remain unresolved.
95 For example, there would be substantial First Amendment freedom of association
objections to the creation of a "domestic terrorist organization" list.
96 Some scholars and commentators prefer the newer label "international
humanitarian law" for the body of international law which governs the conduct of
hostilities in wars and other armed conflicts. See Robert Sloane, Prologue to a Voluntarist
War Convention, 106 MICH. L. REV. 443, 445 (2007) (describing the origins and
implications of the labels). Because of my focus on comparing, contrasting, and analyzing
the interactions between this body of law and the alternative criminal law model, I prefer
the older label "laws of war."
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Nonetheless, the debates about the applicability of the laws of war illustrate
the insights and significance of a military model, grounded in principles of
international law, for dealing with terrorists-an alternative to the criminal law
model under domestic, civilian law. Although the international laws of war on their
own terms may not directly resolve all the necessary issues, they provide an
important conceptual framework for assessing how new U.S. and international law
can, and should, be designed to address the threat of al Qaeda and other
transnational terrorist organizations.
A. The Basics
Historically, the international laws of war applied only to wars between the
Governments of recognized states. 97 All other military conflicts, like civil wars or
secessionist movements, fell outside the scope of the laws of war. 98 State
sovereignty was preeminent, and international law did not reach into the internal
affairs of a country-even when the fighting taking place on the ground involved
exactly the same kinds of military engagements and danger to civilians as a
traditional state-against-state war.99 If the parties to the hostilities were not two
states, the laws of war simply did not apply. The experiences of the twentieth
century led to an expansion of international law to reach other kinds of armed
conflict which closely resembled war but did not fit the traditional formalistic
requirement of two opposing state parties. In particular, the Spanish Civil War in
the 1930s and armed resistance during World War II to Nazi occupations and their
collaborationist governments illustrated the inadequacies of the traditional
model. 100 These circumstances inspired the adoption of provisions in the 1949
Geneva Conventions applicable to those intrastate armed conflicts which were
functionally comparable to interstate war.101 Subsequent conflicts involving
97 See Nathaniel Berman, Privileging Combat? Contemporary Conflict and the Legal
Constructions of War, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 15-23 (2004); Eric Talbot Jensen,
Combatant Status: It Is Time for Intermediate Levels of Recognition for Partial
Compliance, 46 VA. J. INT'L L. 209, 214-18 (2005); Derek Jinks, The Applicability of the
Geneva Conventions to the "Global War on Terrorism," 46 VA. J. INT'L L. 165, 166-68
(2005).
98 See LINDSAY MOIR, THE LAW OF INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICT 1-23 (2002); Derek
Jinks, September 11 and the Laws of War, 28 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 14-15 (2003).
99 See Berman, supra note 97, at 24-31.
100 See MOIR, supra note 98, at 19-21; Berman, supra note 97, at 18; Jinks, supra
note 97, at 167, 189 n.45 (noting that "the Spanish Civil War [was the] the historical case
most often referenced in the [Geneva] Conventions drafting process as proof that
international regulation of 'internal' conflict was necessary").
101 See Jinks, supra note 98, at 14-18, 39 (noting that between the coverage provided
by Common Article 2 and Common Article 3, the Geneva Conventions were intended to
apply to all hostilities, whether transnational or intra-state, which qualified as "armed
conflicts"). The 1949 Geneva Conventions are comprised of four treaties on related
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colonies pursuing independence from European rule reaffirmed the need for the
international laws of war to cover some forms of intrastate armed conflicts.
10 2
Yet the international laws governing interstate war were not simply applied
wholesale to intrastate conflicts. Rather, a dual regime was created, which
provided extensive, detailed provisions for international war and a few, simple,
minimal protections for noninternational war.10 3 This system arose because
sovereignty was no longer viewed as exclusively preeminent, nor was it viewed as
entirely obsolete. Two wars might involve exactly the same kinds of hostilities, but
different interests might be implicated depending on the context. In an
international war, both states have aligned interests in using international law to
ensure reciprocity of obligations. ° 4 In noninternational war, by contrast, a tension
exists between the humanitarian objectives of international law, on the one hand,
and the state's sovereign power to manage its own internal affairs, on the other.
10 5
Expansive application of the international laws of war to noninternational conflicts
would threaten to erode state sovereignty. Thus, although the traditional formalistic
subjects. The First and Second Geneva Conventions address the treatment of sick and
wounded members of ground and naval forces, respectively. See Geneva Convention for
the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31, art. 3; Geneva Convention for the
Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed
Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85, art. 3. The Third Convention
concerns the treatment of prisoners of war, and the Fourth concerns the treatment of
civilians and other protected persons. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, art. 3 [hereinafter
GCPW]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, art. 3 [hereinafter GCCP].
102 Wars seeking self-determination, independence from colonial rule, and other so-
called "wars of national liberation" were the primary impetus for the addition of Protocols I
and II to the Geneva Conventions in 1977. See Berman, supra note 97, at 24-31; Catherine
Bloom, The Classification of Hezbollah in Both International and Non-International
Armed Conflicts, 14 ANN. SURV. INT'L & COMP. L. 61, 70 (2008); Derek Jinks, The
Declining Significance of POW Status, 45 HARV. INT'L L.J. 367, 409 & n.255, 412 (2004);
see also Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949, and Relating to
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S.
3, art. 1, para. 4 [hereinafter Protocol I] (stating that Protocol I applies to "armed conflicts
in which peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and against
racist regimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination"); Protocol Additional to
the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of
Non-International Armed Conflicts, Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609, art. 1 [hereinafter
Protocol II] (stating that Protocol II applies to "all armed conflicts which are not covered
by Article 1 of [Protocol I] and which take place in the territory of a High Contracting
Party between its armed forces and dissident armed forces").
103 This point is elaborated in greater detail infra Parts IJ.A. 1 (international) and Part
III.A.2 (non-international).
104 See Jinks, supra note 97, at 190-95.
105 See Berman, supra note 97, at 32-33; Jensen, supra note 97, at 224-26.
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distinction between international and noninternational war no longer determines
the applicability of any international law, it continues to be a decisive factor in
determining which, and consequently how much, international law applies under
the Geneva Conventions framework.
Today, in the aggregate, the international laws of war regulate military and
paramilitary violence involving formal and informal armed forces in conflicts
between or within nation-states. Even this relatively broad conceptual framework,
however, does not neatly encompass the threat posed by al Qaeda and similar
terrorist groups. Thus, applying the existing laws of war to transnational terrorist
organizations is pragmatically and conceptually problematic. At the same time, the
laws of war provide an important starting point for assessing terrorism as a
military, rather than criminal, threat.
1. Combatants, Noncombatants, and War Criminals
In either type of conflict, international or noninternational, the classification
of persons as combatants or as noncombatants is fundamental to the existing laws
of war.106 Most significantly, the classification has important effects in three
principal areas: targeting by military force, authority for detention, and exposure to
punishment. Whether a person is a combatant or a noncombatant is perhaps the
most critical determination in assessing his or her rights, protections, and fate
under the laws of war.
First, combatants may be targeted by military force in the hostilities but
noncombatants may not.10 7 Combatants are personally involved in the fighting,
106 See MOIR, supra note 98, at 139, 144-49, 150-53, 156-60 (noting that protections
for civilians apply in non-international armed conflicts, and further noting that regulations
on methods of war and prohibitions on crimes against humanity and war crimes apply in
non-international armed conflicts); Fionnuala Ni Aoldin, Hamdan and Common Article 3:
Did the Supreme Court Get It Right?, 91 MINN. L. REv. 1523, 1527 (2007) ("Significantly,
it does not formally address the status of combatants at all-the term does not arise in the
language of Common Article 3. Nonetheless, Common Article 3 necessarily presumes the
existence of combatants, because by protecting civilians, the article explicitly affirms the
existence of hostilities, which inevitably draws attention to the legal status of those persons
engaged in violence."); see also Jensen, supra note 97, at 218-29, 248 (explaining the
efforts to distinguish lawful and unlawful combatants after the experience of World War
II); Jinks, supra note 102, at 379, 437; Derek Jinks, Protective Parity and the Laws of War,
79 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1493, 1497-99, 1524 (2004) (noting that, historically, post-
capture protection was only extended to non-combatants and lawful combatants); Kenneth
Watkin, Warriors Without Rights? Combatants, Unprivileged Belligerents, and the
Struggle over Legitimacy 1-8 (Harvard Univ., Program on Humanitarian Policy and
Conflict Research, Occasional Paper No. 2, 2005), available at www.hpcr.org
/pdfs/OccasionalPaper2.pdf (describing the difficulty in classifying the September 11 th
attacks within the traditional paradigm of armed conflict).
107 See generally INGRID DETTER, THE LAW OF WAR 132-50, 276-87 (2d ed. 2000)
(noting the importance of distinguishing between civilians and combatants to ensure only
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making them legitimate military targets in the conflict. 10 8 For example, military
bases, troop convoys, and ammunition depots are legitimate military targets. 1°9 By
contrast, noncombatants may not be targeted for military attack.110 In fact,
intentional attack against noncombatants constitutes a war crime."1 But not all
harm to noncombatants is automatically a violation of the laws of war-some
detriment to noncombatants is inevitable during armed conflict. The doctrine of
"collateral damage" recognizes this eventuality and provides that when
noncombatant casualties occur as incidental effects of legitimate combatant
activities, no violation of the laws of war takes place.11 2 For example, civilians
killed when a munitions factory is bombed and destroyed are collateral damage.
11 3
Thus, the classification of persons as combatants or noncombatants plays a
significant role in the execution of military operations in the conflict.
Second, combatants may be detained with far greater authority than
noncombatants. As will be discussed below, the details of the applicable detention
rules vary between international and noninternational conflicts, the basic
underlying reason for the classification remains the same. Combatants, even those
who have surrendered or been captured, pose a significant continuing threat to
their enemy; accordingly, they may be detained to incapacitate them from further
participation in hostilities. Noncombatants, by contrast, are by definition not
combatants are targeted); YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE
LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 27-29, 87-99 (2004) (noting that "[l]awful
combatants can attack enemy combatants or military objectives ... but ... civilians enjoy
general protection against dangers arising from military operations"); LESLIE C. GREEN,
THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 122-25 (2d ed. 2000) (discussing
targeting rules applicable to the conduct of hostilities); Kenneth Watkin, Controlling the
Use of Force: A Role for Human Rights Norms in Contemporary Armed Conflict, 98 AM. J.
INT'L. L. 1, 14-17 (2004) (noting that the "use of force must be controlled to ensure that is
it used intentionally only against valid military objectives").
108 See GREEN, supra note 107, at 122-25; Watkin, supra note 107, at 16 ("[P]ersons
taking a direct part in hostilities are subject to being lawfully targeted by the opposing
force.").
109 See DINSTEIN, supra note 107, at 27-29.
110 See id. at 87-94; GREEN, supra note 107, at 155-57, 159-61, 190-93; Watkin,
supra note 107, at 15 ("Although thirty countries have not ratified Additional Protocol I,
the targeting provisions are largely seen as reflective of customary international
law ... [including] the strict limitation of attacks to 'military objectives."').
... DINSTEIN, supra note 107, at 230-32; see also GCCP, supra note 101, art. 146
(providing that state parties must enact legislation imposing penal sanctions for violating
any provision of the GCCP); Protocol I, supra note 102, arts. 51(2), 52(1) (prohibiting
civilian populations and "civilian objects" as "object[s] of attack or of reprisals").
112 See DINSTEIN, supra note 107, at 123-25; Watkin, supra note 107, at 16.
Moreover, using noncombatants as "human shields" for a military target is a violation by
the side exploiting its own civilians, not by the side which legitimately attacks the target.
See DINSTEIN, supra note 107, at 129-31.
113 See GREEN, supra note 107, at 49 n. 186.
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participating directly in hostilities and therefore should not be detained except
when necessary.
Third, only certain combatants may be prosecuted and punished for their
participation in the conflict. Again, the details vary between international and
nonintemational conflicts and will be discussed below, but the underlying rationale
is identical. Persons who qualify as privileged combatants possess a legal
immunity, but persons who are unprivileged combatants lack immunity and
therefore may be prosecuted and punished for their mere participation in hostilities.
The classification of a person as a noncombatant is profound, but it is not
immutable. It is possible, of course, for someone who might previously have been
a noncombatant to become a combatant. For example, enlisting in the regular
armed forces or a militia turns the individual into a combatant, as does joining a
spontaneous uprising against invading forces.
114
On the other hand, rendering aid to the soldiers of one's country, without
personally taking up arms or actively assisting in the conduct of hostilities, does
not make one a combatant. For example, citizens who provide food or shelter to
soldiers, or who otherwise support the overall war effort, remain noncombatants.
115
Significantly, the laws of war do not recognize inchoate or vicarious combatant
status; either an individual is himself a combatant or he is not.1 16 Only personally
taking up arms, as part of a formal or informal armed force, changes a
noncombatant's status into a combatant in the armed conflict.
117
114 See GCPW, supra note 101, art. 4(A).
115 See Watkin, supra note 107, at 16 ("Civilians such as industrial workers have often
prompted moral questions concerning their degree of contribution to the war effort.
Additional Protocol I specifically protects them from intentional attack 'unless and for such
time as they take a direct part in hostilities."' (quoting Protocol I, supra note 102, art.
51(3))); see also DINSTEIN, supra note 107, at 27-28 (noting that "a mere contribution to
the general warfare effort (e.g., by supplying foodstuffs to combatants) is not tantamount to
active participation in hostilities").
116 See Watkins, supra note 107, at 16-17.
117 See, e.g., Jinks, supra note 106, at 1497 ("Noncombatants are granted immunity
from attack so long as they do not participate directly in the hostilities."); Watkin, supra
note 106, at 9-11, 32 (stating that direct participation in hostilities eliminates civilian
status); Watkin, supra note 107, at 15 (noting that "the fundamental tenet of the obligation
to distinguish between persons who take part in hostilities and those who do not"); see also
GCPW, supra note 101, art. 3 (protecting, inter alia, "[p]ersons taking no active part in the
hostilities"). The Fourth Convention also emphasizes personal involvement in hostilities.
See GCCP, supra note 101, art. 5 (declaring that, if "an individual protected person is
definitely suspected of or engaged in activities hostile to the security of the State," such a
person is not entitled to certain rights and privileges); Jinks, supra note 102, at 389
("Derogation [under GCCP Article 5] therefore requires that the detaining state know or
have good reason to suspect that a particular individual has engaged in hostile acts. This
requirement, in general, poses no great difficulty in the case of unlawful combatants, who,




Despite the importance of the combatant/noncombatant classification
decision, however, the Geneva Conventions sometimes fail to specify which
provisions are intended to apply in which scenarios, leading to disagreements over
their application. The most prominent example of this is the dispute over which
provisions, and accordingly which protections, apply to "unlawful combatants"
who have failed to comply with the laws of war. Notwithstanding some
interpretive difficulties, the classification remains crucial to the existing laws of
war.
Finally, persons involved in the commission of war crimes may be prosecuted
and punished for their conduct in violation of the laws of war regardless of their
otherwise applicable status. Combatants who commit war crimes during hostilities
are culpable; so too are noncombatants who order or otherwise participate in their
commission. 118 Furthermore, unlike the determination of combatant status, the
liability rules for war crimes are significantly broader than direct, personal
participation in the actual act of commission. For instance, under the doctrine of
"command responsibility," military officers are accountable for the war crimes
committed by their subordinates, including ones the officer did not personally
order or direct.1 19 In addition, persons who aid and abet the commission of war
crimes by personally providing some direct, substantial assistance to the actual
perpetrators are vicariously liable.120 Vicarious liability also is available under the
international criminal law doctrine of "joint criminal enterprise," which in some
circumstances may impose liability for additional, foreseeable war crimes
committed in furtherance of the commission of other war crimes.121 By contrast,
international war crimes law does not recognize inchoate liability for attempted
war crimes; only completed war crimes may be prosecuted.122 Likewise,
international law does not recognize liability to the full extent of U.S. conspiracy
law's inchoate-offense and expansive Pinkerton vicarious liability.
123
118 See Mark David Maxwell & Sean M. Watts, "Unlawful Enemy Combatant":
Status, Theory or Culpability, or Neither?, 5 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 19, 21 (2007).
119 See DINSTEIN, supra note 107, at 237-43; GREEN, supra note 107, at 280-81, 303-
04 (noting that a commander is vicariously liable because a commander may delegate
authority to act, but may not delegate responsibility); Allison Marston Danner & Jenny S.
Martinez, Guilty Associations: Joint Criminal Enterprise, Command Responsibility, and
the Development of International Criminal Law, 93 CAL. L. REV. 75, 120-31 (2005).
120 See Danner & Martinez, supra note 119, at 102, 120, 141; Joseph Rikhof,
Complicity in International Criminal Law and Canadian Refugee Law, 4 J. INT'L CRiM.
JUST. 702, 704-07 (2006).
121 Danner & Martinez, supra note 119, at 103-20; Rikhof, supra note 120, at 708-
09; see also Prosecutor v. Tadid, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment, ICTY Appeals Chamber,
paras. 190, 220-228 (Jul. 15, 1999) (noting that individuals acting in accordance with a
common plan, design, or purpose are responsible for ensuing criminal conduct).
122 See Danner & Martinez, supra note 119, at 118-19.
123 See Brief of Amici Curiae Specialists in Conspiracy and International Law at 7-8,
19-21, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (No. 05-184); Danner & Martinez,
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Thus, the laws of war mark a sharp distinction between the definition of
combatant status, which depends on some form of direct personal participation in
hostilities, and responsibility for the commission of war crimes, which imputes
liability for some forms of indirect involvement. It may be important, then, to
determine which is the relevant status in a given situation: combatant,
noncombatant, or war criminal.
2. International Armed Conflicts
A substantial body of the international laws of war-in particular the four
Geneva Conventions, most famously the Third, which addresses prisoners of
war-applies to the treatment of persons involved in and affected by international
armed conflicts. 124 Under the Conventions, international armed conflicts include all
"armed conflicts" between states, regardless of whether they are declared wars in
the traditional sense, have some other status under domestic law, or even when one
side refuses to legally recognize the conflict. 125 The Conventions define various
categories of persons who are subject to protection under various provisions, and
delineate the obligations the state parties to the conflict owe to them.
supra note 119, at 118-19; George P. Fletcher, Hamdan Confronts the Military
Commissions Act of 2006, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 427, 440-55 (2007); see also
Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 598-613 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion) ("In sum, the sources that the
Government and Justice Thomas rely upon to show that conspiracy to violate the law of
war is itself a violation of the law of war in fact demonstrate quite the opposite."). Some
critics fear that the scope of joint criminal enterprise liability in international criminal law
is becoming not so different from Pinkerton. See, e.g., Danner & Martinez, supra note 119,
at 136-37; Mark Osiel, The Banality of Good: Aligning Incentives Against Mass Atrocity,
105 COLUM. L. REv. 1751, 1796-1800 (2005).
124 See supra note 101 (citing the four Geneva Conventions). See generally DETTER,
supra note 107, at 17-20, 25-26 (discussing general principles of the law of armed
conflict). In litigation arising from the war on terror, U.S. courts have focused on the
provisions of the Third Convention. See, e.g., Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 618-19; Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 515 (2004); United States v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541, 553
(E.D. Va. 2002).
125 See GCPW, supra note 101, art. 2, para. 1 (stating that "the present Convention
shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise
between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not
recognized by one of them"). Technically, of course, the Convention only applies to
signatories. See id. (referring to its application to conflicts "between two or more of the
High Contracting Parties"). Nonetheless, signatories always are bound to apply the
Convention among themselves, even if third parties to an armed conflict are not
signatories; they likewise are bound to apply the Convention "in relation to" any non-
signatory state that "accepts and applies the provisions thereof' in the conflict. See id art.
2, para. 3. Common Article 2 is identical in all four Geneva Conventions. See supra note
124 and accompanying text.
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The Third Convention covers a large and significant class of protected
persons: prisoners of war. The basic structure of the Convention's application is
straightforward: persons who are combatants in international armed conflicts are
obliged to comply with certain rules of war, and in return they receive certain
protections as "prisoners of war" upon surrender or capture. 26 Persons who qualify
as POWs also are referred to as "lawful combatants" or the older moniker
"privileged belligerents," although the Convention itself does not use those
labels.
1 27
Lawful combatants must comply with several important obligations. First,
they must obey the "principle of distinction," which requires that combatants be
clearly distinguishable from noncombatants to enable opposing forces to readily
and correctly identify legitimate targets and avoid improper ones. 128 To ensure
distinction, combatants must wear distinctive uniforms or emblems, and they must
bear arms openly. 129 Second, lawful combatants must conform their operations in
hostilities to the laws of war and follow principles of command responsibility to
ensure accountability for compliance and noncompliance. 130 These four obligations
apply not only to members of the regular armed forces of a state, but also to
126 See id. art. 4(A) ("Prisoners of war, in the sense of the present Convention, are
persons belonging to one of the following categories, who have fallen into the power of the
enemy .... "). See generally DETTER, supra note 107, at 148-50, 326-36 (discussing the
legal effects of combatant status and prisoner of war status); DINSTEIN, supra note 107, at
29-33 (discussing lawful and unlawful combatants); GREEN, supra note 107, at 196-215
(reviewing the application of the Conventions to prisoners of war); HILAIRE MCCOUBREY,
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: THE REGULATION OF ARMED CONFLICTS 80-108
(1990) (discussing the protection of prisoners of war).
127 See DINSTEIN, supra note 107, at 29-33 (noting the labels); GREEN, supra note
107, at 102-09, 117-18 (noting the labels). The converse labels for unprotected parties are
"unlawful combatant" and "unprivileged combatant." See Berman, supra note 97, at 13-15
(referring to the "unprivileged combatant" label as "the more correct form"); Jinks, supra
note 102, at 379 (noting the labels); Watkin, supra note 106, at 12-13 (noting the labels).
128 See DETTER, supra note 107, at 136; Jinks, supra note 102, at 379 (discussing the
"rule of distinction"); Watkin, supra note 106, at 8-11, 29-33 (discussing the "principle of
distinction"). Given its fundamental importance, weakening the principle of distinction
"would risk unraveling the fabric of international humanitarian law." Jinks, supra note 106,
at 1524; see also EDWARD KWAKWA, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT:
PERSONAL AND MATERIAL FIELDS OF APPLICATION 39-42 (1992) (explaining that the
principle of distinction has acquired the status of customary international law).
129 See GCPW, supra note 101, art. 4(A)(2)(b) ("fixed distinctive sign recognizable at
a distance"); id. art. 4(A)(2)(c) ("carrying arms openly"); DINSTEIN, supra note 107, at 37-
39 ("fixed distinct emblem[s] recognizable at a distance").
130 See GCPW, supra note 101, art. 4(A)(2)(a) ("being commanded by a person
responsible for his subordinates"); id. art. 4(A)(2)(d) ("conducting their operations in
accordance with the laws and customs of war"); see also Watkin, supra note 106, at 25-37
(discussing command responsibility principle and compliance requirement).
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irregular forces, militias, and organized resistance movements. 31  Similar
requirements apply to members of a spontaneous armed resistance against invading
troops.
132
Combatants who comply with these requirements are entitled, upon capture
by the enemy, to treatment as prisoners of war under the Third Convention.
133
Among other protections, POWs must receive humane treatment during detention
and cannot be interrogated for military intelligence. 134 POWs must also be
repatriated when the conflict ends.1 35 In addition, POWs receive "combatant
immunity," which protects them from prosecution or punishment in military or
civilian proceedings for their mere participation in the armed conflict.136 POWs
131 See GCPW, supra note 101, art. 4(A)(1)-(2). The text of the Third Convention
explicitly lists the four requirements as applicable to irregulars in Article 4(A)(2), but does
not list them in Article 4(A)(1) regarding regular armed forces. See Jinks, supra note 102,
at 372-73 n.24. Accordingly, it is unclear whether members of regular armed forces must
comply with the four requirements to obtain POW status. See id. at 372-73 n.24 ("As the
current POW controversy illustrates, states and commentators take divergent views on this
question."). Some commentators and international lawyers argue that the Convention
drafters intended the requirements not to apply to regular armed forces, who would be
protected as POWs even if they did not meet the requirements. See Berman, supra note 97,
at 41-42 (discussing this interpretation); Robert M. Chesney, Leaving Guant6namo: The
Law of International Detainee Transfers, 40 U. RICH. L. REv. 657, 718-28 (2006)
(discussing the "implicit inclusion" interpretation of Article 4). Others assert that regular
armed forces inherently meet the four requirements, so that it was necessary to list the
requirement only for kinds of forces that would not inherently meet them. See Berman,
supra note 97, at 42-43 (discussing this interpretation); see also DINSTEIN, supra note 107,
at 36 (noting interpretation controversy). It is difficult to reach a conclusive interpretation
of the intended meaning of Article 4 because the underlying policies justifying the
definitions of lawful combatant status point in conflicting directions. See Berman, supra
note 97, at 43-50 (noting various interpretations of Article 4); see also Watkin, supra note
106, at 20-23 (discussing the historical origins of the four criteria as a compromise
between the military capabilities and interests of powerful states and weaker states).
132 See GCPW, supra note 101, art. 4(A)(6) (stating that insurgents who
"spontaneously take up arms to resist invading forces, without having had time to form
themselves into regular armed units" which have uniforms and command responsibility are
nonetheless required to bear arms openly and comply with the rules of war).
133 See id. arts. 12-125 (protecting prisoners of war); DINSTEIN, supra note 107, at
43-44 (noting that both the group to which the individual belongs, and the individual
personally, must satisfy the requirements for lawful combatant status).
134 See GCPW, supra note 101, art. 13 (humane treatment); id. art. 17 (limits on
interrogation).135 See id. arts. 117-118.
136 Jinks, supra note 102, at 376 n.38 ("This privilege is, as a formal matter, extra-
conventional in that the Geneva Conventions do not expressly accord any such privilege. It
is nevertheless universally recognized."); see also DINSTEIN, supra note 107, at 31
(discussing combatant immunity); Berman, supra note 97, at 9-15 (same); Jinks, supra
note 102, at 436-37 (same); Jinks, supra note 106, at 1500, 1502 n.21, 1520-21 (same). If
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may be prosecuted, however, for war crimes committed during the course of
hostilities in the same manner and by the same courts-martial as the detaining
country would use to prosecute and punish its own soldiers for the same
offenses. 137
Not all participants in an international armed conflict will comply with the
Convention's obligations. Such "unlawful combatants" or "unprivileged
belligerents " 138 accordingly are denied the protections of POW status under the
Convention.139 For example, the war fought in Afghanistan in 2001-2002 between
the United States and the Taliban regime was an international armed conflict.
140
The Taliban's armed forces failed to meet the requirements of the Geneva
Conventions, at least in part because they did not wear distinctive emblems or
uniforms.14 1 Accordingly, the Bush Administration maintained that captured
Taliban soldiers were categorically not combatants entitled to POW status.
142
If a captured soldier's compliance with the Third Convention's requirements
is disputed, the Convention requires that he be given the protections of POW status
until a "competent tribunal" determines his status one way or the other.
143
Although the Bush Administration initially argued that no such tribunals were
necessary because Taliban soldiers could not possibly dispute their noncompliance
with the Convention requirements, military review boards ultimately were
convened to determine the status of the detainees at Guantanamo Bay.
144
POWs commit crimes while detained, they may be prosecuted and punished for those
offenses by court-martial. See GCPW, supra note 101, arts. 82-108.
137 See GCPW, supra note 101, arts. 82, 84, 99.
138 See supra note 127.
139 See DETTER, supra note 107, at 141, 148; DINSTEIN, supra note 107, at 31-33;
GREEN, supra note 107, at 105-09, 118; Berman, supra note 97, at 13-15; Jinks, supra
note 102, at 378-79; Jinks, supra note 106, at 1506, 1518-19; Watkin, supra note 106, at
45-67.
140 See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 547, 628-29 & n.60 (2006) (noting that U.S.
conflict with the Taliban was an international armed conflict); see also DINSTEIN, supra
note 107, at 47-50 (discussing applicability of GCPW to Taliban and al Qaeda in the
Afghanistan conflict).
141 See, e.g., United States v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541, 557-58 (E.D. Va. 2002)
(concluding that the Taliban did not bear arms openly, lacked command responsibility, and
failed to comply with the rules of war); DINSTEIN, supra note 107, at 47-48 (emphasizing
that Taliban forces did not wear uniforms or emblems).
142 See Brett Shumate, New Rules for a New War: The Applicability of the Geneva
Conventions to Al-Qaeda and Taliban Detainees Captured in Afghanistan, N.Y. INT'L L.
REV., Summer 2005, at 4-10, 28-42 (discussing Bush Administration interpretations of the
Geneva Conventions as applied to the conflict in Afghanistan with Taliban and al Qaeda
forces).
143 See GCPW, supra note 101, art. 5.
144 See generally Norman Abrams, The Military Commissions Saga, 5 J. INT'L CRIM.
JUST. 2, 4-9 (2007) (describing political and litigation history of challenges to Guantanamo
detentions); Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981, 984-86 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (summarizing
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If unlawful combatants are not entitled to the protections for POWs provided
by the Third Convention, the question remains what protection, if any, they are
eligible to receive under the international laws of war. Historically, the answer was
none. 145 In the past, unprivileged belligerents were at the mercy of their captors,
and could be treated summarily. 146 Some commentators and the Bush
Administration argue that unlawful combatants remain unprotected under the
Geneva Conventions, as well. 147 Other commentators assert that, just as the
Geneva Conventions for the first time extended the laws of war to some intrastate
armed conflicts, they also inaugurated a new, more "human rights"-oriented
regime, in which all persons involved in or affected by an armed conflict are
covered by at least some provisions of at least one of the Conventions. 148
Although the title of the Fourth Convention speaks in terms of the "Protection
of Civilian Persons," its provisions sweep far wider than the colloquial meaning of
civilian. Under the Fourth Convention, "persons protected" are defined to include
"those who, at a given moment and in any manner whatsoever, find themselves, in
case of a conflict or occupation, in the hands of' an enemy state, 149 except
the litigation history of Guantanamo detention challenges), rev'd, Boumediene v. Bush,
128 S.Ct. 2229 (2008).
145 See Berman, supra note 97, at 14 n.27; Jinks, supra note 102, at 368-70; Jinks,
supra note 106, at 1498-99; Sean D. Murphy, Evolving Geneva Convention Paradigms in
the "War on Terrorism": Applying the Core Rules to the Release of Persons Deemed
"Unprivileged Combatants," 75 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1105, 1108-13 (2007); Watkin,
supra note 106, at 46-47; see also Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942) (permitting
prosecution by military tribunal of German soldiers whose conduct violated the rules of
war, making them unlawful combatants).
146 See Berman, supra note 97, at 14 n.27; Jinks, supra note 102, at 368-70; Jinks,
supra note 106, at 1498-99; Murphy, supra note 145, at 1108-13; Watkin, supra note 106,
at 46-47; see also Quirin, 317 U.S. at 31, 48 (noting historical tradition of summary
treatment); DETTER, supra note 107, at 148 (stating that "[u]nlawful combatants.., are a
legitimate target for any belligerent action [but] are not, if captured, entitled to any prisoner
of war status. They are also personally responsible for any action they have taken and may
thus be prosecuted and convicted for murder if they have killed an enemy soldier. They are
often summarily tried and enjoy no protection under international law").
147 See Jinks, supra note 106, at 1498-99 nn.9-10 (citing authorities); Shumate, supra
note 142, at 28-42 (describing the Bush Administration's interpretation of the Geneva
Conventions).
148 See Jinks, supra note 106, at 1500 ("[T]he 1949 Geneva Conventions-though
they draw on many structural features of traditional law of war treaties-lay the
foundations for the 'human rights' perspective that so clearly predominates in the 1977
Protocols (and other important developments in humanitarian law)."); see also DINSTEIN,
supra note 107, at 32 (asserting that unlawful combatants are protected by the Fourth
Convention); Watkin, supra note 106, at 50-54 (discussing protections of GCCP).
149 GCCP, supra note 101, art. 4, para. 1 (emphasis added).
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"persons protected by the" First, Second, or Third Conventions. 150 Accordingly,
the text of the Fourth Convention appears to cover unlawful combatants, who fall
into the category of persons not protected by the Third Convention. 151 Moreover,
the Fourth Convention specifically authorizes derogation from rights otherwise
applicable under its terms152 for "an individual protected person [who] is definitely
suspected of or engaged in activities hostile to the security of the" enemy state.
153
This provision can be seen as an explicit reference to unlawful combatants, and an
acknowledgement that their protection under the Fourth Convention justifiably is
narrower than that given to noncombatants. 154 Importantly, however, the
Convention's protections for fair trials cannot be derogated, 155 which would
impose a significant restriction on the summary treatment of unlawful
combatants.
156
Thus, under this interpretation of the Fourth Convention, unlawful combatants
receive some protections similar to those granted to POWs. 157 Like POWs,
unlawful combatants may be detained in military custody158 until they are
repatriated when the conflict ends. 159 Unlike POWs, however, unlawful
combatants do not receive the protection of combatant immunity; therefore, they
may be prosecuted and punished not only for war crimes, but also for ordinary
150 Id. art. 4, para. 3 (emphasis added); see also GREEN, supra note 107, at 229-43
(discussing protections of GCCP).
151 See Jinks, supra note 102, at 381-87; cf Jason Callen, Unlawful Combatants and
the Geneva Conventions, 44 VA. J. INT'L L. 1025, 1028-29 (2004) (agreeing that the Fourth
Convention applies to unlawful combatants captured while operating in the home territory
of the capturing belligerent state, but arguing, based on the Convention's text and its
drafting history at the Geneva Conference, that it does not apply to "battlefield unlawful
combatants" such as those detained by U.S. forces in Afghanistan or pre-occupation Iraq).
152 Like the Third Convention, the Fourth Convention provides extensive protections
for protected persons. See GCCP, supra note 101, arts. 13-141.
153 Id. art. 5, para. 1. The derogation of Fourth Convention rights for such persons is
limited to "such rights and privileges under the present Convention as would, if exercised
in the favour of such individual person, be prejudicial to the security of such State." Id. In
addition, "full rights and privileges of a protected person under the present Convention"
must be restored "at the earliest date consistent with the security of the State." Id. para. 3.
154 See Jinks, supra note 102, at 387-93; Watkin, supra note 106, at 50-54 (analyzing
the scope of protection offered to unlawful combatants under the Fourth Convention).
155 GCCP, supra note 101, art. 5, para. 3 ("[S]uch persons shall nevertheless be
treated with humanity, and in case of trial, shall not be deprived of the rights of fair and
regular trial prescribed by the present Convention .... ."). Many of these rights, see id arts.
71-76, apply in trials taking place in the territory of the detaining country, see id. art. 126.
156 See Jinks, supra note 102, at 397-99, 404-09.
157 Id. at 405-09, 424; Watkin, supra note 106, at 51-52, 68; compare GCCP, supra
note 101, arts. 5, 71-76 (trial rights under the Fourth Convention), with GCPW, supra note
101, arts. 105-108 (trial rights under the Third Convention).
158 See Jinks, supra note 102, at 418.
159 See GCCP, supra note 101, arts. 35-38, 77, 132-135.
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offenses like murder in connection with their mere participation in hostilities.
160
Compared to lawful combatants, this is a substantial disadvantage.
Even if the Fourth Convention applies to unlawful combatants, however, its
coverage is, like the Third Convention, limited to international armed conflicts
between states. 161 As a result, the Convention only applies to enemy nationals-
that is, nationals of opposing states in the armed conflict. 162 The Convention does
not apply to a state's own nationals, and it does not apply to nationals of allied or
neutral states with which ordinary diplomatic relations exist.
1 63
Another provision of the Geneva Conventions also may apply to unlawful
combatants in an international armed conflict. As discussed in more detail below,
Common Article 3 of the four Conventions applies to all persons detained in an
armed conflict, including former combatants, and prohibits the imposition of
punishment without a trial by a regular court with significant procedural
fairness. 164 Although its text would appear to indicate otherwise, the international
law consensus is clear that Common Article 3 applies in international armed
conflicts. 165 Thus, even if captive unlawful combatants are not protected by the
160 See DINSTEIN, supra note 107, at 30-31; Jinks, supra note 102, at 422, 437;
Maxwell & Watts, supra note 118, at 23-25; Watkin, supra note 106, at 49 (noting that
engaging in hostilities as an unlawful combatant is not, by itself, a war crime, but persons
who are unlawful combatants are unprotected by combatant immunity for prosecution for
ordinary crimes arising from their activities during hostilities).
161 See GCCP, supra note 101, art. 2, para. 1.
162 See id art. 4, para. 1 ("Persons protected by the Convention are those who ... find
themselves, in case of a conflict... in the hands of a Party to the conflict... of which they
are not nationals."). The Fourth Convention also applies to territory of an enemy state
occupied by the invading state's military forces. Id. ("Persons protected by the Convention
are those who... find themselves, in case of a[n] ... occupation, in the hands of
a[n] ... Occupying Power of which they are not nationals.").
163 See id. art. 4 para. 2 ("Nationals of a neutral State who find themselves in the
territory of a belligerent State, and nationals of a co-belligerent State, shall not be regarded
as protected persons while the State of which they are nationals has normal diplomatic
representation in the State in whose hands they are."). The only exception is Articles 13 to
26, pertaining primarily to access to medical treatment and facilities by the sick and
wounded, which apply to all persons regardless of nationality. See id. art. 13.
164 See infra notes 176-183 and accompanying text.
165 See Jinks, supra note 102, at 402-03 & nn. 195-206 (citing numerous international
law sources); see also D1NSTE1N, supra note 107, at 32-33 (asserting that unlawful
combatants in international armed conflicts are protected by Common Article 3). In
particular, Article 75 of the 1977 Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions
"clarifies that the protections codified in Common Article 3 apply, as a matter of positive
international law, to all armed conflicts." Jinks, supra note 102, at 403 & n.205. Although
the United States has not ratified Protocol I, see Jinks, supra note 102, at 385 n. 114, "the
United States does not object to Article 75 of Additional Protocol I... [, and] indeed, the
United States recognizes that these minimum protections are part of customary
international law." Id. at 409 n.255. The provisions that the United States did object to
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overall provisions of the Fourth Convention, they are at least covered by Common
Article 3.166
The laws of war provide a detailed set of rules for combatants and
noncombatants involved in or affected by international armed conflicts.
Combatants of both types, lawful and unlawful, are legitimate military targets
during hostilities. 167 During the fighting, the differential status makes no
difference. Moreover, upon their surrender or capture, both lawful and unlawful
combatants are subject to detention to incapacitate them from further participation
in the conflict and are given significant protections by the Geneva Conventions.
The distinction between the two groups arises in their susceptibility to prosecution
and punishment. Lawful combatants have combatant immunity; therefore, they can
be punished only for war crimes under regular courts-martial used against
members of the detaining state's own forces. Unlawful combatants, by contrast,
lack combatant immunity and may be tried not only for war crimes, but also for
mere participation in hostilities. Finally, noncombatants may not be targeted by
military force, and since they have by definition not participated in hostilities, they
are not subject to prosecution for crimes relating to the hostilities other than war
crimes. Enemy noncombatant nationals may be detained under military authority,
subject to the strictures of the Fourth Convention. 
168
3. Noninternational Armed Conflicts
The international laws of war and the Geneva Conventions also provide rules
for dealing with an "armed conflict not of an international character." 169 Rather
than involving cross-border armed conflicts between two states, such conflicts
were those provisions that expanded definitions of lawful combatant status in Article 44 of
Protocol I. See id. at 385 n.114.
166 See Jinks, supra note 102, at 403-09 (discussing the application of Common
Article 3's protections to unlawful combatants).
167 See Watkin, supra note 107, at 16 (emphasizing "the fact that persons taking a
direct part in hostilities are subject to being lawfully targeted by the opposing
force ... [and that c]onsequently, the principle of distinction is perhaps more accurately
described as distinguishing between combatants, legal or otherwise, and those civilians
who do not take a direct part in hostilities").
168 For example, noncombatants and other protected persons should be interned
separately from prisoners of war. See GCCP, supra note 101, art. 84.
169 GCPW, supra note 101, art. 3; see, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 631-
32 (2006) (discussing scope of Common Article 3). See generally DETTER, supra note 107,
at 39-49 (analyzing international aspects of civil wars and internal wars); GREEN, supra
note 107, at 317-35 (summarizing the traditional view and application of the Conventions
to nonintemational conflicts); HILAIRE McCouBREY & NIGEL D. WHITE, INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND ARMED CONFLICT 317-27 (1992) (analyzing the application of Additional
Protocol II and Common Article 3 to internal armed conflicts); MOIR, supra note 98, at 23-
67 (analyzing scope and applicability of Common Article 3).
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occur within the territory of one or more signatory states. 170 Civil wars for control
of a state's government and regional secessionist movements are classic examples
of "armed conflicts not of international character., 171 Thus, by extending coverage
to noninternational armed conflicts, the Geneva Conventions specifically
contemplate the application of the international laws of war to some kinds of
hostilities between a state on one side and nonstate actors on the other.
172
As explained above, rather than simply transposing the rules applicable to
international armed conflicts to noninternational ones, the states that drafted the
Conventions deliberately chose to apply different, far narrower rules to such
conflicts. 173 The Third Convention's protections for lawful combatants do not
apply in noninternational armed conflicts. 174 The Fourth Convention's extensive
protections for noncombatants and other protected persons are likewise
inapplicable.
175
A single provision of the Geneva Conventions, Common Article 3, applies to
noninternational armed conflicts. 176 Unlike the rules applicable to international
170 See GCPW, supra note 101, art. 3 ("In the case of armed conflict not of an
international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting
Parties ...."). It is important to emphasize that this language in Common Article 3 is
meant to provide jurisdiction for applying the Conventions' provisions in the first place
(because, after all, only signatories to the Conventions are bound by their terms), not to
limit the scope of Common Article 3's applicability to only certain types of non-
international conflicts. See Jinks, supra note 97, at 189 n.45 ("The actual purpose of this
language, as the drafting history and subsequent commentary make clear, was to require a
jurisdictional nexus between the conflict and a state party to the treaty. In other words, this
clause should be understood to mean that the armed conflict must occur in the territory of
at least one of the High Contracting Parties.") (citations omitted) (emphasis added); see
also MOIR, supra note 98, at 31 (discussing this interpretation); Jinks, supra note 98, at 40-
41 (arguing that Common Article 3 should be interpreted to apply to "armed conflicts
between a state and a foreign-based (or transnational) armed group or an internal armed
conflict that spills over an international border into the territory of another state").
171 See Jinks, supra note 97, at 188 (noting that civil wars were the "paradigmatic"
situation of intra-state armed conflict covered by the Geneva Conventions).
172 See id. at 182-89; Jinks, supra note 98, at 10-13, 39-41; see also Berman, supra
note 97, at 18-22, 47-50 (discussing the expansion of the international laws of war to
include internal armed conflicts).
173 See supra notes 100-105 and accompanying text; see also Ni Aolain, supra note
106, at 1527-34 (discussing states' motivations for narrow applicability of Common
Article 3); Jinks, supra note 102, at 401-02 (describing reasons for narrow applicability of
Common Article 3 to internal armed conflicts).
174 See GCPW, supra note 101, art. 2 ("[T]he present Convention shall apply to..
id. art. 4 (protecting "[p]risoners of war, in the sense of the present Convention").
175 See GCCP, supra note 101, art. 2 ("[T]he present Convention shall apply to...
id. art. 4 ("Persons protected by the [First, Second, or Third Conventions] shall not be
considered as protected persons within the meaning of the present Convention.").
176 See GCPW, supra note 101, art. 3; see also Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557,
629-31(2006) (recognizing that Common Article 3 applies to noninternational armed
2008] 1291
UTAH LAW REVIEW
armed conflicts, Common Article 3 does not expressly distinguish between lawful
and unlawful combatants, or between combatants and noncombatants, in the
protection it provides. Common Article 3 applies to all "[p]ersons taking no active
part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their
arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other
cause." 177 It protects persons who have remained noncombatants throughout the
conflict, but it also "expressly covers persons who take up arms against the state
and applies even to persons who do not lay down their arms voluntarily. 17 8
Regardless of their prior activities, all such persons are entitled to humane
treatment and nondiscrimination; they also are protected against violence and
outrages to personal dignity such as murder, torture, and humiliating or degrading
treatment.
179
Under Common Article 3, the distinction between lawful and unlawful
combatants does not exist and none of the Third Convention's special protections
for lawful combatants apply.1 80 Accordingly, combatant immunity also is
inapplicable, and former combatants may be prosecuted and punished not only for
any war crimes they committed, but also for their mere participation in
hostilities. 8 Just as unlawful combatants in international conflicts no longer may
be treated summarily, Common Article 3 expressly includes a prohibition on "the
passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment
pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees
which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.1 8 2 Thus, all captured
conflicts). The provision is called "Common" Article 3 because it is repeated verbatim in
each of the four Geneva Conventions on the laws of war. See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 629.
177 GCPW, supra note 101, art. 3(1); see also GREEN, supra note 107, at 44-45, 59-
60, 231, 325-29 (discussing specific applications of Common Article 3).
178 Jinks, supra note 106, at 1507 n.55.
179 See GCPW, supra note 101, art. 3(1), (1)(a), (1)(c). Unlike the GCPW and GCCP,
Common Article 3 "does not expressly include a right to release and repatriation at the
close of hostilities." Jinks, supra note 102, at 423.
180 See Berman, supra note 97, at 19-20; Jinks, supra note 98, at 11-14, 18; Watkin,
supra note 106, at 3 & n.9, 5; see also al-Marri v. Wright, 487 F.3d 160, 184-85 & n.13
(4th Cir. 2007) (citing Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, Official Statement: The Relevance of
IHL in the Context of Terrorism, at 1, 3 (Feb. 21, 2005), available at
http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteengO.nsf/html/terrorism-ihl-210705).
181 See DiNSTEIN, supra note 107, at 30-31; Berman, supra note 97, at 20 ("States
remain free, for example, to prosecute rebels in a 'non-international armed conflict' for
murder and treason on the basis of mere participation in combat."); Jinks, supra note 98, at
18 n.118, 42-44; Jinks, supra note 102, at 403-06, 413; Murphy, supra note 145, at 1116;
see also Watkin, supra note 106, at 65-67 (noting the difficulties of applying combatant
status and the principle of distinction concepts to non-international armed conflicts).
182 GCPW, supra note 101, art. 3(1)(d). The content and extent of these indispensable
judicial guarantees were significantly specified and elaborated in Article 75 of Additional
Protocol I in 1977. See Murphy, supra note 145, at 1145-48 (discussing the scope and
applicability of Protocol I art. 75). Although the U.S. has not ratified Protocol I, it has long
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former soldiers from a noninternational conflict cannot be punished without
significant judicial process.
18 3
The laws of war applicable to noninternational armed conflicts are similar to,
but are considerably less detailed than, those for international armed conflicts. In
either type of conflict, combatants are legitimate military targets during hostilities
while noncombatants are not. Also like international conflicts, Common Article 3
contemplates the detention of both noncombatants and former combatants during
the conflict. Other than a few minimal guarantees of fair treatment, however,
Common Article 3 does not constrain the terms and conditions of detention with
anything close to the specificity of the Third and Fourth Conventions. Unlike the
law of international armed conflict, Common Article 3 does not provide for lawful
combatant status or its protections, subjecting all combatants to the possibility of
prosecution and punishment for their mere participation in hostilities--essentially
making all former combatants in noninternational conflicts the equivalent of
unlawful combatants in international conflicts. Like detention, Common Article 3
prescribes minimal standards for the judicial process used to prosecute and punish
former combatants, but not with the scope of the provisions of the Third and
Fourth Conventions.
4. The Bush Administration and the Military Commissions Act of2006
Since shortly after the September 11 th attacks, the Bush Administration has
maintained that members of al Qaeda should be deemed unlawful combatants in an
international armed conflict.18 4 Accordingly, the Administration claims that
captured al Qaeda members are not protected by any provisions of the Geneva
Conventions.
18 5
conceded that Article 75 has become customary international law. See id.; Jinks supra note
102 at 409 n.255, 431 n.359.
183 See MOIR, supra note 98, at 203-08; Jinks, supra note 102, at 434-35.
184 The principal sources containing the legal arguments for the Administration's
positions are two memoranda from high-level officials in the Department of Justice. See
Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att'y Gen., to Alberto Gonzales, Counsel to
the President, & William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel, Dep't of Def (Jan. 22, 2002)
[hereinafter Bybee Memo]; Memorandum from John Yoo & Robert J. Delahunty, Office of
Legal Counsel, Dep't of Justice, to William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel, Dep't of Def. (Jan.
9, 2002) [hereinafter Yoo-Delahunty Memo]. The analysis in these memoranda was later
repeated in numerous public statements and litigation briefs. See Brief for Respondents at
37-43, 48-50, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (No. 05-184); Shumate, supra
note 142, at 4-10, 28-33 (citing Yoo-Delahunty Memo and other sources).
185 See Bybee Memo, supra note 184, at 9-10; Yoo-Delahunty Memo, supra note
184, at 11-14. For criticisms of the Administration's interpretations of international law,
see, e.g., Neil McDonald & Scott Sullivan, Rational Interpretation in Irrational Times: The
Third Geneva Convention and the "War on Terror," 44 HARv. INT'L L.J. 301, 306-07




The Bush Administration's conclusion, however, relies on several highly
contestable legal positions. 186 If the armed conflict is international, the
Administration ignores the applicability of the Fourth Convention to persons not
protected by the Third, 187 which would refute its claim that unlawful combatants
are unprotected.1 88 More prominently, the Administration misinterprets Common
Article 3 in three important ways. First, it claims that Common Article 3 does not
apply in international armed conflicts. 189 Second, it claims that Common Article 3
does not apply to all noninternational armed conflicts; rather, the Administration
claims it only applies to those conflicts that occur within the territorial limits of a
single state, involving hostilities with solely internal forces. 190 Hence, the
Administration claims that Common Article 3 does not apply to the conflict with al
Qaeda because the conflict is outside the scope of both the international conflicts
and the noninternational conflicts rules of the Conventions. 191 As explained above,
186 One of the Administration's positions is that members of al Qaeda do not qualify
as POWs protected under the Third Convention. See Bybee Memo, supra note 184, at 9-
10; Yoo-Delahunty Memo, supra note 184, at 13-14; Shumate, supra note 142, at 30-33,
56-59. If the Third Convention's POW protections were the exclusive applicable
provisions, the Administration's claim might be correct. See supra notes 126-132 and
accompanying text. As described above, however, other provisions of the Conventions also
would be applicable. See supra notes 153-175 and accompanying text.
187 The memoranda acknowledge the existence of the Fourth Convention but do not
discuss its provisions or address its possible applicability. See Bybee Memo, supra note
184, at 1 n. 1; Yoo-Delahunty Memo, supra note 184, at 1 n. 1.
188 See supra notes 148-163, 185 and accompanying text.
189 See Bybee Memo, supra note 184, at 6-9, 31-32 ("Common article 3 ... does not
serve as a catch-all provision that applies to all armed conflicts, but rather as a specific
complement to common article 2."); see also Yoo-Delahunty Memo, supra note 184, at 6-
11 (stating that "common article 3 should not be read to include all forms of non-
international armed conflict").
190 See Bybee Memo, supra note 184, at 6-9 ("Further, common article 3 addresses
only non-international conflicts that occur within the territory of a single state party, again,
like a civil war. This provision would not reach an armed conflict in which one of the
parties operated from multiple bases in several different states."); see also Yoo-Delahunty
Memo, supra note 184, at 6-11 (finding that there is "substantial reason" to think that
common article 3 applies to a civil war or a "large-scale armed conflict between a state and
an armed movement within its own territory").
191 See Bybee Memo, supra note 184, at 10 (asserting that "the Geneva Conventions
were intended to cover either: a) traditional wars between state parties to the Conventions
(article 2), b) or non-international civil wars (article 3). Our conflict with al Qaeda does not
fit into either category. It is not an international war between nation-States because al
Qaeda is not a State. Nor is this conflict a civil war under article 3, because it is a conflict
of 'an international character'); see also Yoo-Delahunty Memo, supra note 184, at 12-13
(asserting that Al Qaeda conflict "is not an international war between Nation States" and
"'not a civil war under Article 3"); Shumate, supra note 142, at 66 (asserting historical
precedent for individuals to fall outside the protection of the Conventions).
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each of these positions is contrary to consensus international law interpretations of
the Conventions.
192
As of August 2008, the federal courts have not addressed in detail the
Administration's claims about the applicability of the international laws of war and
the Geneva Conventions to members of al Qaeda. 193 In its June 2006 Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld decision, the United States Supreme Court rejected the Administration's
approach and applied Common Article 3 to a captured al Qaeda member facing
trial before a military commission convened by the President on his own
authority.194 Importantly, however, the Court did not apply Common Article 3 of
192 First, Common Article 3 does apply in international, as well as non-international
conflicts. See supra notes 164-166 and accompanying text. Second, Common Article 3
does apply to all non-international armed conflicts, not just typical civil wars. See supra
notes 100-105, 169-172 and accompanying text. Thus, there is no "gap" in the
Conventions' coverage because every armed conflict is covered either by the Third and
Fourth Conventions or by Common Article 3. See supra note 170; see also Ni Aoldin,
supra note 106, at 1547-50; Jinks, supra note 97, at 188-89; Jinks, supra note 98, at 40-
41. "[T]he reading of the provision most faithful to its purpose and text is that Common
Article 3 applies, as a formal matter, to all 'armed conflicts' not covered by Common
Article 2." Jinks, supra note 98, at 41.
On the second point, the Bush Administration's position is particularly ironic, given
the impetus for and purpose behind the adoption of Common Article 3.
[T]his understanding of the provision suggests that the most [sic] "civil wars"
fall outside the rule. Most noninternational conflicts are transnational in the
sense that the fighting spills over international borders. Indeed, even the Spanish
Civil War-the historical case most often referenced in the Conventions drafting
process as proof that international regulation of "internal" conflict was
necessary-exhibited important transnational dimensions. [The same is true
for] other paradigmatic applications of Common Article 3 including: Rwanda,
Algeria, the Chechen Republic, Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Congo.
Jinks, supra note 97, at 189 n.45 (citations omitted). Thus, if the Bush Administration's
position were correct, Common Article 3 would not apply to the very conflicts it was
adopted to cover. But see Jinks, supra note 98, at 39-40 & nn.260-267 (noting support for
a narrow interpretation of Common Article 3's scope, and explaining why that
interpretation "does not withstand close scrutiny").
193 A few cases have addressed the applicability of the Conventions to Taliban
fighters, however. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 538-39 (2004); United States v.
Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541, 552-55 (E.D. Va. 2002).
194 See 548 U.S. 557, 628-31 (2006), superseded by statute on other grounds,
Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600, as recognized in
Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S.Ct. 2229, 2234 (2008). Before addressing the merits, the Court
resolved two preliminary matters. First, it held that the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 did
not divest the Court of jurisdiction to hear Hamdan's claim. See id. at 572-84; ef id. at
655-78 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (rejecting that analysis of the DTA). Second, it held that
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its own force, but rather held that its requirements applied because U.S. domestic
law, particularly the Uniform Code of Military Justice, only authorized military
commissions that comported with international law. 195 The Court concluded that
the military commission created to adjudicate the charges against Hamdan failed to
comply with Common Article 3.196 Consequently, the Court did not have to decide
whether the conflict with al Qaeda was international or noninternational, because
Common Article 3 applied regardless. 197 In June 2007, a panel opinion of the U.S.
abstention, by giving comity to ongoing military proceedings, was not appropriate. See id.
at 583-92 (majority opinion).
195 The Court first held that the President had no Congressional authorization to
convene military commissions outside the terms of the UCMJ. See id. at 590-95; id at 636
(Breyer, J., concurring); cf id at 678-83 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
President did not need congressional authorization). A plurality of the Court also
questioned the validity of the conspiracy charge under the laws of war. See id at 595-613
(Stevens, J., plurality opinion); see also id. at 653-55 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (declining
to decide that question); cf id. at 683-706 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (rejecting plurality's
analysis); id. at 725-27 (Alito, J., dissenting) (same). Next, the Court held that the military
commission convened by the President to try Hamdan was not consistent with the UCMJ's
provisions authorizing deviations from regular court-martial procedures in certain
circumstances. See id at 613-25 (majority opinion); id at 636-53 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring); cf id at 706-15 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (rejecting majority's analysis of the
UCMJ). Then the Court turned to the Common Article 3 issues. Id. at 629-33 (majority
opinion).
196 First, the Court held that Hamdan had individual standing to raise non-compliance
with Common Article 3 because, even if the Geneva Conventions did not provide a remedy
to aggrieved individuals, Hamdan could assert the violation of the UCMJ itself. See id. at
625-28; cf id. at 715-19 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (rejecting individual standing). Second,
the Court held that Common Article 3 applied to the conflict with al Qaeda in Afghanistan,
where Hamdan was captured. See id. at 628-31 (majority opinion); cf id at 718-19
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court should defer to the President's contrary
interpretation). Third, the Court held that the military commission convened by the
President to try Hamdan failed to satisfy Common Article 3's "regularly constituted court"
requirement. See id at 627-33 (majority opinion); id at 636-53 (Kennedy, J., concurring);
cf id at 719-21 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (rejecting majority's analysis); id at 725-34
(Alito, J., dissenting). A plurality of the court also opined that several aspects of the
commissions failed to meet the "indispensable" judicial guarantees requirement. See id. at
633-35 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion); id. at 653-55 (Kennedy, J., concurring); cf id. at
721-24 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (rejecting plurality's analysis). Thus, the Court held that
the commissions violated Common Article 3. See id. at 635 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion)
("The commission that the President has convened to try Hamdan does not meet those
requirements.").
197 The Court stated:
Since Hamdan was captured and detained incident to the conflict with al Qaeda
and not the conflict with the Taliban, and since al Qaeda, unlike Afghanistan, is
not a "High Contracting Party"_i.e., a signatory of the Conventions, the
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Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the conflict with al Qaeda was
noninternational, and therefore subject to Common Article 3, but that position did
not garner a majority upon rehearing en banc in July 2008.198
In direct response to the Supreme Court's June decision in Hamdan, in
September the U.S. Congress passed the Military Commissions Act of 2006
(MCA).1 99 The MCA specifically authorizes the President to convene military
protections of those [four Geneva] Conventions are not, it is argued, applicable
to Hamdan.
We need not decide the merits of this argument because there is at least
one provision of the Geneva Conventions that applies here even if the relevant
conflict is not one between signatories.
Id. at 629 (majority opinion). But see Ni Aoldin, supra note 106, at 1535 ("The Court's
decision not to address Hamdan's status in the context of the law of war relevant to the
conflict in Afghanistan is politically understandable but legally regrettable."); see also Jack
M. Beard, The Geneva Boomerang: The Military Commissions Act of 2006 and US.
Counterterror Operations, 101 AM. J. INT'L. L. 56, 63 (2007) ("The Geneva Conventions
fail to explain precisely what constitutes a 'conflict not of an international character' and
no definition of that term enjoys universal acceptance other than statements contrasting it
with its opposite. As a result, it was not a foregone conclusion that the U.S. Supreme Court
in Hamdan would ultimately decide that Qaeda terrorists are engaged in an armed conflict
governed by common Article 3." (quoting MOIR, supra note 98, at 32)).
198 In al-Marri, the Fourth Circuit panel majority relied on Hamdan to find that "the
conflict with al Qaeda in Afghanistan is a non-international conflict." See al-Marri v.
Wright, 487 F.3d 160, 185 (4th Cir. 2007). Accordingly, the panel held that the "enemy
combatant" doctrines applicable in international armed conflicts were inapplicable to al-
Marri and could not justify his military detention. See id. at 184-86. The panel also noted
that the Supreme Court's analysis in Hamdan only recognized the existence of an armed
conflict with al Qaeda in Afghanistan, where Hamdan was captured-not within the United
States, where al-Marri was seized. See id. at 185 n.14.
Interestingly, the panel opinion several times erroneously described the Supreme
Court's analysis in Hamdan as a "holding" on the issue. See id at 184-85. The Supreme
Court in Hamdan did not need to decide whether the conflict with al Qaeda was
international or non-international because, notwithstanding the seemingly contrary
implication of its text, Common Article 3 applies to both kinds of conflicts. See supra note
197 and accompanying text.
On rehearing en banc, the author of the panel opinion reprised these arguments. See
al-Marri v. Wright, 534 F.3d 213, 233-35 (4th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (Motz, J., concurring).
This analysis was not joined by a majority of the judges, however. See id. at 216 (per
curiam opinion of the court). The Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari to review
the en banc decision. See 129 S. Ct. 680 (Dec. 5, 2008).
199 See Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600
(codified at 10 U.S.C. §§ 948a-50w and other sections of titles 18, 28, and 42). The final
bill passed the Senate on September 28, 2006, and the House on September 29. See 152
CONG. REC. S10,420 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 2006); 152 CONG. REc. H7914 (daily ed. Sept. 29,
2006). The bill was presented to the President on October 10, 2006; he signed it on October
17. Library of Congress, THOMAS Bills, Resolutions, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
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commissions for trials of accused terrorists and war criminals.200 Persons subject to
trial by military commission must be noncitizens and must be unlawful enemy
combatants. 2° 1 The MCA authorizes jurisdiction for the military commissions and
includes numerous procedural provisions for the commissions and their
proceedings.20 2 The MCA also lists and defines the offenses triable by the military
203commissions.
The MCA defines an unlawful enemy combatant as "a person who has
engaged in hostilities ... against the United States or its co-belligerents who is not
a lawful enemy combatant., 20 4 The statute specifically defines members of al
Qaeda as unlawful enemy combatants. 20 5 For its definition of lawful enemy
combatant, the MCA draws directly from the Third Convention's provisions on
prisoners of war.20 6 The exclusion of lawful combatants from the MCA accords
bin/bdquery/z?d19:SN03930:@@@X (last visited Dec. 1, 2008). For a summary of the
impetus behind the MCA and the legislative history of its drafting, see Carlos Manuel
Vazquez, The Military Commissions Act, the Geneva Conventions, and the Courts: A
Critical Guide, 101 AM. J. INT'L. L. 73, 73-76 (2007).
200 See 10 U.S.C. § 948b(a)-(b) (2006). In rejoinder to the Supreme Court in Hamdan,
the statute declares that "[a] military commission established under this chapter is a
regularly constituted court, affording all the necessary 'judicial guarantees which are
recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples' for purposes of common Article 3 of the
Geneva Conventions." Id. § 948b(f) (quoting common Article 3). The MCA further
repudiates the Court's analysis of prior law by declaring that the Geneva Conventions are
not a source of rights that may be invoked by an individual war crimes defendant, whether
before the military commission itself or in a habeas corpus proceeding. See id. § 948b(g)
("No alien unlawful enemy combatant subject to trial by military commission under this
chapter may invoke the Geneva Conventions as a source of rights."); Military
Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 5(a), 120 Stat. 2600, 2631 ("No person
may invoke the Geneva Conventions or any protocols thereto in any habeas
corpus ... proceeding to which the United States... is a party as a source of rights in any
court of the United States .... ."); see also Vazquez, supra note 199, at 82-97 (criticizing
and questioning the validity, under international and U.S. law, of these provisions).
201 See 10 U.S.C. § 948c ("Any alien unlawful enemy combatant is subject to trial by
military commission under this chapter."); id § 948a(3) ("The term 'alien' means a person
who is not a citizen of the United States.").
202 See id § 948d (iurisdiction); id §§ 948h-948m (composition of military
commission); id §§ 948q-948s (pretrial procedures); id §§ 949a-949o (trial procedures);
id. §§ 949s-949u (sentencing provisions); id. §§ 950a-950j (post-trial procedures, appeals
and review ofjudgments).
203 See id. §§ 950p-950w (offenses and culpability doctrines).
204 Id. § 948a(1)(A)(i).
205 See id. ("(including a person who is part of the Taliban, al Qaeda, or associated
forces)") (parenthetical clause in original).
206 A lawful enemy combatant is defined as:
(A) a member of the regular forces of a State party engaged in hostilities
against the United States;
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with the Third Convention; although such persons could be prosecuted by the
United States for war crimes, those trials must occur in the same courts-martial
applicable to U.S. soldiers, not in separate, specially constituted military
commissions.20 7 But other combatants, including unlawful combatants in an
international armed conflict or any combatants in a noninternational armed
conflict, are susceptible to coverage by the MCA. Because they lack combatant
immunity, they can be charged with crimes under the laws of war or domestic
law.20 8 Because they are not protected lawful combatants, they need not be tried by
courts-martial. 20 9 Therefore, the MCA's definitional provisions are to this extent
consistent with the existing international laws of war.210
Another aspect of the MCA's definition of unlawful enemy combatants is
highly controversial, however. 211 The MCA reaches not only individuals who
personally participated in hostilities, but also any person "who has purposefully
and materially supported hostilities." 212 By contrast, under international law, only
persons who are "directly" or "actively" engaged in hostilities are deemed to be
combatants. 2 13 Other persons, including those who supported combatants engaged
(B) a member of a militia, volunteer corps, or organized resistance
movement belonging to a State party engaged in such hostilities, which are
under responsible command, wear a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a
distance, carry their arms openly, and abide by the law of war; or
(C) a member of a regular armed force who professes allegiance to a
government engaged in such hostilities, but not recognized by the United States.
Id. § 948a(2). The MCA repeats the structure of the Third Convention's definitions, which
list the four criteria only for irregulars. See supra note 131.
207 See supra notes 136-137 and accompanying text.
208 See supra notes 160, 181 and accompanying text.
209 See supra notes 155-157, 182-183 and accompanying text.
210 Whether the procedures provided in the MCA satisfy the existing international
laws of war is also highly controversial. See supra note 202 (citing MCA procedural
provisions); supra note 157 (citing procedural provisions of GCCP); supra notes 182-183
(citing and discussing procedural requirements of Common Article 3); see, e.g., David
Glazier, Full and Fair by What Measure?: Identifying the International Law Regulating
Military Commission Procedure, 24 B.U. INT'L L.J. 55, 70-94, 97-103 (2006) (noting
disparities between the procedural provisions of the MCA and international law); James G.
Stewart, The Military Commission Act's Inconsistency with the Geneva Conventions: An
Overview, 5 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 26, 29-32, 35-37 (2007) (discussing the divergence
between the MCA's procedures and the procedures of the Geneva Conventions).
211 See Beard, supra note 197, at 59-60, 66-67 (2007) (discussing the MCA's
controversial expansion of combatant status and its divergence from international law).
212 10 U.S.C. § 948a(1)(A)(i) (2006).
213 See supra note 117 (citing sources); see also Jinks, supra note 106, at 1497
("Noncombatants are granted immunity from attack so long as they do not participate
directly in the hostilities.") (emphasis added); GCPW, supra note 101, art. 3 (stating that
"[p]ersons taking no active part in the hostilities" shall not be subjected to inhumane
treatment such as "violence to life and person") (emphasis added).
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in hostilities, are noncombatants.214 The MCA's expansion of combatant status is
therefore plainly inconsistent with existing international law.215
The MCA also defines the full list of war crimes triable by the military
216commissions authorized by the statute. Most of the offenses are traditional
violations of the laws of war, including attacking civilians, denying quarter,
improperly using a flag of truce, and committing rape. 217 In terms generally
consistent with international law, the MCA provides for liability under the doctrine
of command responsibility, holding superior officers accountable for war crimes
committed at their direction or by their subordinates, 218 and imposes vicarious
liability for aiding and abetting.219 But the MCA also includes three controversial
offenses that depart in significant ways from existing international law.
First, the MCA includes "terrorism" as a separate triable offense. It defines
terrorism as intentionally killing or endangering civilians for purposes of
intimidation, coercion, or retaliation.221 This definition of terrorism is taken
214 See supra notes 114-123 and accompanying text; see, e.g., Protocol I, supra note
102, art. 51(3) ("Civilians shall enjoy the protection afforded by this Section, unless and for
such time as they take a direct part in hostilities.") (emphasis added).
215 See Beard, supra note 197, at 59-60, 66-67 (2007) (arguing that the distinction
between noncombatants and combatants "remains a bedrock principle of the law of war"
and that the MCA's expansion of combatant status "melts this distinction").
216 See 10 U.S.C. § 950v.
217 See id § 950v(b)(3), (6), (18) & (21); see, e.g., DINSTEIN, supra note 107, at 228-
33 (listing and discussing war crimes); GREEN, supra note 107, at 295-303 (discussing war
crimes recognized by international law).
218 See 10 U.S.C. § 950q ("Any person is punishable as a principal under this chapter
who-(1) commits an offense punishable by this chapter, or... commands... its
commission; (2) causes an act to be done which if directly performed by him would be
punishable... ; or (3) is a superior commander who... knew, had reason to know, or
should have known, that a subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so and
who failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish
the perpetrators thereof.") (emphasis added). To the extent that the MCA definition is
premised not on actual or constructive knowledge, but is based in ordinary negligence
("should have known"), it is inconsistent with international law. See DINSTEIN, supra note
107, at 237-42.
219 10 U.S.C. § 950q(1) ("Any person is punishable as a principal under this chapter
who... commits an offense punishable by this chapter, or aids, abets, counsels,
commands, or procures its commission."). The language on aiding and abetting is nearly
verbatim from § 2, although the MCA omits one actus reus verb ("induces"). Compare 10
U.S.C. § 950q(1), with 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) ("Whoever commits an offense against the United
States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is
punishable as a principal.").
220 See id. § 950v(b)(24).
221 Id. Under the MCA, the offense of terrorism occurs when a person:
... intentionally kills or inflicts great bodily harm on one or more protected
persons, or intentionally engages in an act that evinces a wanton disregard for
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straight from U.S. criminal law.222 Of course, prosecuting acts of terrorism
committed during armed conflict is uncontroversial to the extent those acts would
constitute war crimes even without any terrorist motive or connection.223 For
example, intentionally attacking civilian targets is a war crime; so is intentionally
murdering prisoners of war protected by the Third Convention or protected persons
under the Fourth Convention.224 There is considerably less support under the
existing international laws of war for treating terrorism as a freestanding, separate
war crime-particularly considering the breadth of the MCA's definition.225
Second, the MCA also includes the offense of "providing material support for
22627terrorism" as a triable war crime. Just like the § 2339B federal crime,227 this
MCA crime proscribes intentionally providing support or resources toward the
commission of an act of terrorism or to a terrorist organization generally.2 28 In fact,
human life, in a manner calculated to influence or affect the conduct of
government or civilian population by intimidation or coercion, or to retaliate
against government conduct.
Id. A protected person is "any person entitled to protection under one or more of the
Geneva Conventions, including... civilians not taking an active part in hostilities." Id. §
950v(a)(2).
222 Compare id § 950v(b)(24) (defining terrorism to include acts committed "in a
manner calculated to influence or affect the conduct of government or civilian population
by intimidation or coercion, or to retaliate against government conduct"), with 18 U.S.C. §
2332(d) (2006) (authorizing prosecution under this section upon certification that "such
offense was intended to coerce, intimidate, or retaliate against a government or a civilian
population").
223 See Jinks, supra note 102, at 437 & nn.384-387; Jinks, supra note 106, at 1520-21
& nn.112-115.
224 See Jinks, supra note 102, at 437 & n.384; Jinks, supra note 106, at 1520-21 &
n.112; see also supra notes 110-113 and accompanying text (discussing attacks on
civilians); GCCP, supra note 101, art. 147 (defining, inter alia, murdering protected
persons as a grave breach of the Fourth Convention), GCPW, supra note 101, art. 130
(same under the Third Convention).
225 See Jinks, supra note 102, at 437 & n.384; Jinks, supra note 106, at 1520-21 &
n. 112. Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions states that "[a]cts or threats of violence the
primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population are prohibited."
Protocol I, supra note 102, art. 51(2). The authorizing document of the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda included "the power to prosecute persons committing or
ordering to be committed serious violations of Article 3 common to the Geneva
Conventions ... and of Additional Protocol II thereto... [which] shall include, but shall
not be limited to ... acts of terrorism," but it provided no further definition of that term.
See Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, Annex, art.
4(d), U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955/Annex (Nov. 8, 1994).
226 See 10 U.S.C. § 950v(b)(25)(A).
227 See supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.
228 See 10 U.S.C. § 950v(b)(25)(A) ("Any person subject to this chapter who provides
material support or resources, knowing or intending that they are to be used in preparation
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the MCA does not even include its own definition of "material support" but rather
incorporates by reference the definition in the U.S. Criminal Code. 229 Thus, this
crime is nothing more than a direct transposition of a regular federal offense into a
"war crime" under the MCA. But material support for terrorism is a recent
development, even in U.S. domestic criminal law.2 30 There is no support in the
existing international laws of war for a war crime on this theory of liability.
231
Third, the MCA provides for inchoate liability for the war crimes included in
its terms. Under the MCA, a conspiracy to commit any of the other triable offenses
is itself a war crime. 32 This definition of conspiracy is taken directly from U.S.
for, or in carrying out, an act of terrorism... or who intentionally provides material
support or resources to an international terrorist organization engaged in hostilities against
the United States, knowing that such organization has engaged or engages in terrorism shall
be punished as a military commission under this chapter may direct."). The offense
incorporates by reference the definition of "terrorism" in § 950v(b)(24). See id. §
950v(b)(25)(A). The material support offense is not capital even if the act of terrorism
supported results in death, see id., unlike the crime of terrorism itself, see id. § 950v(b)(24)
("Any person subject to this chapter shall be punished, if death results to one or more of the
victims, by death or such other punishment as a military commission under this chapter
may direct, and, if death does not result to any of the victims, by such punishment, other
than death, as a military commission under this chapter may direct....").
229 See id. § 950v(b)(25)(B) ("In this paragraph, the term 'material support or
resources' has the meaning given that term in section 2339A(b) of title 18.").
230 See Chesney, supra note 47, at 88-89.
231 See Beard, supra note 197, at 61-67 (describing material support theory as
"unprecedented" in international laws of war); see also George P. Fletcher, On the Crimes
Subject to Prosecution in Military Commissions, 5 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 39, 45-46 (2007)
(noting that the MCA lays the "foundation for the following radical extension of military
commission jurisdiction").
232 See 10 U.S.C. § 950v(b)(28) ("Any person subject to this chapter who conspires to
commit one or more substantive offenses triable by military commission under this chapter,
and who knowingly does any overt act to effect the object of the conspiracy... shall be
punished.., as a military commission under this chapter shall direct."). The MCA made a
conforming amendment to the Uniform Code of Military Justice, adding conspiracy to
commit a war crime under the laws of war as an offense triable by court-martial or military
commission; this supplemented the preexisting offense of conspiracy to commit a crime in
violation of the UCMJ itself, which is triable by court-martial. See id. § 881(b); see also
Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, §4(b), 120 Stat. 2600, 2631
(adding text of new subsection (b) to § 881 and labeling the previous text of § 881 as new
subsection (a)). Like many other provisions of the MCA, this offense is a response to a
section of the plurality opinion in the Supreme Court's Hamdan decision. See Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 595-613 (2006) (Stevens, J., plurality opinion) (arguing that
conspiracy to commit a war crime is not a cognizable offense under the laws of war); id. at
653-54 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (declining to join the plurality's analysis). But see id. at
681-706 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (rejecting the plurality's analysis and arguing that
conspiracy to a commit a war crime is a valid charge under the laws of war).
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federal criminal law.233 By contrast, the existing international laws of war do not
recognize inchoate liability.
234
The controversial provisions of the MCA are problematic because they appear
to be an attempt by the United States to expand international law unilaterally.23 5
But even if the MCA does simply contradict existing war crimes doctrines under
international law-such as by assigning combatant status to someone who merely
supports hostilities, or by imposing inchoate liability for conspiracy to commit a
war crime-public discourse and the political process may be the only recourse.
When Congress and the President combine to unambiguously supersede or
contravene a prior treaty by a subsequent statute, the federal courts will apply the
statute.236 Thus, it is entirely possible the courts might resolve inconsistency
233 In fact, the language is verbatim. Compare 10 U.S.C. § 950v(b)(28) ("Any person.
who conspires to commit one or more substantive offenses triable by military
commission... shall be punished... ."), with 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2006) ("If two or more
persons conspire ... to commit any offense against the United States ... each shall be
freed[,] . . . imprisoned[,] ... or both."). The overt act requirement, however, differs: §
950v(b)(28) of the MCA requires that a conspiracy defendant "knowingly does" at least
one overt act personally, while § 371 (and traditional conspiracy law) only requires that
any one of the conspirators do so. See 18 U.S.C. § 371 (stating that each conspirator shall
be found guilty if "one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the
conspiracy").
234 See supra notes 122-123 and accompanying text; see also Beard, supra note 197,
at 60-61 (discussing MCA's use of inchoate liability in contradiction to the laws of war);
Fletcher, supra note 231, at 46 ("The MCA 2006 eliminates the use of conspiracy as a
surrogate for proving actual complicity by aiding and abetting. But it does include a
separate stand-alone offence of conspiracy as an inchoate crime. This was precisely the
form of conspiracy invalidated by the Stevens's plurality in Hamdan.").
235 One commentator noted that:
At a fundamental level, unilateral revision of the Geneva Conventions by
the United States undermines the credibility of the U.S. commitment to the
existing Geneva regime. To the extent .. the MCA is perceived as unilaterally
revising key obligations in the Geneva Conventions and providing the president
with the discretion to issue further reinterpretations, it undermines the credible
commitment of the United States to other states in the international community.
Beard, supra note 197, at 65; see also id at 64-69 (discussing the controversial provisions
of the MCA); Michael C. Dorf, The Orwellian Military Commissions Act of 2006, 5 J.
INT'L CRM. JUST. 10, 17-18 (2007) ("Accordingly, despite its repeated invocations of the
Geneva Conventions, the MCA in fact authorizes the United States to breach those
Conventions, because it authorizes the opening of a gap between the US-sourced only
interpretation of the Conventions and the consensus view of the international
community.").
236 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 115(1)(a) (1987) ("An act of Congress supersedes an earlier rule of international
law or a provision of an international agreement as law of the United States if the purpose
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between the MCA and the Geneva Conventions in favor of the MCA.237
Nonetheless, the controversy highlights the developing nature of international law
and the increasing tensions posed by the threat of al Qaeda and other transnational
terrorist groups.
B. The Complexities
Even on their own terms, in situations where their provisions undoubtedly
apply, the international laws of war embodied in the Geneva Conventions often
can be complex and difficult to implement in the realities of conflict on the ground.
The interpretive dilemmas become even more intractable when these provisions
are transposed to the situation of transnational terrorist organizations like al Qaeda.
It is indisputable that the threat of transnational terrorist organizations, as
such, is not directly contemplated within the terms of the existing Conventions
framework. 38 Analogies can be drawn to situations and issues which are addressed
by the Conventions, and inferences can be made about the best way to extend
of the act to supersede the earlier rule or provision is clear or if the act and the earlier rule
or provision cannot be fairly reconciled."). On the other hand, where the intent to supersede
or abrogate is ambiguous, the so-called Charming Betsy canon instructs courts to construe
the statute to avoid violating the treaty (or other international law). See Murray v. The
Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 99-100 (1804); Vazquez, supra note 199,
at 80-81; see also Ingrid Brunk Wuerth, Authorizations for the Use of Force, International
Law, and the Charming Betsy Canon, 46 B.C. L. REV. 293, 330-56 (2005) (discussing the
Charming Betsy canon and analyzing its application to the AUMF at issue in Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004)).
237 But see Vazquez, supra note 199, at 80-82 (arguing that, because Congress
expressed an intention to implement, not violate, Common Article 3 and the Geneva
Conventions, "the Charming Betsy canon should kick in and lead the courts to opt for the
solution that preserves U.S. treaty commitments"). George Fletcher argues that in the
MCA:
Congress purports to be acting under its legislative authority granted under
Article I, Section 8, Clause 10 of the [Constitution], "to define offenses against
the law of nations." In so far as some of these offences are not violations of the
law of nations, they fall outside the field of legislative competence.
Fletcher, supra note 231, at 47; see also Fletcher, supra note 123, at 438-39 (arguing that
the clause gives Congress the power to make international law offenses cognizable in U.S.
courts, but not the power to determine which offenses exist in the law of nations).
238 See, e.g., Geoffrey S. Corn, Hamdan, Lebanon, and the Regulation of Hostilities:
The Need to Recognize a Hybrid Category of Armed Conflict, 40 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
295, 300-10 (2007) (discussing problems with applying the Geneva Conventions to
transnational terrorist organizations); Murphy, supra note 145, at 1132-34 (same); Sloane,
supra note 96, at 443, 452-54 (arguing that transnational terrorist organizations cannot be
integrated into the Geneva Conventions framework).
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existing principles to this unaddressed situation. Nevertheless, the foundational
conceptual problem remains: the Conventions simply were not designed with this
contemporary threat in mind.
The divergences between the existing Conventions framework and the
situation of al Qaeda and other transnational terrorist organizations are numerous
and not insignificant. Most obviously, al Qaeda is not the formal government or
regular armed forces of any state, nor is it a party to the Conventions. Yet al Qaeda
engages in armed conflict much like a state: it carries out acts of violence against
states that would constitute acts of war if committed by agents of a state, 239 and its
leaders purport to have declared war with the United States and other Western
powers. 240 Likewise, al Qaeda does not fit within the other existing categories of
armed groups recognized in the Conventions, such as irregulars, militias,
insurgents, or freedom fighters participating alongside or against state forces in
international armed conflicts.241 Just like such groups, al Qaeda is an organized
armed force capable of projecting violence against states-but it is diffuse and not
strictly hierarchical like a traditional military or paramilitary force. 242 In further
contrast to the traditional nonstate organized armed groups recognized in the
Conventions framework, al Qaeda rejects the fundamental tenets of the
Conventions-especially the privileged status of noncombatants-and would not
join them even if given the legal or practical opportunity. 243 Finally, the
Conventions framework also specifically contemplates hostilities between states
and nonstate groups during nonintemational armed conflicts.244 The paradigm of a
239 See Ni Aoldin, supra note 106, at 1560-61; Jinks, supra note 97, at 166, 183, 184
n.38, 193 n.52; Watkin, supra note 106, at 18.
240 See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 687-88 (2006) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(citing statements from Osama bin Laden and others).
241 See supra notes 131-132 and accompanying text. In international armed conflicts,
irregulars, militias, and organized resistance movements "belonging to a Party to the
conflict and operating in or outside their own territory" may qualify as lawful combatants.
GCPW, supra note 101, art. 4(A)(2). Because al Qaeda is neither a state Party nor attached
to any state Party engaged in international armed conflict, it cannot, by definition, meet
these criteria. See Berman, supra note 97, at 40-41, 44-45; Jinks, supra note 97, at 181-82
(noting the possibility that al Qaeda's relationship with the Taliban regime might meet this
requirement during hostilities in Afghanistan). In addition, al Qaeda also clearly falls
outside the scope of the controversial provisions of Protocol I that extend lawful combatant
status to freedom fighters in wars of national liberation. See Sloane, supra note 96, at 450-
51 (discussing Protocol I, supra note 102, arts. 1, 43-44).
242 See Sloane, supra note 96, at 450.
243 See id. at 452. Because of the national liberation movement ("NLM") paradigm,
"[t]he Protocol I debate presumed that if only the laws of war could be revised to make
compliance by non-state actors practicable, NLMs would wish to comply; NLMs did not
characteristically or in principle reject the principle of distinction, noncombatant immunity,
or any other precept of [international humanitarian law]." Id. at 468.
244 See supra notes 169-173 and accompanying text.
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single state embroiled in intense, sustained internal armed conflict, however, is far
removed from the nature of the violence carried out by al Qaeda, which is global in
scope and directed episodically against numerous different states.245 Many of al
Qaeda's principal targets, like the United States and Western European nations, are
not otherwise affected by anything resembling a noninternational armed conflict.
Thus, the existing Conventions framework does not directly take account of the
distinct nature of the threat posed by transnational terrorist organizations.
One fundamental component of the existing laws of war is the concept of the
"combatant," yet precision in defining it is surprisingly lacking. Understanding
who is a combatant is crucial, not only for purposes of detaining or punishing
enemy soldiers, but also for selecting legitimate military targets-and most
importantly for identifying the noncombatants and civilians to whom privileged
protected status is owed.246 Despite these critical roles, the Conventions leave the
definition of combatant ambiguous, especially with regard to participants in
hostilities other than the regular armed forces of states.247 The definitions of
legitimate military objectives are equally imprecise, to the point that "commanders
may not be operating under rules as much as standards.,248 This imprecision
renders decision making difficult for soldiers on the battlefield, who must make
The challenge presented by contemporary trans-national terrorists ... is their
ability to project state-like violence beyond the borders of a single state. As a
result, a conflict between states and private actors, which is traditionally viewed
as an internal affair, is now being played out on an international scale.
Watkin, supra note 106, at 18.
245 See Corn, supra note 238, at 311-15 (emphasizing that terrorism is neither a
traditional international armed conflict under Common Article 2 because it is not between
states nor a traditional non-international armed conflict under Common Article 3 because it
is not a civil war); Sloane, supra note 96, at 453 (emphasizing the episodic nature of al
Qaeda violence).
246 Sloane, supra note 96, at 470-73.
247 See, e.g., Jensen, supra note 97, at 218-24 (emphasizing the ambiguous nature of
GCPW Article 4); Jinks, supra note 102, at 374 (discussing the competing interpretations
of qualification for combatant status); Jinks, supra note 106, at 1521 (discussing the limited
protection of combatant immunity when combatant status is ambiguously defined); David
Kaye, Complexity in the Law of War, in 60 DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW:
PROGRESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 700-02 (Russell A. Miller & Rebecca M. Bratspies
eds., 2008) (arguing that Protocol I's provisions further complicates combatant status
determinations); see also Berman, supra note 97, at 41-50 (discussing reasons for the
persistence of the ambiguous definition of combatant status under the Conventions).
248 Kaye, supra note 247, at 696; see also DINSTEIN, supra note 107, at 94-99, 108-
112 (noting problems of indeterminacy in the definition of military objectives); Kaye,
supra note 247, at 693-700 (discussing the "abstract and generic" definitions of legitimate
military objectives and the law of targeting).
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quick judgments about whether or not to attack a potential threat.249 The
interpretive problem is particularly acute when dealing with guerrillas, insurgents,
and other fighters who blend into civilian populations and only intermittently
engage in hostilities. 250 Although such persons would be unlawful combatants
while engaged in hostilities, they may attempt to argue that they should be
considered noncombatants while not actively fighting-a claim so far rejected by
the Conventions framework.
251
Transposing the concept of combatant status to transnational terrorist
organizations exacerbates the definitional difficulties. What degree of participation
in al Qaeda should be necessary before a noncombatant is deemed to have become
a combatant? In the traditional laws of war paradigm, a civilian becomes a
combatant in an international conflict by enlisting in the regular or irregular armed
forces of a state or by joining an organized resistance movement or a spontaneous
uprising against invaders; in a paradigmatic noninternational armed conflict, a
civilian becomes a combatant by personally taking up arms in an armed
insurrection against his own state.252 Should simply joining al Qaeda, like
249 See Kaye, supra note 247, at 701 ("[T]ime to consider whether a person has earned
[combatant status] ... may not be available in a situation of a military engagement, where
a commander will need to determine whether a particular individual has combatant status
and thus is liable to be attacked.").
250 See id at 698-99 ("For instance, imagine that a guerilla force has dispersed itself
and its weapons throughout a residential neighborhood in order to shield itself with
civilians and civilian objects .... May the military force attack the neighborhood, thereby
targeting civilians and military objects necessarily without distinction? Or must the force
let the guerilla force be ... ? These are not easy questions, and even if there are answers, it
is unlikely that opposing forces will agree on their outcome."); see also Protocol I, supra
note 102, arts. 43(1), 44(3) (defining combatant status for certain irregular forces engaged
in wars of national liberation).
251 See D1NSTE1N, supra note 107, at 28-29 ("[A] person cannot (and is not allowed
to) be both a combatant and a civilian at the same time, nor can he constantly shift from
one status to the other.... [A] person is not allowed to wear simultaneously two caps: the
hat of a civilian and the helmet of a soldier. A person who engages in military raids by
night, while purporting to be an innocent civilian by day, is neither a civilian nor a lawful
combatant. He is an unlawful combatant."); see also Berman, supra note 97, at 51-55
(discussing the problem of part-time combatants under Protocol I).
252 See DINSTEIN, supra note 107, at 27-33. Thus, while the laws of war apply broad
status categories-noncombatant, lawful combatant, and unlawful combatant-to allocate
the scope of applicable privileges and protections, an individual's own personal conduct
ultimately determines which classification he or she receives. For example, certain groups
in international armed conflicts (like regular armed forces) comply with the requirements
of the GCPW and thereby entitle their members to POW status upon capture. See id. at 43.
Yet an individual soldier's noncompliance (for example, by failing to wear the uniform or
committing a war crime) divests him of POW status as an unlawful combatant, even while
the group as a whole remains protected. See id. at 43-44. Similarly, an individual civilian's
decision to personally take up arms and actively participate in hostilities (other than as part
of a GCPW-compliant group) changes her status from noncombatant to unlawful
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enlistment in a state's military, necessarily also constitute becoming a combatant?
Some argue in favor of such a conclusion.253
Or, as in civil wars, should direct involvement in hostilities by personally
taking up arms be required? Those al Qaeda operatives who personally and directly
prepare for and carry out terrorist attacks might be the analogue of rebel soldiers in
a civil war who fight with guerilla tactics and blend into civilian populations. But
what about other members of al Qaeda who play different and sometimes indirect
roles in its overall mission of carrying out hostilities? In the traditional paradigm,
[f]or instance, a driver delivering ammunition to combatants and a
person who gathers military intelligence in enemy-controlled territory are
commonly acknowledged to be actively taking part in hostilities... [,
but] a mere contribution to the general war effort (e.g., by supplying
foodstuffs to combatants) is not tantamount to active participation in
hostilities.254
If the analogy holds, a person who provides weapons or operational support for a
terrorist attack might similarly be seen as a combatant. But the fundraiser or
combatant. See id at 27-31. The same analysis applies to individuals who become
combatants by joining armed groups which are, as a whole, ineligible to provide lawful
combatant status to their members-especially non-state forces engaged in non-
international armed conflicts or non-GCPW organizations in international armed conflicts.
See id at 44, 49 (arguing that all members of al Qaeda are unlawful combatants due to
organization's non-compliance with GCPW); Watkin, supra note 106, at 34-37 (same).
253 Justice Thomas in Hamdan argued not only that joining al Qaeda was sufficient to
deem a person a combatant, but also that it constituted commission of a war crime:
Hamdan, a confirmed enemy combatant and member or affiliate of al Qaeda, has
been charged with willfully and knowingly joining a group (al Qaeda) whose
purpose is "to support violent attacks against property and nationals (both
military and civilian) of the United States."
... [U]nlawful combatants, such as Hamdan, violate the law of war merely
by joining an organization, such as al Qaeda, whose principal purpose is the
"killing and disabling of peaceable citizens or soldiers."
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. at 693-94 (2006) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quotation marks
omitted); see also id. at 689 ("Hamdan is an unlawful combatant charged with joining and
conspiring with a terrorist network dedicated to flouting the laws of war."); id. at 692
("Hamdan has been charged with conduct constituting two distinct violations of the law of
war cognizable before a military commission: membership in a war-criminal enterprise and
conspiracy to commit war crimes."). Justice Thomas also argued that Hamdan properly was
charged based on his own personal conduct in conspiring to assist al Qaeda leaders in
committing war crimes. See id at 696-97. According to Justice Thomas, conspiracy to
commit war crimes is itself a cognizable war crime. See id at 697-704.
254 DINSTEIN, supra note 107, at 27-28.
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propagandist-much less the food supplier or any other provider of "material
support" to the organization generally255-would seem not to be a combatant
because, while they contribute to al Qaeda's overall cause, they are not actively
involved in the hostilities. Classifying which members of al Qaeda are combatants
and which are not is crucial for determining who legitimately may be targeted by
military force and who may be detained or prosecuted and punished under what
standards. Yet the existing international laws of war fail to provide clear
definitions of combatant and noncombatant status, especially when those concepts
are sought to be applied to transnational terrorist organizations.
A second fundamental component of the existing laws of war is the threshold
question of whether an "armed conflict" subject to the Conventions framework
exists. Its defmition is also left imprecise: "The problem is that the Geneva
Conventions do not provide an authoritative definition of 'armed conflict.'
Substantial evidence suggests, in fact, that the drafters of the Conventions
purposely avoided any rigid formulation that might limit the applicability of the
treaties. 256 In the context of hostilities between states, the existence of a covered
armed conflict is rarely called into doubt.257 But in noninternational armed
conflicts, a state's sovereign interest in suppressing crime and internal violence
frequently leads a government to deny the existence of an armed conflict subject to
the laws of war, even when hostilities begin to closely resemble the sustained
violence of civil war or even international war.258 Accordingly, in considering
whether intrastate hostilities such as revolts or insurrections should be deemed to
constitute an armed conflict, the crucial factors are whether the Government
acknowledges the insurgency as a military threat, whether the Government
recognizes the applicability of the laws of war, and whether the insurgents are
organized in an endeavor to become an alternative government, possess a military
255 Such persons are deemed combatants under the MCA, but that characterization is
highly controversial and probably contrary to existing international law. See supra notes
212-215, 226-231 and accompanying text.
256 Jinks, supra note 97, at 182-83 (emphasis added); see also MOIR, supra note 98, at
23-39 (discussing the drafting history of Common Article 3); Jinks, supra note 97, at 21-
32 (discussing the ambiguities of Common Article 3).
257 See Jinks, supra note 97, at 183 ("In the context of Common Article 2, this
purposeful ambiguity has not presented significant difficulties. As discussed above [id. at
178-82], hostilities between states are, for the most part, governed by the Conventions
irrespective of the intensity, duration, or scale of the conflict.").
258 See id. at 183 ("[T]he definition of 'armed conflict' in Common Article 3, as the
factual predicate for the operation of the laws of war in noninternational hostilities, should
both reflect the humanitarian purposes of the Conventions and respect the national
sovereignty of states. Balancing these often competing objectives is necessary because the
international regulation of internal armed conflict is both necessary and potentially
problematic."); see also GREEN, supra note 107, at 65-67 (discussing historical examples);




structure, and agree to comply with the laws of war.259 Outside of the paradigmatic
context of civil wars, similar issues are involved: the nature and extent of the
hostilities and how the parties view them.260 Thus, whether intrastate violence will
be subjected to the noninternational armed conflict provisions of the Conventions
is a highly contextual-and highly political-determination.
Whether an armed conflict exists in the context of the violence carried out by
al Qaeda and other transnational terrorist organizations is an even more vexing
question. Technically, because al Qaeda is not a state, much less a signatory of the
Conventions, the definition of an international armed conflict is not met.26 1 But
Common Article 3 encourages states to apply the Conventions' international armed
conflict rules in all conflicts. 62 This provision strongly suggests that deeming a
conflict to be international rather than noninternational-and thereby more subject
to the Conventions, not less-should not be problematic, particularly if the United
States were to bind itself to the full scope of the Conventions when its adversary
263does not. In addition, although the conflict with al Qaeda is not a typical
intrastate or internal conflict subject to Common Article 3, that provision still
applies to any armed conflict not covered by the international conflict rules.
264
But is al Qaeda engaged in an "armed conflict" in the first place? By
comparison to the factors examined in typical conflicts, a persuasive case can be
made that the answer is yes,265 but some certainly would disagree.266 Regardless,
259 See Jinks, supra note 97, at 184-85 (quoting, citing, and discussing the
interpretation of Common Article 3 set forth in INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED
CROSS, 3 THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949: COMMENTARY 35-36 (Jean S.
Pictet ed., 1958) [hereinafter COMMENTARY]); see also MOIR, supra note 98, at 34-45
(discussing factors which identify an internal armed conflict subject to the laws of war).
260 See Jinks, supra note 97, at 186 ("Noninternational hostilities constitute 'armed
conflict' within the meaning of the Conventions if (1) the conditions pose an aggravated
threat to core humanitarian values (an objective standard); or (2) the state party to the
hostilities interprets them as an 'armed conflict' (a subjective standard)."); see also MOIR,
supra note 98, at 46-52 (discussing situations in which armed conflict may become more
international than non-international).
261 See supra notes 124-125 and accompanying text; accord Jinks, supra note 97, at
178-82; Jinks, supra note 98, at 10-13; Murphy, supra note 145, at 1135.
262 See GCCP, supra note 101, art. 3 ("The Parties to the conflict [not of an
international character] should further endeavour to bring into force, by means of special
agreements, all or part of the other provisions of the present Convention."); GCPW, supra
note 101, art. 3.
263 See Sloane, supra note 96, at 451-52, 483-85 (describing a "voluntarist" situation
where states bind their conduct toward terrorists, despite terrorists' non-compliance with
international law).
264 See supra notes 169-172 and accompanying text. But see Murphy, supra note 145,
at 1135-36 (noting the objection that Common Article 3 is "a poor fit" for conflicts that are
"transnational in scale").
265 See Jinks, supra note 97, at 187. Jinks argues that:
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the nature of the threat posed by al Qaeda is so far removed from the paradigmatic
situations contemplated in the Conventions framework that a new, specifically
tailored definition of armed conflict is the optimal solution for clearly and
unequivocally bringing transnational terrorist organizations within the coverage of
the laws of war.267 Until such a definition achieves widespread acceptance or
adoption in a treaty, however, the interpretative difficulties created by the existing
Conventions framework will persist.
Determining whether an armed conflict subject to the Conventions framework
exists is particularly difficult when the hostilities do not fit the traditional
paradigm-for either interstate or civil wars--of continuous violence on discrete
territorial battlegrounds. 268 The 1949 Conventions addressed the problem of armed
resistance to an enemy military force occupying territory of the state during an
international armed conflict.269 Subsequently the 1977 Protocols sought to extend
The systematic application of these factors to the U.S. hostilities against al
Qaeda strongly suggests that the "armed conflict" requirement is
satisfied.... [T]he United States does not assert that the characterization of the
hostilities as a conflict undermines its sovereignty-indeed it has clearly chosen
to respond to the group as a belligerent.... As evidenced by the attacks, al
Qaeda is an armed group with the organizational capacity to engage in sustained
hostilities on a global scale. Substantial evidence suggests that al Qaeda
considered itself "at war," and that the attacks were part of an extended,
escalating military campaign against the United States. The United States
characterized the attacks as an "armed attack" and as "acts of war," and
subsequently launched an international military campaign against al Qaeda and
its supporters. ... These factors, considered in light of the values underlying
Common Article 3, justify classifying the hostilities as an "armed conflict"
within the meaning of the Geneva Conventions.
Id. See also Ni AolAin, supra note 106, at 1555-60 (identifying the events of the September
11 attacks as initiating an armed conflict given their ferocity, "scale of destruction," and the
"legal response" to the attacks); Jinks, supra note 97, at 182-87 (arguing that the hostilities
between the U.S. and al Qaeda constitute an armed conflict).
266 See Murphy, supra note 145, at 1135-36 & nn.126-128 (citing various sources
which argue that hostilities with al Qaeda do not rise to the level of an "armed conflict" for
purposes of the Conventions).
267 See Corn, supra note 238, at 299-300, 330-46 (proposing a new category of
"transnational armed conflict" for situations involving "the extraterritorial application of
military combat power by the regular armed forces of a state against a transnational non-
state armed enemy"); see also Berman, supra note 97, at 32-33 (acknowledging difficulties
in applying existing Conventions framework); Murphy, supra note 145, at 1135-40 (same).
268 See Berman, supra note 97, at 23-27.
269 See id. at 19-20, 24-25 & n.56; see also GCCP, supra note 101, arts. 4-6, 11, 27-
34, 47-78 (explaining the rules and guidelines concerning the treatment of persons
protected under the Convention who find themselves in the hands of enemy parties during
times of conflict or occupation); GCPW, supra note 101, arts. 4, 10, 122 (similar
provisions regarding prisoners of war). Common Article 2 provides that the four
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those principles in the context of decolonization and national liberation
movements.2 70 In each of these contexts, the states drafting the treaties struggled
with the reality that such hostilities have both spatial and temporal discontinuities
as compared with the traditional paradigm. 271 For example, resistance to wartime
invaders or colonial occupiers rarely takes place on identifiable battlefields.27 2
Likewise, while resistance may be sustained over a prolonged period of time, it
often does not constitute a condition of continuous military hostilities.273 An armed
conflict can exist so long as the hostilities constitute "protracted armed violence
between governmental authorities and organized armed groups, '274 but armed
conflict does not exist merely in "situations of internal disturbances and tensions,
such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence[,] and other acts of a similar
nature. 27 5 Somewhere between "protracted" and "sporadic" lies the indeterminate
threshold of armed conflict.
The spatial and temporal divergences from the traditional Conventions'
paradigm are even greater in the context of transnational terrorist organizations.
Conventions "shall... apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a
High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets with no armed resistance."
GCCP, supra note 101, art. 2.
270 See Protocol I, supra note 102, art. 1(3)-(4); Berman, supra note 97, at 21-23.
271 See Berman, supra note 97, at 23 ("The spatial dimension concerns shifting control
over territory; the temporal dimension concerns the episodic quality of the violence. These
discontinuities make problematic the application of the key doctrinal distinctions that select
certain forms of violence as the kind of combat entitled to international law privileges.").
272 See id at 25-26 ("[S]uch struggles are marked by 'the ubiquity of confrontation'
in occupied or colonized territory. They may even be said to be wars 'without a front,' wars
marked by the 'interpenetration and reciprocal encirclement' of the forces of occupiers and
resisters." (translating and quoting MICHEL VEUTHEY, GUtRILLA ET DROIT HUMANITAIRE
21 (1983))).
273 Id. at 26; see, e.g., id. at 27 (discussing Algerian resistance to French colonial
occupation over a span of 130 years). Berman notes that:
The length of such occupations and the struggles against them, which may last
decades or even centuries, defy the principles underlying the relevant
international rules, which presuppose a relatively short occupation. Moreover,
regardless of length, such struggles often go through a variety of phases,
involving greater or lesser resemblance to military conflict, ranging from
organized to disorganized actions, from violent to non-violent confrontations,
from war-like periods marked by high-intensity violence to less turbulent
periods marked by erratic violence, civil disobedience, or even relative
quiescence.
Id. at 26.
274 Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction,
Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-1, 70 (Oct. 2, 1995), available at
http://www.un.org/icty/tadic/appeal/decision-e/51002.htm.
275 Protocol II, supra note 102, art. 1(2).
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The closest analogy probably is to resistance fighters,276 but with terrorists the
discontinuities are more extensive. Al Qaeda directs its hostilities at numerous
countries around the world, so its "battlefield" is not limited even to the
generalized territorial location where resistance fighters live and oppose invading
or colonial occupiers, but it might rather be seen as comprising the entire territory
of all its target nations.277 Alternatively, an armed conflict between the United
States and al Qaeda might exist only where the United States actually deploys its
own military forces in active combat status against al Qaeda and its allies, but not
elsewhere-the position taken by a panel of the Fourth Circuit in al-Marrif'
s
Similarly, al Qaeda poses a continuous threat of hostilities, but it launches its
major attacks at unpredictable, "episodic" intervals of months or even years. 279 Are
al Qaeda's intermittent attacks "protracted" enough to qualify as armed conflict?
Or are they merely "sporadic" violence insufficient to invoke the laws of war at
all?280 The existing laws of war struggle to answer such questions in traditional
situations like intrastate violence, which may or may not be a civil war subject to
the Conventions framework. When it comes to transnational terrorist
organizations, the answers are even further from clear.
Finally, a foundational concept underlying the existing Conventions
framework is the principle of the "equality of belligerents," which insists that all
parties to a conflict should be entitled to the protections of the laws of war,
irrespective of the legitimacy or justifiability of their role in initiating hostilities in
the first place.28 1 For example, soldiers fighting in service to a state responsible for
276 Berman, supra note 97, at 33 ("This quality of a discontinuous, yet protracted,
conflict, ill-suited to the traditional categories, makes it akin to anti-occupation and anti-
colonial struggles.").
277 See, e.g., Neal Richardson & Spencer Crona, Detention of Terrorists as Unlawful
Combatants and Their Trial by American Military Commissions, in LAW IN THE WAR ON
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 123, 147 (Ved P. Nanda ed., 2005) ("The very nature of
international terrorism makes 'the battlefield' anywhere and everywhere. The terrorist
seeks to find soft civilian targets in the homeland as well as military targets overseas.").
278 See supra note 198 (describing the al-Marri court's reasoning).
279 See Berman, supra note 97, at 23 (describing the temporal discontinuity issue as
one of "episodic" violence); Sloane, supra note 96, at 453, 485 (describing al Qaeda
violence as "episodic").
280 See Mary Ellen O'Connell, When is a War Not a War? The Myth of the Global
War on Terror, 12 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 535, 538 (2006) (suggesting that "al Qaeda's
actions and our responses have been too sporadic and low-intensity to qualify as armed
conflict").
281 See Berman, supra note 97, at 5 n.9, 11-12 (explaining the principle of equality of
belligerents as signifying that the applicability of jus in bello, the international
humanitarian law embodied in the Conventions governing the conduct of war, is
independent from the determinations ofjus ad bellum, governing the justifiability of states'
resort to war); see also DINSTEIN, supra note 107, at 4-5 (noting that the law of
international armed conflict "is predicated on the postulate of equal application of its legal
norms to all parties"); Watkin, supra note 106, at 13-16, 67 (noting that the broader issues
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unlawfully launching an aggressive war receive equal treatment under the
Conventions as those fighting for the state exercising its right of self-defense. 82
Proposals to extend privileged combatant status to certain "noble causes" have
proven highly controversial precisely because they weaken and undermine this
principle .2 83
Yet the principle of equality of belligerents potentially carries undesirable
implications if the laws of war are applied to transnational terrorist organizations.
Under the principle, if the laws of war apply, then al Qaeda terrorists pursuing
despicable purposes must be given the same legal consideration as, for example,
prodemocracy guerillas fighting a civil war for the worthy goal of toppling a
tyrannical despot. 284 Therefore, keeping terrorists exclusively under the jurisdiction
of domestic, criminal law might be preferable to many states if the alternative is
that terrorists acquire a privileged combatant status as freedom fighters in wars of
national liberation.285 The concern is not trivial: "There has been a gradual erosion
of the concepts of resistance, freedom fighter, guerilla, and terrorist movements.
The choice of term sometimes merely indicates the attitudes of the beholder." 286
For all its potential as a legal framework for addressing the threat of transnational
terrorist organizations, the application of the laws of war is not without legal policy
danger and political risk, as well.
of jus ad bellum have been separated conceptually from the law governingjus in bello, and
that protections must be provided to all parties to an armed conflict without distinction).
282 See DINSTEIN, supra note 107, at 4-5; Berman, supra note 97, at 11.
283 See Berman, supra note 97, at 45-50 (contrasting the drafting of the 1949
Conventions, which rejected a Danish proposal for privileged status for civilians resisting
illegal occupation despite the then-recent anti-Nazi resistance experiences, with the
drafting of the 1977 Protocols, which provided privileged combatant status to certain kinds
of irregular and guerilla forces fighting in wars of national liberation, leading some states
to refuse to ratify the treaty); see also Protocol I, supra note 102, at pmbl. ("Reaffirming
further that the provisions of the [four 1949] Geneva Conventions... and of this Protocol
must be fully applied in all circumstances to all persons who are protected by those
instruments, without any adverse distinction based on the nature or origin of the armed
conflict or on the causes espoused by or attributed to the Parties to the conflicts... [J").
284 See Berman, supra note 97, at 28-29 (suggesting that "the combatants' privilege
would be granted not only to arguably worthy forces such as armed pro-democracy
militants, but also to those on the other side as well, such as armed anti-democracy
forces"); see also id. at 29 (raising similar issues regarding "the actions against which such
[United Nations-sanctioned military] operations are directed-such as terrorism, anti-
government and anti-UN violence, narco-militia operations, pre-2003 Iraqi attacks on
'coalition' forces, and so on").
285 See, e.g., Beard, supra note 197, at 68-69 (arguing that "the continuing attempt to
apply a model based on war instead of crime to suspected al Qaeda terrorists risks cloaking
these individuals with legal trappings that increasingly resemble those of warriors instead
of criminals").
286 DETTER, supra note 107, at 144.
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Thus, while the Geneva Conventions and the existing laws of war provide a
powerful model for addressing the hostilities with al Qaeda, their applicability is
far from clear and easy. The complexities in the Convention framework are
difficult enough to resolve, even in the traditional situations for which it was
designed. The difficulty in transposing the laws of war to the threat of transnational
terrorist organizations is compounded by the undeniable reality that the
Conventions simply were not designed with this form of hostilities and this
contemporary threat in mind.
IV. DEFINING THE TERRORIST THREAT: INTEGRATING THE Two MODELS
These bodies of law provide two models, criminal and military, for defining
the threat of terrorism. Each model presents different alternatives for pursuing the
dual objectives of preventing terrorist attacks from occurring and punishing the
individuals involved with terrorism, including planning or committing acts of
terrorism or supporting the operations of terrorist organizations. The criminal and
military models each have insights into the nature of the terrorist threat, as well as
shortcomings in defining it. Similarly, both models struggle to balance the relative
importance of personal conduct and group affiliation in addressing the threat posed
by individual terrorists or particular conspiracies and the broader organizations of
which they are a part. Neither model, standing alone, sufficiently covers all aspects
of the problem.
Combining the criminal and military models into a unified framework,
however, enables identification of which terrorists and individuals involved in
terrorism should be treated as criminal defendants, and which should be deemed
military enemies subject to military authority. Therefore, an integrated model is
necessary to fully address the threat posed by al Qaeda and other transnational
terrorist organizations.
A. Prevention and Punishment Objectives
Confronting the threat of terrorism involves the pursuit of two objectives:
prevention and punishment. These objectives are related, but they are not always
complementary. Prevention is an important goal, of course, because it is always
better to stop a terrorist attack from occurring than for it to take place. Punishment
of the perpetrators of completed acts of terrorism also is an important goal because
it ensures that justice is done for the harm inflicted. But in the middle are many
situations where both objectives are implicated. A terrorist cell may be arrested
while still in the preparatory stages of their planned attack. Funds intended to
support terrorist plots may be intercepted, or a conspiracy may be discovered
shortly after its formation. Or terrorists armed and ready with a bomb may be
foiled moments short of detonating their device. In each of these scenarios, charges
may be filed based on the activities already undertaken, seeking to serve
punishment as well as prevention objectives.
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The criminal model is, by nature, focused primarily on punishment objectives.
The substantive criminal law defines offenses that punish conduct that has already
taken place.2 87 That conduct may be the actual completion of a particular direct
harm, or it may involve more preliminary activities, comprising inchoate or
facilitation offenses. 288 In each context, however, the criminal law specifies the
nature of the proscribed conduct and determines the appropriate punishment for
engaging in it. Punishment can be imposed only after that conduct, whatever it
may be for a given offense, occurs.
The prevention objectives of the criminal model are, therefore, necessarily
derivative of this punishment focus. Suspicious persons can be investigated in
numerous ways prior to arrest,289 but the arrest itself can occur only once there is a
crime to charge.290 Obviously, an arrest can be made prior to the commission of a
completed crime-for example, murder-but the arrest nonetheless must be based
on conduct constituting an attempted murder or a conspiracy to commit murder.
291
Until the conduct reaches the level of a chargeable offense of some type, there can
be no intervention by the criminal law; no matter how troubling or dangerous the
individual appears, there is no prevention without some form of crime.292 Inchoate
and facilitation offenses, therefore, allow the criminal model to serve the
prevention objective by incorporating preliminary-stage conduct into the
287 The Ex Post Facto Clauses of the U.S Constitution prohibit the imposition of
criminal punishment for conduct which had not been criminalized at the time it occurred.
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (federal); id art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (states); see also, e.g.,
Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607, 622-23 (2003) (holding that a statute purporting to
revive a time-barred prosecution violates the Ex Post Facto Clause).
288 See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text.
289 Possible methods of investigation might include visual surveillance, wiretaps, or
other electronic surveillance; the use of confidential informants; or grand jury subpoenas
and search warrants of the suspicious or third parties.
290 An arrest, with or without a warrant, must be based upon "probable cause" that a
crime has occurred and that the person arrested committed it. See, e.g., Atwater v. City of
Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979). A
subsequent indictment also requires probable cause that the defendant committed the
charged offenses. See, e.g., United States v. R. Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 297 (1991).
291 With respect to the facilitator, the crime of facilitation is completed once the
facilitating conduct is engaged in with the requisite mens rea-e.g., providing funds to a
known FTO. The facilitated person, however, does not commit a crime by receiving the
facilitation, but rather can be charged only with an inchoate offense of attempt or
conspiracy.
292 See Chesney, supra note 47, at 26-34 (describing tactics used by the Department
of Justice to achieve prevention objectives using criminal law). See generally Robert
Chesney, Anticipatory Prosecution in Terrorism-Related Cases, in THE CHANGING ROLE
OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR 157 (John L. Worrall & M. Elaine Nugent-Borakove eds.,
2008) (discussing how the Department of Justice has implemented terrorism-prevention
goals).
1316 [No. 4
CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS AND MILITARY ENEMIES
punishment structure itself. Thus, while the criminal model can be directed toward
prevention, it is constrained by the ultimate focus on criminal punishment.
By contrast, the military model is focused primarily on prevention objectives.
The purpose of military engagement is to defeat the enemy, thereby ensuring that
the victorious party's goals are achieved and the vanquished party's are not.
293
Those goals may vary from local skirmishes to geopolitical strategic power, but no
matter the stakes, the purpose of preventing the enemy's success remains the same.
In particular, the laws of war contemplate two significant methods of prevention:
killing combatants fighting for the enemy, or incapacitating them. Combatants are
legitimate targets for military force, and any combatant who continues to fight is
constantly at risk of being killed during the hostilities.294 Combatants also may be
captured, surrender, or otherwise cease to fight.295 These captured combatants may
be detained by the opposing force, incapacitating them from further participation in
the fighting.296 Whether they are targeted or detained, the objective is prevention:
removing enemy combatants from the conflict.
The punishment objectives of the military model are derivative of the overall
prevention focus. In international armed conflicts, and any noninternational armed
conflict in which the affected state chooses to invoke the full scope of the Geneva
Conventions, combatants who comply with the relevant rules are protected as
lawful combatants with combatant immunity. Accordingly, such persons may not
be punished at all by the opposing side, for the very reason that their actions during
hostilities were privileged.297 Punishment, in international or noninternational
conflicts, is reserved for two categories of persons: war criminals and unlawful
combatants.298 War crimes are an offense against the rules of war, such as
intentionally attacking civilians or engaging in perfidy. 299 Any person who
commits a war crime, regardless of whether that person otherwise would have been
a lawful or unlawful combatant, is subject not only to incapacitation by detention,
but also to punishment for violating the international rules of war.300 Similarly,
combatants who fail to qualify as lawful combatants may be punished as well as
detained.30 1 If they have committed no war crime, then unlawful combatants are
not punishable for an offense against the rules of war.30 2 Unlawful combatants lack
combatant immunity, however, so they may be punished by the capturing state
293 Cf CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR (1832) (variously translated, frequently as
"war is simply the continuation of politics by other means").
294 See supra notes 107-108 and accompanying text.
295 See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
296 See supra note 133 and accompanying text.297 See supra notes 133-136 and accompanying text.
298 See supra notes 137-139 and accompanying text.
299 See supra note 217 and accompanying text.
329 Supra note 118 and accompanying text.
301 See supra notes 137-139 and accompanying text.
302 See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
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under its applicable criminal laws.3 °3 Therefore, under the military model,
punishment for war crimes is limited to those who exceed the acceptable bounds of
warfare, while punishment of unlawful combatants simply involves denying
individuals a laws-of-war privilege against ordinary prosecution.
Thus, the two models approach the threat of terrorism from opposite angles.
The criminal model is concerned with punishing nefarious conduct, and achieves
prevention only through the capacity to punish preliminary activity. The military
model, on the other hand, is concerned with preventing enemy soldiers from
achieving their goals through targeting and detention, while punishment of
unprivileged combatants is secondary. In addressing the threat of terrorism, a
balance closer to the middle of these two models is necessary.
B. Insights and Shortcomings
In defining the nature of the terrorist threat, each of the two models in its
current form has insights and shortcomings. The insights provide useful guidance
in shaping the legal framework for dealing with terrorists and indicate effective
concepts that should be preserved. The shortcomings reveal ways in which the
current models may be inadequate to fully address the threat and suggest problems
that should be avoided in integrating the two models.
The insights of the criminal model flow from its focus on punishment. In
particular, the criminal model is concerned with identifying the varying kinds and
degrees of responsibility held by individuals involved in terrorism. 30 4 The model
identifies four kinds of responsibility for terrorist acts: completed crimes, inchoate
attempted offenses, inchoate conspiratorial agreements, and separate facilitation
crimes. It also identifies four degrees of responsibility: direct liability for personal
participation, vicarious liability for personally aiding and abetting other persons,
vicarious liability for object or Pinkerton offenses committed by others in
furtherance of a conspiratorial agreement, and independent liability for facilitation.
Nearly any combination of these categories could form the basis of criminal
charges.
30 5
In making these distinctions of kind and degree, the criminal model provides a
framework to demarcate which individuals should be held responsible as
"terrorists" and which individuals, despite their crimes, should not. In the
categories of both kind and degree of responsibility, a sharp distinction is made
between facilitation on the one hand, and the other three categories on the other.
303 See supra notes 151-160 and accompanying text.
304 See supra Part II.A.
305 See supra Part II.A. There is no "double facilitation" offense; that is, no existing
offense proscribes person X's facilitation of person Y's § 2339B offense of facilitating
FTO Z. The other fifteen possibilities exist: for example, direct liability for an inchoate
conspiracy, aiding and abetting an inchoate attempt, conspiracy to commit § 2339B
facilitation of an FTO, or facilitation of an FTO's activities culminating in a completed
offense.
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Individuals who complete or attempt terrorist attacks are "terrorists" by any
measure, and so too are individuals who intentionally join a conspiratorial
agreement to plan and carry out a specific terrorism act. Such individuals will be
convicted of criminal charges directly related to the relevant terrorism offenses.30 6
But a person who provides some form of material support to terrorists, with
knowledge of who they are helping but with no actual involvement in specific
plans, conspiracies, or attacks, is convicted for a crime of facilitation liability.30 7
That person is responsible as a "facilitator" for knowingly helping terrorists, but
does not, under the criminal model, actually become a terrorist. Likewise,
individuals who are directly liable for personal participation in terrorist crimes, or
who are vicariously liable for such crimes based on their involvement with others,
are "terrorists" under the criminal model. But a person whose involvement is
attenuated at the point of general knowledge and who has no specific intention is
not guilty of any actual terrorism offense; rather, he is guilty only of the
independent crime of facilitation. He is a "facilitator" of terrorism but not actually,
personally a terrorist.
Finally, the criminal model's distinctions among the kinds and degrees of
responsibility, although focused on the punishment objective, provide insight into
achieving the prevention objective. Completed offenses and nearly completed
attempted offenses have little to do with prevention. But inchoate conspiracy
liability extends responsibility far earlier in the course of conduct-practically to
the point of the act of forming the conspiratorial agreement alone.308 And
facilitation liability extends responsibility even further back than that, reaching
persons who engage in generalized terrorism-support activity but nothing more.
309
This signifies the judgment of the criminal model that the deep roots of terrorism
must be dealt with, not just the final stages of terrorist activity. Similarly, vicarious
liability for conspiracy-especially for Pinkerton offenses as well as object
offenses-and facilitation liability for generalized support extend the scope of
responsibility far beyond direct personal participation in, or personally aiding and
abetting, terrorism offenses.310 This liability also strikes at the deep roots of
terrorism, reaching all those who involve themselves with terrorists, even in the
earliest stages. Thus, the criminal model displays a cognizance of the entire
breadth and depth of the terrorist threat.
The criminal model also has its shortcomings, and these too flow from the
focus on punishment. Existing U.S. federal criminal law, unsurprisingly, addresses
terrorism primarily as a threat to be managed by law enforcement authorities and
criminal prosecutions-just like the many kinds of activity condemned in the
Criminal Code, such as child pornography, narcotics trafficking, and countless
306 See supra notes 5-8, 14, 26-27 and accompanying text.
307 See supra notes 45-58 and accompanying text.
308 Supra Part II.A.2.; supra note 23 and accompanying text.
309 Supra Part II.A.4.
310 Supra Parts I.A.2., IJ.A.3.
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others.311 The legal reality is that many of the crimes charged against terrorists are
not terrorism-specific offenses at all, but rather generally applicable crimes that
happen to fit the facts.312 Although there are exceptions, such as § 2339B and its
emphasis on connections to FTOs, there is little in the criminal model that directly
confronts what is distinctive about the threat of terrorists and the factors that
distinguish them from the mine run of "regular" criminals like drug dealers,
organized crime families, and porn peddlers. 313 Accordingly, the criminal model
fails to fully identify the scope of the threat or the nature of the harms inflicted,
and largely understates the international dimensions of the problem. The criminal
model therefore treats terrorism as merely one exceptionally despicable form of
"ordinary" crime, when in fact it is something more.
The insights of the military model derive from its premise that the threat
posed by al Qaeda and other transnational terrorist organizations has fundamental
similarities to the armed conflicts already governed by the existing international
laws of war. These similarities illustrate the ways in which the conflict with al
Qaeda has elements that are substantially more "warlike" than any ordinary
criminal threat. First, the kinds of attacks carried out by terrorists closely resemble
traditional war crimes cognizable in armed conflicts governed by the laws of
war. 314 The targets of terrorist attacks often are civilians, because taking hostages
or killing civilians going about their daily lives evokes the fear and outrage the
315terrorists seek to spawn. Terrorists attack indiscriminately, making no effort to
strike only legitimate military targets or mitigate the effects on protected persons
even when they do.3 16 Were such attacks carried out by a military force during an
armed conflict, war crimes prosecutions would result. 317 Second, terrorists carrying
out these proscribed activities operate much like unlawful combatants under the
311 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252, 2252A (child pornography); 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2006)
(narcotics distribution); id. § 848 (continuing criminal enterprise); id. § 960 (narcotics
trafficking).
312 See supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text.
313 It even fails to differentiate between terrorists and other criminals who launch
violent attacks on governmental facilities:
It is important to note that the ICRC Commentary to Common Article 3
provides only one concrete example of activities not amounting to "armed
conflict": a handful of individuals rebel against the state and attack a police
station. The intensity, coordination, and pattern of al Qaeda attacks against the
United States make clear that the September 11 attacks were not simply "mere
acts of banditry."
Jinks, supra note 98, at 37 (quoting COMMENTARY, supra note 259, at 34).314 See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
315 See supra notes 220-222 and accompanying text.
316 See MARK JUERGENSMEYER, TERROR IN THE MIND OF GOD: THE GLOBAL RISE OF
RELIGIOUS VIOLENCE 121 (2000).317 See supra notes 223-225 and accompanying text.
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laws of war: they do not wear uniforms or distinctive emblems to indicate their
allegiance, nor do they bear arms openly to signify their active participation in
hostilities. Instead, they conceal themselves among civilian populations, feigning
noncombatant status and relying on that deception to make the perpetration of their
attacks possible.318 Unlike even the guerilla fighters controversially privileged by
the 1977 Protocol,319 terrorists do not reveal themselves as combatants even when
they do actually take part in hostilities-they simply strike without warning. Thus,
in mode and method of operation, terrorists have much in common with war
criminals and unlawful combatants.
In addition, the organization and operation of al Qaeda and other transnational
terrorist organizations has close similarities to armed groups engaged in traditional
armed conflicts. Like the regular armed forces of a state, al Qaeda recruits and
enlists members to its cause and trains them to carry out many kinds of violent
attacks. 320 Although it may lack the rigid institutionalism of state armies, al Qaeda
does contain leadership and command structures not unlike more loosely organized
irregular forces, militias, or organized resistance movements.321 In addition, al
Qaeda has a division of labor much like an armed force: it has leaders and
strategists, commanders and foot soldiers, members who actively engage in
hostilities and members who play supporting roles. 322 Al Qaeda also has allies and
supporters among nonmembers: persons who have not joined the group but who
favor its cause and render support to the overall terrorist effort.323 Thus, al Qaeda
has member terrorists who have the hallmarks of traditional combatants, and it has
like-minded loyalists who would be deemed noncombatants in a traditional armed
conflict.
Finally, the military model reflects several important aspects of how the
parties involved-particularly the United States and al Qaeda-characterize their
conflict. For their part, al Qaeda's leaders purport to be at war with the United
States.324 Although the United State did not officially declare war on al Qaeda, the
Congress did specifically authorize the use of the U.S. armed forces against al
Qaeda.325 The international community similarly supported the validity of the
United States' claimed right to exercise military self-defense against the al Qaeda
318 Karen S. Seifert, Interpreting the Law of War: Rewriting the Rules of Engagement
to Police Iraq, 92 MINN. L. REv. 836, 854 (2008).319 See supra notes 102, 165-166.
320 See RoHAN GUNARATNA, INSIDE AL QAEDA 70-76 (2002).
321 See id at 54-60, 95.
322 See id. at 54-60.
323 See id. at 60-70, 77, 226.
324 Supra note 240 and accompanying text.
325 See Authorization for the Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, §2(a), 115
Stat. 224, 224 (2001) (stating that "the President is authorized to use all necessary and
appropriate force against those.., organizations, or persons he determines planned,
authorized, committed or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001").
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threat.326 And it is indisputable that the United States has deployed and exercised
military force against al Qaeda targets around the globe.327 Thus, the military
model conforms not only to the rhetoric of the conflict, but also to the reality of the
hostilities between the parties.328
The shortcomings of the military model derive from the limitations intrinsic to
the existing laws of war, because the threat posed by al Qaeda and other
transnational terrorist organizations also has several fundamental dissimilarities to
the paradigmatic armed conflicts contemplated by the Conventions framework.
Although the acts of terrorism and nature of the al Qaeda organization closely
resemble the conduct of, and some participants in, traditional armed conflicts,
other aspects of the threat are divergent. The geographic scope of the threat is vast,
without a paradigmatic battlefield openly fought over by armed forces in an
interstate war, ongoing civil war, or even cyclical rebellion.329 The temporal scope
of hostilities is difficult to quantify: a continuous threat that an attack could occur
at any time, yet only intermittent actual violence; hostilities that are "protracted"
over many years but arguably may be "sporadic" over any given time span.
330
Even if the participants and actions of the conflict resemble the paradigm, the when
and where do not. This profound difference from the existing concepts of "armed
conflicts" calls into question the validity of transposing other aspects of the laws of
war to the terrorist threat when the foundational premise for applying the laws of
war in the first place may not exist.
Another feature intrinsic to the existing laws of war also presents a potential
shortcoming to the military model. Under the principle of equality of belligerents,
the application of the laws of war does not depend on the rightness or wrongness
of the cause for which a combatant fights. 3 Soldiers in an army fighting a clearly
illegal, aggressive war remain eligible for protection as lawful combatants; soldiers
who fight as unlawful combatants, with no pretense of complying with the
326 See Jinks, supra note 98, at 35-37 (describing actions taken by the United Nations,
NATO, and the Organization of American States).
327 See, e.g., Jinks, supra note 97, at 187 ("Military operations directed against al
Qaeda and its affiliates have continued to the time of this writing [in 2005]-currently
ongoing in Afghanistan, the Philippines, Colombia, and several countries in the Horn of
Africa.").
328 Berman, supra note 97, at 33 ("One could... categorize[e] Al-Qaeda['s] attacks
as purely criminal and the response as law-enforcement activities that should be closely
disciplined by domestic civil liberties law and international human rights law. This
categorization would, however, defy the way all parties to the struggle conduct and define
it. It would also take one of the key armed conflicts of our time, conducted by military
means, out of the jurisdiction of the laws of war.").
329 See supra note 261.
330 See supra notes 276-277; cf supra notes 271-275 and accompanying text
(discussing factors identifying an internal armed conflict).
331 See Berman, supra note 97, at 5 n.9, 11-12; see also supra text accompanying note
281 (explaining the principle of equality of belligerents).
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requirements of lawful combatants, remain entitled to lesser protections under the
Conventions.332 Yet the existing paradigm does not contemplate an armed force
devoted to the commission of war crimes, the members of which have no interest
in ever complying with the rules of war but only in committing acts of terrorism. It
is one thing to invoke the equality of belligerents in international conflicts or
internal insurrections, where the justice of either cause may be simply in the eye of
the beholder-and where beholders will be found both inside and outside the
conflict. It is another thing entirely to invoke it on behalf of al Qaeda and other
transnational terrorist organizations, which are universally condemned by civilized
nations. 333 Even if their cause otherwise might be morally ambiguous or even
noble,334 their methods and their repudiation of any intention to comply with the
rules of war divest terrorists of any moral standing. Consequently, to apply the
equality of belligerents to terrorists may be a politically and legally intolerable step
too far down the path of moral equivalency.
Thus, the criminal and military models each have insights and shortcomings
in defining the nature of the terrorist threat. Neither model, standing alone,
addresses the threat fully and satisfactorily. But taken together, they provide the
conceptual tools for solving their respective problems. An integrated model takes
the best parts of each, and best addresses the issues involved.
C. Balancing the Significance of Personal Conduct and Group Affiliation
The confrontation with terrorism exists on two levels: the dangers posed by
individual terrorists and the particular activities they personally undertake, and the
threat posed by transnational terrorist organizations and the aggregate activities of
the group as a whole. The criminal and military models both address these two
aspects, seeking to strike the right balance between personal conduct and group
affiliation in defining terrorism.
When addressing an individual's direct, personal participation in terrorist
activity, the models are in basic agreement that holding the individual responsible
for the consequences of his personal conduct is justifiable and appropriate. In the
criminal model, a person may be convicted of a completed or attempted crime in
which she directly took part; a person also is guilty of the inchoate offense of
332 See DiNSTEIN, supra note 107, at 29-33; Berman, supra note 97, at 13-15; Jinks,
supra note 102, at 379; see also supra text accompanying note 139 (describing the limited
protections offered to unlawful combatants under the Conventions).
313 Cf S.C. Res. 1368, 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001) (stating that the
Security Council "[u]nequivocally condemns in the strongest terms the horrifying terrorist
attacks ... which took place on 11 September 2001 in New York, Washington, D.C. and
Pennsylvania and regards such acts, like any act of international terrorism, as a threat to
international peace and security").
131 Cf Berman, supra note 283, at 23-31 (discussing Protocol I's application to wars




conspiracy when she personally joins the conspiratorial agreement. In addition, a
person is guilty of an offense she did not personally commit if she nonetheless
directly and personally aided and abetted its commission by others.336 Similarly, in
the military model, an individual who takes up arms and personally participates in
hostilities is a combatant. 337 An individual's own personal conduct also may serve
as the basis for classifying him as an unlawful rather than lawful combatant, such
as when the individual soldier fails to comply with the principle of distinction.
338
And an individual who personally participates in a violation of the rules of war, or
who personally and substantially aids and abets a violation by others, may be
prosecuted and punished for his completed war crimes. 339 Thus, under either
model, assessing a person's fate based on her own direct, personal conduct is not
problematic.
The models begin to diverge when addressing the extent to which individuals
are responsible for the consequences of their membership in a group. In the
criminal model, all the members of a conspiratorial agreement are held vicariously
liable for offenses committed in furtherance of the agreement by any one or more
of them.340 This includes not only the specifically agreed to object offenses but
also any reasonably foreseeable Pinkerton offenses. 341 At least with respect to
particular conspiratorial groups, therefore, an individual's responsibility is
extensive. And members of a terrorist organization who provide generalized
assistance toward the organization's objectives, but are not involved in any
particular conspiratorial agreement and therefore have no vicarious liability,
nevertheless can be convicted of facilitation offenses.
342
In the military model, by contrast, responsibility for group membership is
more constrained. Membership in certain forms of armed groups may determine a
person's status as a combatant per se, or as an unlawful combatant per se, because
the characteristics of the group itself are dispositive on the relevant criteria.
343
Beyond the possible determination of combatant status, however, the individual
does not incur responsibility for group membership.344 Most importantly, there is
311 See supra notes 2-23 and accompanying text.
336 See supra notes 24-30 and accompanying text.
337 See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
338 See supra note 263.
339 See supra notes 123-125 and accompanying text.
340 See supra notes 25-30 an accompanying text.
341 See id
342 See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
14' For example, all persons who are members of the regular armed forces of a state
are combatants, regardless of their own actual role in the group. See supra note 114 and
accompanying text. Likewise, all persons who take part in hostilities as part of an armed
group without uniforms and emblems or command responsibility are unlawful combatants
because the group's non-compliance with GCPW requirements makes eligibility for lawful
combatant status impossible. See supra note 252.
344 See Danner & Martinez, supra note 119, at 114.
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no vicarious liability for war crimes based on membership alone; some extent of
individual participation is required.345 Unlike the criminal model's conspiracy, in
the military model, individuals are not held personally accountable for the specific
actions or misdeeds of other members of the armed group to which they belong.
Finally, the two models diverge significantly when addressing the
implications of an individual's loose affiliation or loyalty to a group of which he or
she is not a member. In the criminal model, facilitation liability reaches those
individuals who knowingly provide material support to terrorist organizations but
who lack any form of direct knowledge, purpose, or participation regarding any
specific terrorist objectives required to establish a conspiracy. 346 Individuals who
are not members of a terrorist organization can be convicted for facilitation just as
members can be, so long as they have the required actus reus and mens rea. Thus,
individuals who will never personally participate in anything remotely resembling
a terrorist attack, and who are not members of any terrorist group, nevertheless are
held criminally responsible for providing support to a group whose general
objectives they favor.
In the military model, on the other hand, such ties are insufficient to affect the
individual's status or responsibility. Only taking up arms, whether individually or
347as part of an armed group, makes a person into a combatant. Absent some
involvement in the conduct of hostilities, a person remains a noncombatant; that is,
348a noncombatant may render material support to combatants without being one.
Likewise, there is no vicarious or facilitation liability for rendering general support
to a group that engages in war crimes; accountability requires personal
involvement in specific crimes.
349
Thus, although there are some similarities in the ways the criminal and
military models balance personal conduct and group affiliation, there also are
significant differences. These differences provide further reason to integrate the
two models in defining the terrorist threat.
D. Consequences: Military Enemies and Criminal Defendants
The threat posed by al Qaeda and other transnational terrorist organizations
challenges both existing models. The criminal model fails to account for the ways
terrorism more closely resembles war than ordinary crime. By contrast, the
military model fails to account for the stark disparities between the terrorist threat
341 See, e.g., id. at 127-28 (explaining that command liability is not a form of strict
liability or vicarious liability).346 See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
347 Supra notes 114-117 and accompanying text.
348 See supra notes 115, 212-214 and accompanying text. For example, involvement
with weapons of war or military espionage qualifies as participation in hostilities but
rendering other forms of non-combat, "ordinary" assistance to combatants does not. See
supra note 254 and accompanying text.349 Supra note 123 and accompanying text.
2008] 1325
UTAH LAW REVIEW
and the traditional forms of armed conflict. Standing alone, neither model
adequately defines the terrorist threat.350 An integrated model, incorporating the
best insights and bolstering the shortcomings of each, is necessary to fully define
this threat.
The terrorist threat presents such a great challenge to the existing models
because al Qaeda is an entity far different from the paradigms at their cores. To
compare al Qaeda terrorists to local street gangs menacing a neighborhood or
armed bank robbers who initiate a shootout with police ignores the coordination
and resources al Qaeda devotes to carrying out a pattern of large-scale, high-
intensity attacks. 3 5 To compare al Qaeda to the regular armed forces of a state, or
even irregulars or militias, ignores not only the diffuse geographical and
organizational aspects of the group, which lacks the strict hierarchies and clearly
delineated membership rosters of traditional military forces, but also the equally
diffuse aspects of the conflict it wages, which is spatially and temporally
unpredictable and intermittent.352 Some organized crime families or drug
trafficking conspiracies may have extensive coordination and resources, and some
armed groups engaged in armed conflicts of resistance or insurrection may have an
amorphous membership. But such entities do not have as their constitutive purpose
the goal of waging war against the civilian populations of "enemy" nations
deliberately and expressly by means and methods of war crimes. Thus, an
integrated model is needed to define the al Qaeda threat.
The most effective way to define the nature of the threat is to determine when,
how, and why any given individual should be deemed to be part of the overall al
Qaeda terrorist threat. There are four possible categories of individuals who might
be held responsible as "terrorists." Examining each category from the perspective
of integrating the two models identifies the applicability and limits of each.
The broadest category would deem an individual to be a terrorist based upon
simple affiliation with al Qaeda, such as an oath of allegiance or a pledge of
loyalty. In other words, it is enough simply to carry a membership card, or
whatever its al Qaeda equivalent may be.
Both models suggest that this category is overbroad, so the integrated model
rejects it. The criminal model does not punish membership as such, in the sense of
351 Cf Berman, supra note 97, at 33 ("No matter which body of law one chooses, to
place this conflict within its sole jurisdiction seems to expand its conceptual framework
beyond reasonable bounds.").
351 See Jinks, supra note 98, at 37 ("The intensity, coordination, and pattern of al
Qaeda attacks against the United States make clear that the September 11 attacks were not
simply 'mere acts of banditry."' (citing COMMENTARY, supra note 259, at 35)); see also
Berman, supra note 97, at 57 ("[T]he maintenance of the legal construction of war requires
that we distinguish between combatants and criminal gangs, between people 'captured in
combat' and people 'arrested after a shootout with police,' with the unprivileged combatant
category a byproduct of the always contestable character of such distinctions.").352 See supra notes 242, 245, 277, 279 and accompanying text.
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pure affiliation or loyalty.3 53 It might be possible to draft a membership offense to
meet the constitutional requirements of the First Amendment, but Congress has not
done SO.354 This is unsurprising, due to the breadth of the facilitation offenses: a
fact pattern of mere membership, unaccompanied by anything further, rarely will
arise-and does not warrant criminal punishment if it does.355
The issue of simple affiliation is more complex in the military model, where
the question is whether al Qaeda qualifies as an armed force whose members are
combatants per se. While certain aspects of al Qaeda resemble a military force
engaged in armed conflict, other aspects do not. Given the ambiguities in its
characteristics, one conclusion is clear: it cannot be said definitively that al Qaeda
is directly comparable and equivalent to a traditional armed force. This suggests
that the military model, on its own terms, weighs against per se combatant status.
The contribution of the criminal model to the analysis tilts the scales even further,
353 Even the facilitation offenses do not reach pure membership disconnected from
any additional activity or intent. The § 2339D offense proscribes engaging in military-type
training for an FTO, which is a commitment of time and action beyond simple allegiance.
See supra note 57 and accompanying text. Similarly, the § 2339B offense includes
"personnel," including "providing" oneself, as a form of proscribed "material support or
resources" to an FTO. See supra notes 49, 58 and accompanying text. The plain meaning
suggests that mere loyalty is not covered, but rather that a person is "provided" to an FTO
only when they will serve an instrumental function as "support" or "resources" for the
organization, just as other listed "resources" like property, service, money, transportation,
lodging, expert advice, and weapons also are instrumental. See supra notes 48-49 and
accompanying text. A mere pledge of loyalty, unaccompanied by any other commitment of
action or intent, does not "provide" any usable "resource" or "support" to the FTO. In any
event, it does not appear that the Government has sought to charge § 2339B on a theory of
pure membership. See Chesney, supra note 47, at 68-71.
354 See Chesney, supra note 47, at 66-71. In Scales v. United States, the U.S. Supreme
Court upheld a conviction under the Smith Act, which had criminalized membership in the
Communist Party, against Due Process and First Amendment challenges. See Scales v.
United States, 367 U.S. 203, 220-30 (1961) (interpreting and applying 18 U.S.C. § 2385).
The Scales Court "identified two constitutionally required elements that must be present in
order to criminalize membership itself': that "the defendant was not merely a passive but
an active member of the organization" and "not only knew of but also specifically intended
to facilitate the organization's unlawful ends," which in the case of the Communist Party
was the violent overthrow of the U.S. government. Chesney, supra note 47, at 68
(discussing Scales, 367 U.S. at 220-28; see also NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458
U.S. 886, 920 (1982)) ("For liability to be imposed by reason of association alone, it is
necessary to establish that the group itself possessed unlawful goals and that the individual
held a specific intent to further those illegal aims."). A similar offense could be enacted in
the context of terrorism, proscribing active membership in al Qaeda or another
transnational terrorist organization with specific intent to contribute to the commission of
acts of terrorism by the group. See Chesney, supra note 47, at 81-82.
355 That is, the risk posed by the individual is so attenuated from the harms threatened




because it also counsels against heavy consequences for mere affiliation.
Accordingly, when the two models are integrated, the assertion that all members of
al Qaeda are combatants per se, necessarily and by reason of members alone, must
be rejected. Absent further, additional conduct on their part, members of al Qaeda
are noncombatants-and they are not criminals. An individual's allegiance or
loyalty to al Qaeda may be morally or politically troubling, but it should, by itself,
have no legal consequences. Such a person may be a terrorist sympathizer, but she
is not, without more, a terrorist.
By contrast, the narrowest category deems an individual to be a terrorist only
if he or she personally had direct involvement in the commission of a completed
terrorist attack. This category includes the persons who actually carried out the
attack, as well as those who aided and abetted it by personally assisting in the
planning or implementation of the offense. In addition to those active operatives,
the al Qaeda commanders and strategists who ordered, directed, managed, or
assisted the commission of an attack by their subordinates also fall into this
category.
The integrated model unequivocally allows such persons to be treated as
combatants who are military enemies subject to military authority. In the criminal
model, they could be convicted and punished for their roles in the completed
crimes that apply to the attack carried out. That is, the military model is not
necessary to deal with this category. Nevertheless, it is available-and
appropriate. Unlike many of the difficult questions about how the military model
applies to al Qaeda, classifying these persons as combatants is not complicated or
ambiguous. By personally taking part in hostilities, they have forfeited their
noncombatant status. As combatants, they may be targeted by military force or
detained as military prisoners.356 By personal involvement in a completed attack,
they also have become responsible for a war crime under the rules of war, for
which they are subject to punishment in a military proceeding.35 7 The application
of the laws of war and the military model to individuals in this category is
straightforward. Thus, the integrated model deems them to be terrorists who
qualify as combatants and war criminals, and who may be treated accordingly
under military authority.
The two remaining categories fall between these two poles on the spectrum of
involvement and participation in terrorist activities and organizations. One
category, somewhat narrower than mere membership, would deem an individual to
be a terrorist if he or she renders generalized assistance to al Qaeda's overall
endeavor. Affiliation alone is not enough; rather, some quantity of support or aid to
356 See supra Part II.A. 1.
357 See supra notes 110-111, 118-121 and accompanying text. As unlawful
combatants, such persons do not possess combatant immunity. See supra notes 114, 160
and accompanying text. This simply means, however, that they are eligible for prosecution
and punishment under the criminal model for whichever offenses are applicable to their
conduct during hostilities.
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the terrorist organization is needed. Yet the person need not know about, prepare
for, or take part in any particular al Qaeda operation or terrorist attack. Support for
the general operational activities of al Qaeda is sufficient.
The integrated model allows for the punishment of this category of
individuals through the criminal law, but it does not allow them to be subjected to
military authority. The criminal model already defines and punishes this conduct as
facilitation. Persons convicted for facilitation liability do not acquire any liability
for crimes related to participation in terrorist activities.358 Rather, the lack of more
specific knowledge or action renders them liable for the extent of their own
conduct: knowingly providing support to the generalized efforts of terrorists.
Under the military model, by contrast, facilitation is not a basis for attributing
combatant status to someone who otherwise is a noncombatant. 359 Facilitating a
terrorist organization generally is too far removed from personally taking up arms
in hostilities. Accordingly, the military model clearly counsels in favor of
facilitators remaining noncombatants. They remain subject to criminal prosecution
for the relevant facilitation crimes, of course, but they are not military enemies.
Thus, while these individuals are responsible for supporting terrorists, they do not
actually become terrorists themselves.
The final category applies to anyone more involved in terrorism than a
facilitator and who, therefore, has some degree of personal involvement in specific
terrorist activities. This category potentially includes a wide range of individuals,
from those who directly participate in attempted offenses to those who are a small
piece in a large conspiracy puzzle. What the persons in this category have in
common, however, is some identifiable personal participation in particular terrorist
plots, above and beyond generalized involvement or support.
The last category is the most difficult for the integrated model to resolve,
because it involves those situations with the greatest divergence between the
criminal and military models. The criminal model defines and punishes offenses
applicable to the full range of conduct in this category. Inchoate liability for
attempt reaches plots that are thwarted just short of completion, while inchoate
liability for conspiracy punishes the formation of the agreement to plan and
360commit an attack. Vicarious liability extends well beyond personally aiding and
abetting to all object and Pinkerton offenses of the conspiracy, completed or
attempted by any member of the group, even when an individual conspirator had
no personal involvement at all in the planning or commission of those offenses.3 61
Criminal liability, therefore, is extensive.
The military model, on the other hand, has much more ambiguous
applicability. Without a completed terrorist attack there is no war crime, so the
358 See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
359 See supra notes 114-115, 117 and accompanying text.
360 See supra notes 16, 22 and accompanying text.
361 See supra notes 25-30 and accompanying text.
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military model itself provides no basis for punishment.3 62 To the extent these
persons are deemed noncombatants, they remain subject to the criminal model
anyway. 363 Hence, the question is whether some or all of the individuals in this
category should be deemed combatants because their conduct is tantamount to
personally taking up arms in hostilities-specifically, as unlawful combatants
taking part in the hostilities carried out by al Qaeda in its armed conflict with the
United States.36 4 As unlawful combatants, they would not possess combatant
immunity; thus, to the extent they are prosecuted and punished, their responsibility
comes from the bases of liability provided in the criminal model.365 This does not
mean, however, that unlawful combatant status would have no consequences. As
combatants, these persons would be subject to targeting by military force and
366detention as military prisoners. They also could be subject, unlike
noncombatants, to prosecution and punishment for their crimes in a military
proceeding, rather than civilian courts.3 67 Therefore, the crucial determination is
which, if any, of the individuals in this category should be deemed unlawful
combatants subject to military authority.
The integrated model resolves this difficult question by concluding that only a
narrow subset of the individuals in this category should be deemed military
enemies rather than criminal defendants. Only those persons who are members of a
specific al Qaeda terrorist plot which poses the danger of an imminent terrorist
attack are subject to military authority. All other persons in this category are
subject to criminal prosecution for their crimes, but they may not be removed from
the ordinary civilian legal regime.
This narrow definition of military enemies follows from integrating the
existing criminal and military models. Under the criminal model, liability is
extensive for persons who have varying degrees of personal involvement in
specific terrorist activities above and beyond the generalized support punishable as
facilitation. But that liability comes from ordinary criminal law. The breadth and
depth of liability does not, standing alone, authorize any extraordinary treatment
of terrorists-after all, the extensive criminal liability rules applicable to terrorists
are equally applicable to all other criminals, such as drug traffickers, organized
crime syndicates, or identity thieves.
368
The argument for exceptional treatment for terrorists comes from the military
model and the analogy of terrorists to combatants in an armed conflict. As
362 See supra note 122.
363 See supra notes 135, 159, 166-167, 302, 356, and accompanying text (describing
combatant immunity from ordinary criminal prosecution possessed by lawful combatants,
and corresponding lack of immunity from ordinary criminal prosecution for unlawful
combatants and noncombatants).
364 See supra note 252.
365 See supra note 303 and accompanying text.
366 See supra notes 107-108 and accompanying text.
367 See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
368 See supra note 313 and accompanying text.
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explained above, the integrated model rejects the claim that membership in al
Qaeda, as such, imputes to an individual combatant status per se."' Under the
military model in its current form, therefore, the alternative definition of combatant
status is very narrow-personally taking up arms in hostilities. There is no
inchoate combatant status or vicarious combatant status. Individuals are
combatants when they are directly involved in the conduct of hostilities by
participating in armed combat or providing operational support such as weapons or
intelligence to those who do. All other persons are noncombatants, even those who
provide direct support to noncombat aspects of the war effort.37 °
The integrated model accommodates these competing frameworks in a new
model, which adapts aspects of each to the distinct threat posed by al Qaeda and
other transnational terrorist organizations. Expanding unlawful combatant status to
all persons responsible for terrorism offenses in the criminal model ignores the
important contribution of the military model. In less structured, more diffuse
conflicts like insurrections, civil wars, and terrorism, a high degree of personal
participation should be necessary to deem an individual to be an active combatant
at risk of reciprocal military violence, rather than a noncombatant subject to
civilian treatment and ordinary criminal law. Similarly, limiting unlawful
combatant status exclusively to those currently covered by the military model
ignores the significant contribution of the criminal model. In the context of the
threat of al Qaeda, terrorists who are on the cusp of committing a terrorist attack
create equally grave social harms and are deserving of punishments with severity
equal to those who actually carry out an attack.371
Integrating the two models, therefore, requires relaxing the stringent standard
of the existing military model to encompass the most dangerous threats identified
by the criminal model. First, terrorist unlawful combatants should include
individuals whose conduct fits the definition of attempt liability. But for being
thwarted by authorities or their own failures, such individuals would have carried
out their planned attack and committed completed offenses. The fortuity that they
failed to engage in their intended actual hostilities should not grant them the
windfall of noncombatant status, given that they clearly would have been
combatants had their intended-nearly successful-plot been carried out to
369 See supra notes 350-368 and accompanying text. Thus, to the extent that terrorists
are comparable to traditional combatants, the better comparison is to participants in a non-
international armed conflict, rather than the more organized armed groups in an
international conflict. See supra notes 252-253.370 See supra note 254 and accompanying text.
371 The only substantial limitation is that the death penalty is not available if no deaths
have resulted from the defendant's conduct; life sentences are available, however, for many
conspiracy offenses charged in terrorism cases. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 956(a)(2)(A) (2006)
(conspiracy to commit murder abroad); id. § 1117 (conspiracy to commit murder within
federal jurisdiction); id. § 2332a (conspiracy to use weapon of mass destruction); id. §




completion. Such individuals are so close to having engaged in actual hostilities
that they should be treated equivalently to those who do.
Second, terrorist unlawful combatants also should include persons whose
conduct has not reached the full extent of attempt liability, so long as the intended
terrorist attack is imminent. An attack is imminent in situations where the terrorists
have not yet set out to commit their attack, but where it is ready for commission
and can be carried out at any time of their choosing. An attack is imminent,
therefore, when planning and preparation are completed and the only factor not yet
present is the decision-or order-to go forward. As with attempted attacks,
persons ready to carry out an imminent attack are fully committed to engaging in
actual hostilities but have not yet done so only due to a fortuity of timing, such as
being arrested or captured before they could. They too are so close to having
engaged in actual hostilities that they should be treated equivalently as those who
did.
Third, this expanded scope of terrorist unlawful combatant status requires a
demonstrated connection between the specific terrorist plot and al Qaeda or
another transnational terrorist organization. The application of the military model
in the first place depends on the existence of hostilities equivalent or tantamount to
an armed conflict with a nonstate armed force under the international laws of war.
That is, it depends on the analogy between al Qaeda and various armed forces
recognized by international law-groups which include regular armed forces,
irregulars, militias, and organized resistance movements, but most especially
nonstate armed factions engaged in civil war or insurrection against a state. An
organized, group character of the participation in hostilities is necessary to apply
principles of armed conflict. Therefore, the integrated model requires a connection
to such a group, in the form of a transnational terrorist organization, for its
definition of terrorist unlawful combatant status.
Thus, in the last category of persons potentially defined as terrorists, the
integrated model allows only those persons who are members of a specific al
Qaeda terrorist plot posing the danger of an imminent terrorist attack to be deemed
terrorist unlawful combatants. Those persons are military enemies subject to
military authority. All other persons in the last category remain noncombatants
subject only to ordinary criminal law.
Taken together, the four categories provide the integrated model's definition
of the individuals who may be held responsible as terrorists. Combining the
analysis from the four categories reveals the integrated model's conclusions about
which persons should be deemed military enemies, and which must be criminal
defendants.
First, the great majority of individuals affiliated with al Qaeda and other
transnational terrorist organizations, even the great majority of those involved in
conspiracies to plan and commit particular terrorist attacks, must be treated as
criminal defendants. They may be held responsible for their participation in
terrorist activities, of course, to the extent they are culpable under ordinary
criminal law. But they present no extraordinary factors justifying the application of
military authority in dealing with them.
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Second, only a narrow range of al Qaeda members-those who have directly
participated in a completed terrorist attack or those who are directly participating
in a specific plot and are ready to commit an imminent attack-may be deemed
military enemies. These persons are unlawful combatants and may be treated as
such. They may be targeted by military force, detained as military prisoners, or
prosecuted and punished in military proceedings. By their personal participation to
this substantial degree in al Qaeda's activities of actually or imminently carrying
out terrorist attacks, they have become combatants in an armed conflict.
The practical implementation of the integrated model is straightforward.
High-level al Qaeda leaders, such as commanders and strategists, clearly are
military enemies. If they are captured alive, they may be detained as military
prisoners. Because such persons are responsible for directing, planning, and
ordering completed terrorist attacks, they may be prosecuted for the applicable war
crimes in military proceedings, as well as applicable civilian criminal charges. The
same is true for the operatives involved in particular completed terrorist attacks.
Operatives participating in attempted or imminent attacks likewise may be
detained as military prisoners or prosecuted in military proceedings, although the
lack of a completed attack means the charges will be civilian criminal offenses, not
372war crimes.
All other individuals affiliated with or involved in terrorism must be treated
exclusively as criminal defendants. Like other facilitators, for example, sleeper cell
operatives without a specific conspiratorial agreement must be tried and punished
as criminal defendants. Clandestine terrorist operatives with a specific
conspiratorial objective in the planning or preparation stages also must be treated
as criminal defendants. And unaffiliated terrorists who lack any connection to an
372 An alleged terrorist detained under military authority as a leader or eligible
operative may seek to contest the factual allegations supporting that designation. A U.S.
citizen detained in military custody may pursue a writ of habeas corpus petition to compel
the Government to make a substantial showing to justify military detention. See generally
Benjamin J. Priester, Return of the Great Writ: Judicial Review, Due Process, and the
Detention of Alleged Terrorists as Enemy Combatants, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 39 (2005)
(discussing procedural rights of U.S. citizens detained as enemy combatants). Aliens
detained in the United States, similarly, may file habeas challenges to indefinite detention.
See Priester, supra, at 76 n.165; see also Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 376 (2005)
(involving habeas corpus challenge to indefinite detention under immigration laws);
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 684-86 (2001) (same). Whether aliens detained in
military custody abroad may file habeas petitions in U.S. courts has been a controversial
question. See Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (discussing history of
litigation challenging Guantanamo detentions, including Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466
(2004), the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 1005(e), 119 Stat.
2680 (2005), Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006), and the Military Commissions
Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 7(a), 120 Stat. 2600 (2006)). The U.S. Supreme
Court's most recent decision on Guantanmo detainees was handed down in June 2008. See
Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008) (holding that Guantanamo detainees possess
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus to challenge their detention).
2008] 1333
UTAH LAW REVIEW
armed force engaged in hostilities, whether al Qaeda or another transnational
terrorist organization, must be criminal defendants, as well.
373
The integrated model provides a comprehensive framework for defining the
threat of al Qaeda and other transnational terrorist organizations. It serves the
objectives of prevention and punishment by drawing upon the insights of the
criminal and military models to reconcile their shortcomings. It also balances the
importance of personal conduct and group affiliation by reserving the most
substantial consequences for activities dependent on direct, personal involvement,
while remaining cognizant of the significant contribution to the nature of the
terrorist threat posed by the particular dangers of al Qaeda as a form of organized
armed force. Thus, the integrated model concludes that most individuals involved
in terrorism should be treated as criminal defendants, and only the most dangerous
direct participants should be deemed military enemies.
E. Other Implications of the Integrated Model
The integrated model has implications beyond defining the nature of the
terrorist threat. It also provides a framework for analyzing additional aspects of the
legal response to al Qaeda and other transnational terrorist organizations.
First, in addition to the substantive definitional analysis discussed above, the
integrated model also has consequences for a procedural analysis of the institutions
used to address the terrorist threat. Just as the integrated model resolves difficulties
in defining the terrorist threat generally, it equally would apply to questions raised
by the prosecution and punishment of individual alleged terrorists. For reasons
similar to its restrictive authorization of military authority against individuals
involved in terrorist activities, the integrated model would not authorize the
adoption of diminished procedural protections or reduced regularity in proceedings
against them. The criminal model's procedural requisites are significant, invoking
the full array of constitutional rights applicable to all criminal defendants.374 Even
373 In many cases, therefore, the important question will be whether the Government
can prove the individual's membership or participation in al Qaeda or another group. See
Watkin, supra note 106, at 34-44 (discussing difficulties in proving affiliation). Thus,
individuals who are inspired by the global jihad movement, but who have no actual
connection to any other participants therein-and accordingly have not drawn upon the
coordination or resources provided by transnational terrorist organizations-are the
equivalent not of al Qaeda operatives engaged in warfare, but of a handful of bandits who
mount an attack on a police station. See supra note 313.
174 See U.S. CONST. amends. V-VI (including, inter alia, the Jury Trial Clause,
Confrontation Clause, Compulsory Process Clause, and Due Process Clause); In re
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (holding that the Due Process Clause requires the
Government to proves it case beyond a reasonable doubt in criminal prosecutions); see also
3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE at 1089-1127 (3d ed. 2000 & Supp.
2007) (discussing the constitutional rights of criminal defendants at trial).
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in terrorism cases, these rights must be enforced. 375 Similarly, the existing
international laws of war also provide a high level of procedural protections when
proceedings to prosecute and punish individuals are instituted, even against
unlawful combatants.376 While the integrated model would allow certain terrorists
to be tried in military proceedings rather than civilian courts, it would reject the
denial of meaningful representation by counsel, the use of secret or classified
evidence the defense is precluded from confronting or contesting, or any other
substantial decrease in the procedural protections provided to accused terrorists
who are put on trial in either civilian or military courts.377
Second, the integrated model suggests several opportunities for adapting and
reforming federal criminal law to more carefully address the terrorist threat. Rather
than stretching the outer limits of conspiracy law principles or pushing the
boundaries of inchoate offense liability, facilitation offenses are better suited to
confronting the group affiliation aspects of the terrorist threat. By focusing on the
individual's conduct and state of mind in knowingly rendering general aid to
terrorist groups, facilitation offenses strike deep at the roots of support for
terrorism without requiring proof of specific involvement in particular terrorist
plots. Relying on facilitation offenses in such circumstances thus ensures that
culpable individuals are punished for what they have actually done, rather than
375 For example, the Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA) provides the
procedures that determine how to proceed in a criminal prosecution when classified
information is implicated in either the Government's or defendant's case. See 18 U.S.C.
app. 3 §§ 1-16 (2006). In certain situations, when necessary to protect the defendant's
interests, the court may order the disclosure of classified information, provide the
defendant with summaries or substitutions for that information, or even dismiss the
indictment. See id. § 6. Similarly, the Government's refusal to allow the defendant access
to potentially exculpatory national security information may violate the Compulsory
Process Clause. See United States v. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453, 471-76 (4th Cir. 2004)
(holding that denying the defendant access to three al Qaeda leaders held in military
custody as enemy combatants, who potentially could provide exculpatory testimony for the
defendant, violated Compulsory Process Clause), reh'g granted, United States v.
Moussaoui, 365 F.3d 292 (4th Cir. 2004).
376 See supra notes 137, 160, 181-183, and accompanying text.
377 Some commentators have proposed the creation of special courts to handle
terrorism cases. See, e.g., Jack L. Goldsmith & Neal Katyal, Op-Ed., The Terrorists' Court,
N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2007, at A19 (arguing for the creation of a special court to make
preventive detention determinations regarding accused terrorists); Glenn Sulmasy, Op-Ed.,
Momentum for a National Security Court, JURIST, July 13, 2007, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/
forumy/2007/07/momentum-for-national-security-court.php (arguing for creation of special
courts to hold criminal trials of terrorists); cf David Glazier, The "War on Terror":
Criminal Law Minus or Law of War Plus?, July 13, 2007, http://natseclaw.typepad.com!
natseclaw/2007/07/national-securi.html (criticizing both proposals). The integrated model
would not necessarily reject these proposals as another form of accommodation between
the criminal and military models, so long as the new judicial forum retained the same
stringent degree of procedural standards.
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trying to describe them as members of a broad or amorphously described
"conspiracy" that does not fit the facts. This increased focus on facilitation theories
of liability, however, suggests the need to enact more narrowly tailored gradations
of facilitation offenses. For example, an individual who knowingly provides
weapons or explosives to agents of an FTO for an undetermined future attack may
warrant conviction for a more severe offense than a person who knowingly
provides financial support to an FTO for general expenses. Similarly, members of
a terrorist sleeper cell who intend to personally plan and carry out a terrorist attack,
but currently lack any identifiable specific agreement, preparations, or objectives
to constitute a conspiracy, are considerably more dangerous than persons who are
willing to sacrifice nothing more to the cause than their money. Thus, just as
facilitators are differently culpable than conspirators, not all facilitators are equally
culpable, and the applicable facilitation offenses should reflect these different
degrees of dangerousness and extent of support. Finally, although unaffiliated
terrorists are not military enemies, they are a dangerous threat, and facilitating
them should also be a crime.
378
Third, the integrated model also suggests several possibilities for adapting and
reforming the international laws of war in response to the threat of transnational
terrorist organizations. The nature of the armed conflict with al Qaeda and similar
groups should be addressed on its own terms, rather than seeking to make it fit the
preexisting boxes of international and noninternational conflicts. Similarly, the
threat of transnational terrorist organizations has revived once again the difficult
and controversial questions of combatant and noncombatant status and the rules
applicable to the treatment of unlawful combatants. International agreement on
these issues may not be possible generally, much less in the context of terrorism,
but the need for adaptation and reform is undeniable. Most notably, however, the
principle of equality of belligerents should be directly confronted and soundly
rejected in the context of terrorism. No matter the seeming justifiability or arguable
nobility of the cause, transnational nonstate organizations waging conflict through
terrorism rightly bear the condemnation of the entire international community.
Unlike legally or morally ambiguous international or intrastate conflicts in which
all parties have an interest in according each other mutual respect under the laws of
war, terrorist groups that flout the very premises of the international laws of war
should be condemned by it.
378 The offense need not be coextensive with the current FTO offense in § 2339B, and
might address rendering support to individual terrorists or a particular group of terrorist
conspirators, rather than an organization on a government-maintained list. See supra note
95. Nonetheless, providing at least certain kinds of support (e.g., weapons or money) to
persons known to be involved in terrorist acts or plans (but without sufficient information
or intent to become a conspirator in any particular terrorist plot) is culpable action worthy
of criminal punishment, whether the persons aided are affiliated with an FTO or instead are
homegrown threats.
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V. CONCLUSION
The nature of the terrorist threat is not easy to define. In some ways terrorists
resemble traditional criminals, albeit criminals of a particularly dangerous sort. In
other ways terrorists resemble traditional combatants engaged in armed conflict
with an enemy nation. But each analogy has its flaws, because the threat posed by
al Qaeda and other transnational terrorist organizations is substantially different
from both paradigmatic criminal activity and paradigmatic military violence.
Accordingly, the existing principles and doctrines of U.S. federal criminal law
and the international laws of war cannot fully address the nature of the terrorist
threat. The criminal model presents one set of laws for defining the threat of
terrorism; the military model offers another. Each model, in its current form,
provides opportunities for pursuing the dual objectives of preventing terrorist
attacks from occurring and punishing individuals involved with planning or
committing acts of terrorism or with supporting the operations of terrorist
organizations.
While the criminal and military models each provide insights into the nature
of the terrorist threat, each also has shortcomings in defining it. Both models have
difficulty balancing the relative importance of personal conduct and group
affiliation when assessing the dangerousness and culpability of individual terrorists
or particular conspiracies and the broader organizations of which they are a part.
Thus, neither model standing alone adequately addresses all aspects of the
problem.
The solution is an integrated model combining the criminal and military
models into a unified, comprehensive framework for defining the threat of al
Qaeda and other transnational terrorist organizations. This integrated model
identifies which terrorists-and individuals with connections to terrorists or
terrorist organizations-should be treated as criminal defendants, and which
should be deemed military enemies subject to military authority. It pursues the
objectives of prevention and punishment by drawing upon the insights of the
criminal and military models to reconcile their respective shortcomings. The
integrated model also balances the importance of personal conduct and group
affiliation by reserving the most substantial consequences for activities dependent
on direct, personal involvement. But it also takes full account of the particular
dangers that exist because of al Qaeda's nature as a form of organized armed force,
and the substantial implications that holds for the nature of the terrorist threat. The
integrated model concludes that most individuals involved in terrorism should be
treated as criminal defendants and only the most dangerous direct participants
should be deemed military enemies. In this way, the integrated model resolves the
problems of the existing criminal and military models and fully addresses the
threat posed by al Qaeda and other transnational terrorist organizations.
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